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THE MECHANISMS OF MARKET EFFICIENCY*
Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman**

O

F all recent developments in financial economics, the efficient
capital market hypothesis ("ECMH") has achieved the widest
acceptance by the legal culture. It now commonly informs the academic literature on a variety of topics;1 it is addressed by major
law school casebooks and textbooks on business law; 2 it structures
* Copyright 0 1983 by Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman.
** The authors are, respectively, Professor of Law, Stanford University, and Assistant

Professor of Law, Yale University. Gilson's research for this article was supported in part by
the Stanford Legal Research Fund, made possible by a bequest from the estate of Ira S.
Lillick, and by gifts from friends of the Stanford Law School. Both authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Yale Law School and the Stanford Law School Law and Eco-

nomics Program.
We are grateful to David Baron, Lucian Bebchuk, Michael Bradley, Dennis Carlton,
Daniel Fischel, Henry Hansmann, Thomas Jackson, Douglas Leslie, Henry Manne, Robert
Mnookin, Mitchell Polinsky, Roberta Romano, Katherine Schipper, Myron Scholes, Kenneth Scott, Joel Seligman, Edward Sherry, Steven Sheffrin, Oliver Williamson, and to participants in the Yale Law School Civil Liability Workshop for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1 See, e.g., H. Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a Purpose 83-139 (1979) (disclosure under the federal securities laws); Barry, The Economics of
Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1307, 1330-59 (1981) (disclosure
under the federal securities laws); Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 722 (1976) (fiduciary duty of
portfolio managers as trustees); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
Yale L.J. 698, 723-31, 729 & n.84 (1982) (freezeouts of minority shareholders); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1978) (regulation of tender offers); Lorie, Insider Trading.
Rule 10b-5, Disclosure, and Corporate Privacy- A Comment, 9 J. Legal Stud. 819 (1980)
(insider trading); Note, A Reconsideration of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting
Shareholder's Right of Appraisal, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1023, 1040-44 (1976) (shareholder rights
in corporate acquisitions).
2See, e.g., W. Klein, Business Organization and Finance: Legal and Economic Principles
241-43 (1980); R. Posner & K. Scott, Economics of Corporation Law and Securities Regulation 155-94 (1980); R. Pozen, Financial Institutions: Cases, Materials and Problems on Investment Management 139-86 (1978); D. Ratner, Institutional Investors: Teaching Materials
67-95 (1978); L. Soderquist, Securities Regulation: A Problem Approach 173-77 (1982); L.
Solomon, R. Stevenson & D. Schwartz, Corporations Law and Policy: Materials and
Problems 431-53 (1982). There remain exceptions. See, e.g., R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials xix-xx (5th ed. 1982) ("[S]pace does not permit, nor
are we convinced of the utility of, the inclusion of diverse and irreconcilable economic opin-

550

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 70:549

debate over the future of securities regulation both within and
without the Securities and Exchange Commission;3 it has served as
the intellectual premise for a major revision of the disclosure system administered by the Commission; 4 and it has even begun to
influence judicial decisions 5 and the actual practice of law.' In
short, the ECMH is now the context in which serious discussion of
the regulation of financial markets takes place.
Yet the legal culture's remarkably rapid and broad acceptance of
an economic concept that did not exist twenty years ago7 is not
matched by an equivalent degree of understanding. The disparate
ways in which the legal culture employs the ECMH share a single,
ions which might have some bearing on the legal problems presented.").
3 See, e.g., Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 644-47 (House Comm. Print 95-29, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Report]; H. Kripke, supra note 1.
I In the Release proposing its new integrated disclosure system, the Commission stated
that "the new concept of integration also proceeds from the observation that information is
regularly being furnished to the market through periodic reports under the Exchange Act
....
To the extent that the market accordingly acts efficiently ... there seems little need
to reiterate this information in a prospectus . . . ." Securities Act Release No. 6235, Proposed Comprehensive Revision to the System for Registration of Securities Offerings, [1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,649, at 83,484. See also Executive Summary
of Securities Act Release Nos. 6331-38, Proposed Rulemaking to Implement the Integrated
Disclosure System [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 83,016, at 84,479 ("Proposed Form S-3 relies on the efficient market theory . .
").
' See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 633 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981); Seaboard World Airlines v. Tiger
International, 600 F.2d 355, 362 (2d Cir. 1979); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th
Cir. 1975); In re Ramada Inn Securities Litigation, 550 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (D. Del. 1982);
In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
6 See, e.g., Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving
Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1, 3-5, 4 n.9 (1982) (suggesting applications of
theory to cases); Pickholz & Horahan, The SEC's Version of the Efficient Market Theory
and Its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 29 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 943 (1982) (describing
recent cases and suggesting reassessment of securities law liabilities in terms of efficient
market theory).
7J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence 80 (1973). The first
of the modern empirical tests that underlie the ECMH, see infra text accompanying note 25,
was published in 1959, although earlier research anticipating the same result dates back to
1900. J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, supra, at 71-72. It was not until the mid-1960's, however, that
scholars fully specified the implications these tests held for informational efficiency. J. Lorie
& M. Hamilton assign credit for full specification of this link to Benoit Mandelbrot and
Paul Samuelson. Id. See Mandelbrot, Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and
"Martingale" Models, 39 J. Bus. 242 (1966); Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated
Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 Indus. Mgmt. Rev., Spring 1965, at 41. Yet full elaboration of
the ECMH, as it is now conventionally employed, should probably be traced to Eugene
Fama's seminal review article, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. Fin. 383 (1970).
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and to us critical, commonality. They rest on legal and policy implications derived from the ECMH (particularly in its semi-strong
form) without serious attention to how these implications depend
on a more preliminary question: What makes the market efficient
when it appears to be so? 8
This fixation on the fact of market efficiency has also characterized much of the financial economics literature on the ECMH.
Professor Jensen has stated that "there is no other proposition in
economics which has more empirical evidence supporting it than
the efficient markets hypothesis." 9 Despite certain anomalies, 10 numerous studies demonstrate that the capital market responds efficiently to an extraordinary variety of information.1 Indeed, in the
single area of financial accounting data, even the number of
surveys of empirical studies of capital market efficiency is substantial.1 2 But this outpouring of empirical research demonstrating
market efficiency has greatly outpaced efforts to explain the phenomenon. As Professor Beaver recently acknowledged, a theory is
8 For a notable exception see Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309, 335-37 (discussing
insider trading and stock prices).
Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. Fin. Econ. 95, 95
(1978).
'0For a discussion of recent evidence that the market may not respond with total efficiency to certain novel or ambiguous forms of public information, see infra text accompanying note 205. In addition, recent studies of the volatility of securities prices have proven
difficult to reconcile with both the ECMH and existing models of equilibrium market prices.
See, e.g., S. Sheffrin, Rational Expectations 141-46 (1983) (reviewing studies); Shiller, Do
Stock Prices Move Too Much To Be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71
Am. Econ. Rev. 421, 421 (1981). These studies pose difficult interpretative problems in their
own right. See Leroy, Efficiency and the Variability of Asset Prices, 74 Am.Econ. Rev 183
(1984). Yet even if problems are finally resolved against current formulations of the ECMH,
"the basic insights of the efficient markets literature [would] still remain." S. Sheffrin,
supra, at 123. No one suggests, for example, that the market does not respond efficiently to
easily interpreted forms of public information, see infra text accompanying note 26. Indeed,
a satisfactory theoretical account of the ECMH empirical tests would be the natural starting
point for analysis of the recent, and still tentative, volatility literature.
" This literature is surveyed infra note 26.
22 See, e.g., G. Foster, Financial Statement Analysis (1978); P. Griffin, Usefulness to Investors and Creditors of Information Provided by Financial Reporting: A Review of Empirical Accounting Research (1981). One of the early researchers in this area recently wrote that
when "asked to do a paper surveying empirical research in accounting, I found it difficult to
believe that the world needed yet another survey on this topic." Kaplan, The Information
Content of Financial Accounting Numbers: A Survey of Empirical Evidence in The Impact
of Accounting Research on Practice and Disclosure 134, 134 (A. Abdel-Khalik & T. Keller
eds. 1978).
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needed to "complement the predominantly empirical tradition of
efficient market research. . .. The empirical findings have largely
preceded a formal, conceptual development of market efficiency."1 3
Thus, legal users of the ECMH literature have been, by and large,
confronted with a body of empirical evidence in search of a causative theory.
In recent years, however, financial economists have found the
absence of an explanation for market efficiency increasingly troubling. To be sure, the phenomenon of market efficiency is easily explained under perfect market assumptions-for example, that information is immediately and costlessly available to all
participants in the capital market. But this explanation is, in the
words of a joke commonly directed at both lawyers and economists, "absolutely accurate and totally useless." 14 In commenting
on Fama's seminal review article on market efficiency, 5 Professor
Sharpe has made precisely this point: "Simply put, the thesis is
this: in a well-functioning market, the prices of ... securities win
reflect predictions based on all relevant and available information.
This seems almost trivially self-evident to most professional economists-so much so, that testing seems almost silly."' 6 What makes
the ECMH non-trivial, of course, is its prediction that, even
though information is not immediately and costlessly available to
all participants, the market will act as if it were.

"3Beaver, Market Efficiency, 56 Acct. Rev. 23, 24 (1981). See Figlewski, Market "Efficiency" in a Market with Heterogeneous Information, 86 J. Pol. Econ. 581, 596 (1978) ("Discussions of the efficient-markets model seldom specify precisely how the market processes
information to produce a price that accurately discounts it."); Verrecchia, On the Theory of
Market Information Efficiency, 1 J. Acct. & Econ. 77, 77 (1979) ("Despite the substantial
empirical evidence in support of the efficient market hypothesis, information efficiency has
proved difficult to interpret in a compelling way .... ."). These commentators refer to the
lack of a causative theory of market efficiency. Beginning with Samuelson's pioneering
work, supra note 7, economists have offered formal models whose efficiency is explainable.
"' The story usually begins with two people in a hot air balloon who discover they have
lost their way. They notice someone on the ground and call out, "Where are we?"
Unhesitatingly the ground observer responds, "You're in a balloon."
At this point one balloonist turns to the other and says, "He must be a lawyer
(economist)."
"How can you tell?" the second passenger asks.
"It's easy," the first responds. "What he said was absolutely accurate and totally useless."
" Fama, supra note 7.
Sharpe, Discussion, 25 J. Fin. 418, 418 (1970). Professor Beaver has made a similar
point more recently- "Why would one ever expect prices not to 'fully reflect' publicly available information? Won't market efficiency hold trivially?" Beaver, supra note 13, at 32.
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The challenge of explaining why the market can behave efficiently despite the fact that information-even publicly "available" information-is costly to obtain and process, has led financial
economists to formulate models of market mechanisms that, under
carefully specified circumstances, can cause the capital market to
act as if everyone were costlessly informed even though they are
not. 17 But although these models are all intuitively persuasive, they
nonetheless differ in important respects in their specification of
how the capital market achieves efficient prices. Thus, despite the
substantial progress that has been made, we still lack a single,
comprehensive explanation for the existence of market efficiency.
The absence of such a unified explanation of market efficiency
presents a serious problem for those judges, lawyers, and regulators
who would rely upon the ECMH as the basis for judicial or regulatory policy making. When market efficiency serves as a basis for
reform-as it has done, for example, for recent changes in the disclosure requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission 1s-before we clearly understand why the capital markets are
efficient in the first place, we risk interfering with the very condition that originally made reform desirable. On a more positive
note, an understanding of the mechanisms of market efficiency
should allow the design of more effective reform.
In this article, we propose a general explanation for the elements
that lead to-and limit-market efficiency. Our analysis integrates
not only the disparate capital market mechanisms that appear in
the financial economics literature, but also the interaction between
these mechanisms and the information market, which we believe is
central to an understanding of capital market efficiency."9 Focusing on the information market, in turn, allows us to draw on another body of recent literature whose significance for the analysis
of market efficiency has only recently become apparent. This is the
1'7We discuss these models in detail in Section II.

" See supra note 4.
19Others have made this point. See T. Copeland & J. Weston, Financial Theory and Corporate Policy 198-204, 210-11 (1979); Gonedes, The Capital Market, The Market for Information, and External Accounting, 31 J. Fin. 611, 628 (1976). They have not, however, pursued the insight in search of an integrated explanation of capital market efficiency. In a
more limited context, Campbell and Kracaw have recognized the need for simultaneous
equilibria in both the capital market and the market for information in order to explain the
informational role of financial intermediaries. Campbell & Kracaw, Information Production,
Market Signalling, and the Theory of Financial Intermediation, 35 J. Fin. 863, 865 (1980).

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 70:549

literature that details the role of transactions costs in shaping market arrangements.2 0
We begin in Section I with a necessary preliminary: clarifying
precisely what is meant by the term market efficiency. Section II
then surveys the several capital market mechanisms that have
been offered as explanations for market efficiency. We argue that,
rather than being alternatives, these market mechanisms are all
potentially operative. Which mechanism operates with respect to a
particular piece of information, and, ultimately, how efficient the
capital market is with respect to that information, depends upon
the initial distribution of the information among traders. This focus on the distribution of information as a determinant of capital
market efficiency sets the stage for consideration in Section In of
the structure of the market for information. Here, we argue that
the distribution of information among traders is a function of information costs, and that many familiar market institutions, such
as investment banks, serve the function of reducing information
costs, and thereby facilitate efficiency in the capital market. Section IV completes a synthesis of the workings of the capital and
information markets and demonstrates its value by analyzing two
theoretical problems: the role of investment bankers in achieving
market efficiency; and the persistance of an efficient market response to some forms of information despite the constraint that
traders must earn a return on their investment in information. Finally, Section V examines the implications of our synthesis for two
current policy issues: the role of insider trading as a means of
achieving more accurate securities prices; and the implications of
empirical studies intended to demonstrate that compulsory disclosure by issuers under the Securities Exchange Act of 193421 has not
benefited investors.

I.

PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS

The language of efficient capital market theory reveals its origins as a vocabulary of empirical description. The common definition of market efficiency, that "prices at any time 'fully reflect' all
available information, ' 22 is really a shorthand for the empirical
We discuss this literature infra text accompanying notes 157-63.
15 U.S.C. § 78a-kk (1982).
22 Fama, supra note 7, at 383.
20

21
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claim that "available information" does not support profitable
trading strategies or arbitrage opportunities. 3 Similarly, Eugene
Fama's landmark 1970 review article first proposed the now-familiar division of the ECMH into "weak," "semi-strong," and
"strong" forms as a device for classifying empirical tests of price
behavior.2 4 Weak form tests examined the claim that the histories
of securities prices could not yield lucrative trading opportunities. 15 Semi-strong form tests probed the same prediction about
categories of publicly available information of obvious interest to
investors.26 Finally, strong form tests examined the extension of
the hypothesis to information that was available only to particular
-2 Unless its key terms are specified, this definition lacks empirical value. See id. at 38485. Its ambiguities are innocuous, however, so long as it is identified with arbitrage opportunity tests.
24 Id. at 383, 388. Fama credited Harry Roberts with distinguishing weak and strong form
tests. Id. at 383 n.1.
2 Id. at 389-96 (review of tests).
Numerous weak form tests support the hypothesis that the history of securities prices
does not yield exploitable trading opportunities. For overviews supplementing the Fama review, see K. Garbade, Securities Markets 241-49 (1982); J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, supra note
7, at 75-82. Generally, these tests take two forms: serial correlation analyses, which establish
little or no relationship between changes in securities prices over successive periods, K. Garbade, supra, at 241-47; and analyses of "filter rule" trading strategies, which reject the possibility that trading on more complex patterns of price movements of the sort employed by
"chartists" can yield abnormal returns, id. at 247-49. See E. Fama, Foundations of Finance,
Portfolio Decisions and Securities Prices 139-41 (1976). See also K. Garbade, supra, at 241
(varieties of weak form tests); Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. 34, 45
(1965) (results or correlation tests covering 30 stocks over five-year period); Fama & Blume,
Filter Rules and Stock-Market Trading, 39 J. Bus. 226 (1966) (extensive testing of filter
rules). For a review of the simple assumptions about market pricing behavior that underlie
these tests, see E. Fama, supra, at 149-51.
2 Fama, supra note 7, at 383, 404-09 (reviewing empirical tests).
Studies of semi-strong form efficiency are tests of how long market prices require to adjust to price-relevant information that is released to the public. These studies typically ask
whether trading activity that follows the release of such information can earn investors abnormally high returns and focus on the security's price history before and after the test
period. See K. Garbade, supra note 25, at 250. The discovery of abnormal returns indicates
trading opportunities and, therefore, possible market inefficiency. The results thus far indicate efficient price responses to a wide variety of publicly released information, ranging
from earning reports and dividend announcements to accounting changes, stock splits, press
evaluations, and even changes in Federal Reserve Board policy. For representative surveys
with which to supplement the Fama review, see T. Copeland & J. Weston, supra note 19, at
222-44; G. Foster, supra note 12, at 332-59; K. Garbade, supra note 25, at 249-59; Kaplan,
supra note 12, at 134-51, 156-62, 166-68. Not all semi-strong form tests indicate market
efficiency, however. See infra note 205 (citing studies finding inefficiencies). We discuss in
Section IV the implications that these atypical results hold for the distinction between weak
and semi-strong form tests.
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groups of privileged investors.17 In this usage, the weak, semistrong, and strong form categories have proved both useful and
precise. The hypothesized dearth of arbitrage opportunities,
whatever its explanation, clearly grows in strength with each successive genre of test. The more private the information, the more
intuitively reasonable the proposition that one might profit by
trading on it, and so the stronger the opposing claim that such
profitable trading is impossible.
Over time, however, scholars have pressed the weak, semi-strong,
and strong form categories beyond their original service as a classification of empirical tests into more general duty as a classification
of market responses to particularkinds of information.For example, prices might be said to incorporate efficiently one genre of information that is semi-strong or public, but fail to reflect another
that is strong form, or non-public. Indeed, taken a step further,
scholars sometime describe markets themselves as weak, semistrong, or strong form efficient."' Without ever being quite explicit,
this powerful shorthand implies that different market dynamics
217Fama, supra note 7, at 409-13 (reviewing strong form tests).

Unlike weak and semi-strong form tests, which probe for trading opportunities that might
arise from particular kinds of information, see supra notes 25-26, strong form studies cannot
test for analogous opportunities arising from the generation of non-public information because investigators are unlikely to learn about such information (or if they do, they are
unlikely to employ it for research purposes). For this reason, strong form tests must probe
indirectly for trading opportunities arising from non-public information. Such tests seek to
identify investors who are likely to possess non-public information and to determine
whether these traders consistently earn net returns higher than the market average. The
results have been mixed. Corporate insiders, such as officers, directors and affiliated bankers, systematically outperform the market. So do specialists on the major stock exchanges
who possess non-public information about unexecuted investor orders. See, e.g., Baesel &
Stein, The Value of Information: Inferences from The Profitability of Insider Trading, 14 J.
Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 553 (1981) (corporate insiders); Lorie & Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 J.L. & Econ. 35, 52-53 (1968) (corporate insiders); Niederhoffer & Osborne, Market Making and Reversal on the Stock Exchange, 61 J. Am. Stat. A. 897 (1966) (exchange specialists). Mutual funds, however, appear
to outperform the market only well enough to cover administrative and trading costs. See
Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23 J. Fin. 389, 418
(1968); Mains, Risk, the Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios: Comment, 50 J. Bus. 371, 384 (1977) (reanalyzing Jensen data and noting that Jensen's
conclusion that mutual funds were inferior performers should be revised to call them neutral performers). For discussion of these results, see infra text accompanying notes 70-72.
28 See, e.g., K. Garbade, supra note 25, at 241, 249-50, 259-60 (1982) ("weak," "semistrong," and "strong form" efficient markets defined); Figlewski, supra note 13, at 582 ("A
market is weakly efficient if the current price . . . discounts the information contained in
the history of past market prices.").
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are involved in the reflection of different kinds of information into
price, and that varying degrees of market efficiency might well be
the consequence.
The recognition that different market mechanisms operate on
different types of information is central to our analysis of market
efficiency. But before we explore this conclusion in greater detail,
it is first necessary that we define the key terms of the ECMH, and
that we do so conceptually rather than operationally. Four basic
concepts are critical. Two of these are encompassed within the operational definition of market efficiency: that prices "fully reflect"
all "available" information. The third inheres in the expanded use
of the weak, semi-strong, and strong form categories to describe
price response to different kinds of information. We need a concept of "relative efficiency" that distinguishes among and ranks
the different market dynamics according to how closely they approximate the ideal of ensuring that prices always fully reflect all
available information. Finally, we need a working definition of the
most basic concept of all, that of "information," in order to specify
the processes by which price comes to reflect not only the actual
occurrence of events, but also changes in perceptions of the
probability of future events.
It is our good fortune here, as at several junctures in this analysis, to have at hand prior work that provides major elements of the
theoretical structure required by our discussion. The ambiguities
inherent in the loose operational terminology of efficient market
theory have led several commentators, including Beaver, 9 Rubinstein,30 and Fama himself,3 1 to propose restatements of the basic
price-oriented definition of market efficiency. Their efforts have
focused on clarifying the first two concepts, that prices "fully reflect" all "available information." Following Beaver's analysis, the
requirement that prices "fully reflect" information means that
prices must behave "as if everyone knows" the relevant information. 2 Full reflection of information, then, entails a hypothetical
2 Beaver, supra note 12, at 27-31.

3'Rubinstein, Securities Market Efficiency in an Arrow-Debreu Economy, 65 Am.Econ.
Rev. 812, 812 (1975).
" E. Fama, supra note 24, at 134-37; Fama, supra note 7, at 384-88.
32 Beaver, supra note 12, at 28. Beaver attributes this definition to William Sharpe and
notes its similarity to the proposals of Rubinstein, supra note 30, and Beja. Beaver, supra
note 12, at 28 n.11.
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identity between two equilibria in the same market: the equilibrium that would result if everyone knew the information, and the
equilibrium that is actually observed. The market is efficient if
(and when) the two equilibria are identical.3 The effect of this reformulation is to shift our attention away from the operational
consequences of efficiency for traders and toward the challenge of
describing the market processes of price formation.
By contrast, the second basic concept embodied in the operational definition of market efficiency, that prices mirror all available information, is less in need of reformulation than of expansion.
The availability of information is a function of its distribution
among traders in a given market. Different "bits" of information
are more or less "available" depending on how many traders are
aware of them.3 Thus, the strength of the claim that prices fully
reflect all available information hinges in large part on where one
sets the minimum threshold of information distribution. Strong
form market efficiency tacitly sets the threshold as low as possible,
by describing information as "available" if it is accessible to only a
single individual even if no one actually trades on it. The consequence, as Fama has observed, is an "extreme null hypothesis"
that cannot literally be true. 5 Weak form market efficiency, on the
other hand, implicitly sets the distributional threshold as high as
possible. Information about prices in the recent past, for example,
is likely to be distributed to all traders in a single market. Indeed,
for traders who are continuously active in the market, the distribution of this type of information may follow from the fact of trading
itself.
. Because different distributions may place information
anywhere
between these extremes of high and low "availability" to traders,
our concern must be with particular categories or "sets" of infor-

One critical attribute of the Sharpe-Beaver definition is that it imposes few restrictions
on the beliefs of individual traders. It can be interpreted to require a "consensus" among
traders about the price import of new information, but it does not require actual homogeneity of belief. Id. at 29-30. For a review of alternative definitions of market efficiency, see id.
at 30-31.
Id. at 28.

The distribution of information among traders, in turn, is a function of its cost. See
infra text accompanying notes 143-67. Because the cost of information is determined by
factors outside the capital market, we postpone its discussion for now. See infra Part III
(The Information Market).
35 Fama, supra note 7, at 388.
34
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mation rather than with information in general. An efficient market response to one information set does not necessarily mean that
the market will respond efficiently to a different set; it may or may
not, depending on the analytical framework that informs our initial
partitioning of information sets. For example, Fama's original tripartite classification of efficiency tests explicitly permits differentially efficient market responses to the information sets sampled
by each category of test.36 This classification also implies, however,
that a finer partitioning of the three information sets should not
yield a hitherto untested, anomalous subset that can support lucrative trading opportunities.3 7 It is this tacit recognition-that the
weak, semi-strong, and strong form tests each sample a particular
information set with potentially unique efficiency characteristics-that permits the expansion of the weak, semi-strong, and
strong form trichotomy into a shorthand system for partitioning
information sets. The additional use of the trichotomy as a means
of classifying markets only highlights further the implicit assumption that different information sets implicate their own processes
of price formation and their own efficiency dynamics.
In clarifying the operational definition of market efficiency-that prices fully reflect all available information-we have
suggested that different market mechanisms may be responsible
for the reflection in price of differentially available categories of
information. Differences among market mechanisms will matter,
however, only if these mechanisms operate with unequal results.
We still require a measure of success-a yardstick of "relative efficiency"-in order to assess the importance of differences in the
mechanisms of price formation.
The formal definition of informationally efficient prices does not
provide such a yardstick. To say, without more, that sooner or
later prices will reflect certain information only describes the

" Fama, supra note 7.
For example, generalizations about the results of weak form tests imply confidence that
additional studies of new and more elaborate filter rules, see supra note 25, will not reveal
market inefficiency.
A more precise delimitation of information sets distinguishes between "signal" and "information" sets. The former consists only of an observed signal; the latter consists of all information, including nonobservable information of the type that is sampled by the signal. The
point of the distinction is that the market may be efficient with respect to the narrower set
but not with respect to the broader set. See Beaver, supra note 13, at 28-30.
37
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endpoint of a process that by itself is not very interesting or surprising.3s We learn something by fixing this endpoint, of course:
that the price disequilibrium generated by new information 9 ultimately evolves to a new equilibrium with the same efficient prices
that would result if all traders initially possessed the new information. But this description of the restoration of efficient prices ignores all aspects of the process itself, including the most critical:
How long does it take?
The operational definition of market efficiency tightly restricts
the speed of the market's response to new information by requiring
40
prices to reflect such information "always"-i.e., very promptly.
It is a short step from this emphasis on the rapidity of price response to a definition of "relative efficiency." The market, and the
mechanisms that operate to reflect new information in price, are
more or less efficient depending on how quickly they yield efficient
equilibrium prices; relative efficiency is a measure of the speed
with which new information is reflected in price. Similarly, the relative efficiency of market mechanisms determines the magnitude
of arbitrage opportunities that new information creates for the fortunate traders who "know" it first. The requirement that prices
always reflect new information means, in effect, that these mechanisms must function rapidly enough to foreclose any exploitable
trading opportunities. This result is the benchmark against which
claims of market efficiency are ordinarily measured. Thus, when
we speak simply of the "efficiency" with which market mechanisms incorporate information into price, we will use this term in
its relative sense.
The final and most difficult concept that requires clarification is
As Beaver has observed:
Unless individuals are characterized as throwing away something of value, information is not used because it is costly. Yet much of the empirical research has examined
market efficiency with respect to publicly available information ....
Why would one
ever expect prices not to "fully reflect" publicly available information? Won't market
efficiency hold trivially?
W. Beaver, Financial Reporting: An Accounting Revolution 158 (1981). He notes, however,
that differences might exist because of information costs. Id.
39 See Hirschleifer & Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information-An Expository Survey, 17 J. Econ. Lit. 1375, 1411-14 (1979).
40 In addition to the speed of the market's adjustment, we will consider the shape of the
path it takes to the new equilibrium. Specifically, we will ask whether the speed of adjustment is constant or whether it varies at different stages of the adjustment. See infra text
accompanying notes 127-30.
"
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that of information. In the broadest sense, information is data that
has the capacity to alter one's beliefs about the world or, in our
more limited context, one's beliefs about the appropriate price of
an asset. For our purposes, however, it is useful to distinguish between two different types of information bearing on asset price:
the "hard" information of known facts, and the "soft" information
of forecasts and estimates.
The fact-forecast dichotomy rests on a distinction between the
fixed past and the uncertain future. Imagine a trader who enjoyed
absolutely certain knowledge about all past or present events that
bore on the pricing of securities. This knowledge would include all
the hard facts, which would be known with certainty precisely because they concerned events or outcomes that had already occurred. But even this fully informed trader would lack a type of
information critical to price determination. Because securities
prices ultimately turn on expectations about future earnings, hard
information, in this wholly certain sense, would hardly be the only
information of interest. Even a trader fully informed about the
past would wish to have access to optimal forecasts about future
events that seemed likely to affect future cash flows. 41 And because

41 Put somewhat differently, the valuation of a capital asset is itself a master forecast of a

future earnings stream, which builds on facts (e.g., last year's reported profits) and subsidiary forecasts (e.g., next year's expected profits). Valuation, then, is a two stage process,

involving both the acquisition of relevant facts and forecasts and their use in estimating an
appropriate market price.

Models of equilibrium market prices, including the widely-accepted capital asset pricing
model (CAPM), necessarily make simplifying assumptions about both the acquisition and
the processing of information. For example, the CAPM is a "two-factor" model
that-supported by considerable empirical evidence-posits that the only forecasts relevant

to determining a security's equilibrium price concern its systematic risk and expected returns. See Jensen, Tests of Capital Market Theory and Implications of the Evidence, in
Handbook of Financial Economics 13, 37 (J. Bicksler ed. 1979). To explain discrepancies in
the empirical results, however, one might suppose that factors other than systematic risk

and expected return have an effect on share prices, without attempting to explain why they
do so. See, e.g., J. Van Home, Financial Management and Policy 70-71 (6th ed. 1983); Ross,
The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing, 13 J. Econ. Theory 341 (1976) (discussing

need for additional assumptions).
Similarly, the CAPM assumes homogeneity of beliefs about systematic risk on the part of
traders, which in our terms means the acquisition of identical facts and forecasts. J. Van
Home, supra, at 66. By definition there is homogeneity of beliefs in a world of fully in-

formed investors. In actual markets, however, investors may acquire different information
and make different forecasts. The basic tenets of the CAPM remain valid when these differ-

ences are moderate. Id. (impact of moderate homogeneity is to make the capital market
line-the relationship between expected return and systematic risk--"fuzzy"). Where heter-
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of the inherent complexity of the events on which such forecasts
depend, they would necessarily be cast as probability distributions
displaying the likelihood of a range of possible outcomes. The particular shape of these distributions would derive from facts, subsidiary inferences, and the best available forecasting technology;
but the very impossibility of complete certainty about the future
forces expectations about future events into the mold of
probability distributions.
The dichotomy between certain facts and uncertain forecasts
represents the central static distinction between types of information that our analysis requires.4 2 It remains necessary, however, to
consider an element of the dynamic aspect of information as well.
Recall the example of the hypothetical fully informed trader. At
any particular time, this trader has complete information about
the past and present and a set of expectations about the future.
But now assume that he acquires a new "bit" of information,
whether hard or soft. This acquisition increases his total store of
information, but it may also alter some or all of the information he
already holds. For example, the acquisition of a new piece of
"hard" information of major importance is likely to affect the
trader's master forecast of price not only directly but also indirectly, by altering the information on which much of his "soft," or
forecast information is based.4 3 In this sense, the structure of trad-

ogeneity becomes more pronounced, however, one would expect increasingly inefficient
prices, at least as judged by the yardstick of the CAPM. See, e.g., Figlewski, Information
Diversity and Market Behavior, 37 J. Fin. 87, 101 (1982) (heterogeneous expectations as
obstacles to short and long run equilibrium prices); Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. Fin. 1151, 1153-54 (1977) (badly informed investors tend to overprice
risky assets). Thus, it is not only the ECMH, but also the assumptions underlying the
CAPM, that depend critically on the speed with which the market efficiency mechanisms
operate.
42 A second static distinction would be the further division of soft information into "soft"
and "very soft" categories. Soft information would be that gleaned from objective
probability distributions, such as the response of price to routine contingencies. Very soft
information would be that obtained from largely subjective probability distributions, such
as the range of price responses to a wholly innovative security. See F. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 233 (1921); infra text accompanying notes 111-13. Full development of this
distinction, however, would raise a host of problems with only tangential relevance to our
analysis. For a discussion of some of these problems in the context of forecasting, see Kantor, Rational Expectations and Economic Thought, 17 J. Econ. Lit. 1422, 1433-35 (1979).
13 For example, new information about an issuer's unexpected loss on a major product
line can directly reduce the total value of the issuer's securities by diminishing its expected
future income to the extent of the unanticipated amount of the loss. This information may
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ing information is holistic and hierarchical rather than additive
and democratic. New information may act either as an overlay to
an entire range of previously acquired information, or as a finetuning and confirmation of an existing aspect of trader
expectations.
The distinction between hard-certain-information and uncertain forecast portrays a constant movement toward certainty. Uncertain information inevitably becomes more certain as the acquisition of new data either confirms or alters the old information and
thereby renders it "new." Similarly, any change that new information induces in the forecast of future events also results in "new"
information. A forecast that an event has a fifty percent likelihood
of occurence is different information from one that projects a
nearly certain probability of occurrence.
Thus far, however, we have described the hierarchical interaction between new information and old, and the resulting transmigration of old information into new, as a passive phenomenon. The
passage of time alone reduces uncertainty and, in turn, the reduction of uncertainty confirms or alters our expectations about value.
But the reduction of uncertainty is seldom a wholly passive phenomenon in the real world. Market participants often engage in
active attempts to reduce uncertainty about unknown or future
events. In order to understand the active response to uncertainty,"
we must abandon our hypothetical of the fully informed trader and
shift instead to traders who, like the rest of us, are less than fully
informed.'5
Uninformed investors may actively attempt to reduce uncertainty in three different ways. First, investors who lack either hard
or soft information may act to acquire it, rather than waiting pasalso reduce total value indirectly,by lowering trader estimates of the likely performance of
the issuer's other products or the quality of its management. The acquisition of many secondary facts of minor importance may affect the trader's assessment of value only by altering the probability distributions associated with one or another of his forecasts. Much the
same distinction holds true for the acquisition of new soft information. The formation of
some new forecasts will also alter existing forecasts whenever the newly projected events
bear on the probability distributions underlying such forecasts. But the impetus to make
certain secondary forecasts will stem directly from their value in refining the probability
distributions associated with the existing set of primary forecasts.
" See Hirshleifer & Riley, supra note 39, at 1376-77.
45 It is, of course, the fact that investors are not fully informed that prompts the search
for market efficiency mechanisms in the first place.
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sively for the passage of time to reveal it to them. Second, traders
may attempt to derive more benefit from the store of information
that they already possess. Study of existing information may provide new understanding of its implications or of its relationship to
other information, thereby confirming or altering one's existing
forecast of value. 46 Finally, traders may attempt to ascertain the
accuracy of information that they have obtained from others. Most
trading facts are acquired second-hand from sources of widely varying credibility. Traders frequently learn the surface content of
alleged facts but remain uncertain about their accuracy. The third
response to uncertainty is the effort to resolve these doubts, either
through study or the acquisition of new facts.47
Our description of the concept of information thus ends with a
focus on its role in dissipating uncertainty about the future and by
46 Even data about recent price changes, which alone possess little or no trading value, see
supra note 25, may yield valuable insights when interpreted in conjunction with other, less
widely distributed information. See infra text accompanying notes 84-91 (discussing derivatively informed trading).
47 Consider the example of a securities analyst who is told by a former employee of an
insurance company that the company has been fabricating its policies in order to create the
illusion of earnings. The fabrication of policies is a critical matter of fact. But insofar as the
employee's allegation of fraud is suspect, the analyst does not learn the hard fact of fraud,
but only its imperfect proxy-the hard fact of the employee's report. For the analyst, the
fraud itself remains a projection whose value hinges on an estimate of its reliability.
Put in simple expected value terms, if the analyst believes that the damning information
about the insurance company warrants a reduction of its current stock price from $30 to
$10, the information has a value that can be measured by merely multiplying the number of
shares the analyst can sell short by $20. If, however, the analyst doubts the accuracy of the
information, its value changes. Suppose the analyst believes there is a 50% chance that the
information is incorrect and that the company's next release of audited financial statements
will result in a $20 increase in the price of the stock. Assuming risk neutrality, the information then will not change the analyst's expected value of the insurance company's stock,
because the two alternatives, having equal opposite values and equal likelihoods of occurring, balance exactly. But now suppose that the analyst acquires other information that
further alters his belief about the likelihood that the initial information is correct. If the
analyst then believes the original information has a 70% likelihood of being correct, his
belief concerning the value of the insurance company's stock changes; there is now a 70%
likelihood of a $20 drop in price and a 30% likelihood of a $20 increase in price, resulting in
a net downward shift of $8 in the analyst's belief about the correct stock price.
The analyst may reduce uncertainty by undertaking active efforts to verify the accuracy
of the information. And just as with the other active responses to uncertainty, this effort
serves to change the initial information by altering or confirming it. A statement that a
condition certainly exists is a different statement from one asserting only a 50% probability
of the condition's existence. Indeed, a single statement about the world can be one of an
infinite number of different statements-different pieces of information-depending on its
perceived degree of accuracy.
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emphasizing three types of informational activity that a trader
may undertake to reduce uncertainty: efforts to acquire additional
information, efforts to refine forecasts and deepen the predictive
value of information already in hand, and efforts to determine the
accuracy of information already in hand. We will return to this typology in Section III when we describe the operation of the market
for information, a market whose existence stems from the demand
for precisely these kinds of efforts and whose analysis must proceed on their terms.48 For now, however, we have completed our
task of clarifying the concept of information in the context of trading markets. Since this also concludes our broader aim of clarifying
the key terms of the ECMH, we can now turn to an account of the
mechanisms of market efficiency. In a very real sense, this new
task is no more than clarification of the dynamic aspect of market
efficiency. An account of market mechanisms makes explicit the
processes of price change that the original operational definition of
market efficiency implicitly recognized by its emphasis on the differential availability of arbitrage opportunities.
II.

MECHANISMS OF MARKET EFFICIENCY

Review of the basic vocabulary of efficient market theory reveals
a missing link: an account of the mechanisms of market efficiency
that its terms foreshadow but do not explicitly detail. Once the
"full reflection" of information into price is reformulated as an
identity between an existing equilibrium price and a fully informed
equilibrium price, the general contours of these mechanisms become clear. They must be trading processes that, with more or less
promptness (or "relative efficiency"), force prices to a new, fully
informed equilibrium. Moreover, clarifying the meaning of informational "availability" also reveals the chief obstacle to any mechanism that serves to push prices toward a fully informed equilibrium. New information is "available" to the capital market under
an extraordinary variety of circumstances, ranging from the extreme of near-universal initial distribution of information-when
everyone really does know the information-to the opposite extreme of initial distribution to only a very few traders. 49 A satisfac4'

See infra text accompanying notes 131-35 (taxonomy of information costs).

49 Similarly, there may be partial distribution of the information to only some traders,

without "complete" distribution to any. Partial distribution of soft information may occur
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tory account of the mechanisms of market efficiency must describe
their operation over this entire continuum of availability, including
those circumstances in which the initial distribution is extremely
limited or incomplete. Finally, and most important, the insight implicit in the extended application of the weak/semi-strong/strong
form categories to information sets and markets suggests how one
can explain distinct levels of relative efficiency over the entire continuum of informational availability. We must search for several
different mechanisms, each of which can operate over an information set of particular availability to market traders, and each of
which can generate its own dynamics of price equilibration.
Fortunately, the most difficult step in this search-the identification of a basic repertoire of mechanisms to explain the incorporation of new information into equilibrium securities prices-has
already been taken. Over the past dozen years, financial economists have proposed four general forms of mechanisms, which may
be termed "universally informed trading," 50 "professionally informed trading,"' 51 "derivatively informed trading," 52 and "uninformed trading. '53 In accordance with the economists' rigorous
conventions of formal exposition, each of these mechanisms has
thus far been modeled in isolation, as if it singlehandedly could
explain the dynamics of price equilibration. Yet from the perspective of policy formulation, the precise operation of these mechanisms in vacuo is of less interest than the fact that all four shape
the formation of prices in the same securities markets. Moreover,
they do so in a fashion that can account for the reflection of information in price over the entire range of informational availability.
We shall present these four mechanisms as components of a single
complex repertoire of market responses. Our contribution lies not
in identifying a new efficiency mechanism, but in specifying how
the "fit" among the original four can supply the foundations for an
explicit account of price equilibration.

where traders imperfectly forecast matters of fact. Partial distribution of hard information
may occur where traders acquire unreliable reports on matters of fact. See supra text accompanying notes 40-48 ("information"); infra text accompanying notes 96-123 ("uninformed trading" mechanism).
50See infra text accompanying notes 58-60.
51See infra text accompanying notes 61-72.
52 See infra text accompanying notes 73-95.
53 See infra text accompanying notes 96-123.
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Three features of the relation among the market mechanisms are
critical. First, only one of the market mechanisms at a time can
ordinarily operate to cause a particular bit of new information to
be reflected in price. Second, which mechanism will dominate the
dynamics of price change at any time depends on how widely the
particular information is distributed in the market.5 4 Third, each
of the mechanisms operates with a characteristic level of relative
efficiency that depends on how widely information must be distributed in order to trigger it. The wider the initial distribution of information that a mechanism requires, the more rapidly that mechanism operates.
Together, these characteristic interrelationships permit us to array the four market mechanisms on a continuum based on the initial distribution 5 of information among traders, that is, on how
many traders learn of the new information. 6 Although all four
mechanisms can ultimately lead to efficient equilibrium prices, the
dynamics of equilibration will take longer as one moves from wide
to narrow distribution mechanisms. Thus, just as the extended use
of the weak/semi-strong/strong form categories implies, less "available" information will require more time for "full reflection" in
price because its narrower distribution will force a qualitatively
more circuitous form of price equilibration. Correlatively, the individual trader who initially learns of new information can capture
an increasing portion of its trading value as the initial distribution
of the information narrows and the dominant market mechanism
shifts accordingly.

Recall, however, that the distribution of information to traders can fail at several distinct steps: in its acquisition, processing, or verification. See supra text accompanying notes
45-48.
51 The operation of particular mechanisms may also broaden the distribution of information, and thus trigger a transition to a new dominant mechanism. See infra text accompanying notes 124-30. For reasons indicated in our discussion of the individual mechanisms, however, the initial distribution of information and the initial dominant mechanism determine
the overall pace with which information is reflected in price.
" Alternatively, these four mechanisms may be arrayed on a continuum based on how
many trades are initially informed by the information. This informed-trade continuum is
the better formulation whenever a small fraction of traders, such as institutional investors,
control a substantial percentage of the total trading volume. For simplicity of exposition,
however, we use the informed-trader and the informed-trade approaches interchangeably in
this section.
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Universally Informed Trading

The simplest efficiency mechanism that causes prices to behave
"as if' all traders knew of information is a market in which all
traders are, in fact, costlessly and simultaneously informed. To be
sure, universally informed trading in its purest sense results in efficient prices tautologically, 57 and may seem more a statement of a
sufficient condition for market efficiency than an active mechanism. But several varieties of price-relevant information at least
approximate the ideal of universal dissemination. "Old" information, embedded in securities prices, is one example. Ongoing market activity assures its distribution to all interested traders, and
precisely because all know it, we do not expect it to reveal arbitrage opportunities in the form of lucrative screens or trading rules
that all alike could exploit.5 8 Another example is important news
items-from presidential election results, which most citizens learn
almost instantaneously, to changes in Federal Reserve Board policy, which are announced after trading hours precisely in order to
ensure widespread dissemination.5 9 Thus, the universally informed

57 See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
58 See supra note 25 (weak form efficiency tests). Note, however, that the interactionof
price changes and other, less widely distributed data, may reveal new information to astute
traders. See infra text accompanying notes 85-94.
59 In practice, of course, much of the trading impact of routine press announcements is
often registered before publication, presumably as the result of either accurate forecasting
or inside trading. See, e.g., Morse, Wall Street Journal Announcements and the Securities
Markets, Fin. Analysts J., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 69, 69, 75-76 (company-specific information
announced in Wall Street Journal largely anticipated); Waud, Public Interpretation of Federal Reserve Discount Rate Changes: Evidence on the "Announcement Effect," 38
Econometrica 231, 248-49 (1970) (Federal Reserve decisions anticipated 5-7 days in advance); SEC's Inquiry Widens As It Questions Broker, Others in Journal Case, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 6 (Wall Street Journal reporter admitted leaking market-sensitive
information to investors). Yet the residual price response that follows publication is extremely rapid. See, e.g., Lloyd-Davies & Canes, Stock Prices and the Publication of SecondHand Information, 51 J. Bus. 43, 55 (1978) (Wall Street Journal columns affect prices too
rapidly to support trading profits).
Note that, even after the "universal" dissemination of reliable trading facts, some portion
of the resulting price impact may be channelled through other market mechanisms, especially "professionally informed" and "uninformed" trading, considered infra text accompanying notes 61-72, 96-123. This will occur if the quality of trader expectations about "how
much" good or bad news affects value differs substantially; or, what amounts to the same
thing, if optimal forecast information based on widely-disseminated facts is far more narrowly distributed than the facts themselves. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 44-48 (typology of breakdowns in distribution of information). Under these circumstances, one would
expect universal trading to account for the bulk of post-dissemination price movements and
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trading mechanism ranges over all "old" price information and
much that is new. It lumps together traditional "weak-form" information about price histories with information about current events
into a single information set that prices reflect rapidly and with
near perfect dynamic efficiency.6 0
B. Professionally Informed Trading
In contrast to news about price and current events, however,
much so-called "public" information is not universally disseminated among traders. Many traders are too unsophisticated to
make full use of the technical accounting information contained in
mandated disclosure reports; 61 much disclosure data is accessible
in the first instance only through documents on file with government agencies; s2 and much information about a firm's prospects
may be announced initially only to small groups of securities analysts and other market professionals.6 " How, then, do prices come
to reflect this semi-public information? The answer, as identified
in general terms by Fama 4 and many others,6 5 is that rapid price
equilibration does not require widespread dissemination of information, but only a minority of knowledgeable traders who control
a critical volume of trading activity. From this perspective, the
universally informed trading mechanism is actually only a special
case of price formation through the activity of traders who are diexpert trading to provide fine tuning. Arguably, this phenomenon explains the "technical
corrections" that are often said to follow close on the heels of initial market responses to
dramatic trading news. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 111-13.
"0For additional analysis of when readily accessible public information falls into the universally informed information set, see infra text accompanying notes 198-205.

"1Advisory

Committee Report, supra note 3, at 289-98; Kripke, The Myth of the In-

formed Layman, 28 Bus. Law. 631, 632-38 (1973).
" Advisory Committee Report, supra note 3, at 621. Access to documents of the Securities and Exchange Commission will be made much easier, however, as a result of the computerization of the Commission's records. See Sanger, S.E.C.'s Computer Revolution, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 4, 1984, at D1, col. 3 (computerization of reports filed with SEC will allow
investors to examine them through their own personal computers).
63 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 3, at 11-14, 66-68, 621. A sample of professional securities analysts rated issuer-analyst relations programs and, in particular, personal
conversations with managers, as their most valuable source of firm-specific information. Id.
at 67.
", Fama, supra note 7, at 387-88.

,5 E.g., R. Brealey, An Introduction to Risk and Return from Common Stocks 17 (2d ed.
1983); J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, supra note 7, at 86-88. See also Advisory Committee Report,
supra note 3, at 620-21.
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rect recipients of information. Subgroups of informed traders, or

even a single knowledgeable trader with sufficient resources, can
also cause prices to reflect information by persistent trading at a
premium over "uninformed" price levels. The rapidity of such
price adjustments depends on the volume of informed trading. And
although a precise account of that process has yet to be offered,6 it
seems plausible that the relative efficiency of price adjustment to
new information that proceeds through professionally informed
trading declines only gradually as initial access to the information
narrows to a threshold minority of traders, after which it declines
rapidly.

67

Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630, 640-51 (1979), develop a similar model
for the consumer product context. They ask how many consumers must be informed in
order for a product's price to be identical to one that would be charged in a market in which
all consumers are perfectly informed. They conclude that the ratio of "comparison shoppers"-what we might call "professional shoppers"-to total shoppers must be sufficiently
high. Id. The problem is more complicated in a speculative securities market, where the
information to be reflected differs among piofessional traders, and where its reflection in
price depends, in part, on the initial distribution of wealth among traders. This point is
pursued in Figlewski, supra note 13. See also infra note 109 (discussing Figlewski).
67 This account still begs the question of exactly how informed minority trading can lead
to the rapid price reflection of new information even when the minority is too small to
dominate trading volume. If uninformed traders held widely divergent beliefs about the
value of a security, the short answer would be "price pressure": trading by informed investors that alters the demand or supply for particular securities, and raises or lowers their
prices accordingly. This answer is almost certainly incomplete, however. It rejects wholesale
the homogeneous expectations postulate of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, see supra note
41, as well as the depiction of securities as fungible commodities with large numbers of nearperfect risk-return substitutes. A far more plausible answer is that suggested by Myron
Scholes, who demonstrated that secondary offerings affect securities prices primarily
through the release of information rather than through price pressure. Scholes, The Market
for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share
Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179, 182-84, 206-08 (1972). See infra text accompanying notes 78-80 (summarizing Scholes' findings). Similarly, intense trading by an informed minority will trigger
temporary fluctuations in price and volume that may, in turn, alert an uninformed majority
to the existence of new information. Cf. Kraus & Stoll, Price Impacts of Block Trading on
the New York Stock Exchange, 27 J. Fin. 569 (1972) (temporary liquidity and transactioncost price fluctuation from block trading). The ways in which uninformed traders may
"learn" from price changes are discussed infra text accompanying notes 78-91. The involvement of uninformed traders in the professionally informed trading mechanism would help
explain the need for a threshold number of informed traders to asssure the rapid reflection
of new information in price. Rapid learning by uninformed traders requires a clear price
signal and, therefore, a critical volume of informed trades. Cf. Lloyd-Davies & Canes, supra
note 59, at 44-45, 55 (trading by security analysts' individual clients insufficient to reflect
information fully in price prior to publication).
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In today's securities markets, the dominant minority of informed
traders is the community of market professionals, such as arbitrageurs, researchers, brokers and portfolio managers, who devote
their careers to acquiring information and honing evaluative
skills.6 8 The trading volume in most securities that these professionals control, directly or indirectly, seems sufficient to assure the
market's rapid assimilation into price of most routine information."' Of course, the relative efficiency of the assimilation is never
perfect. Since informed trading is costly, market professionals
must enjoy some informational advantage that permits them to
earn a commensurate return. 0 But given competitive arbitrage and
the market for analyst services, we would not expect the long-run
returns of individual professionals to exceed the market average by

" As of 1977, 14,646 professional securities analysts were employed by investment and
commercial banks, brokerage houses, mutual funds, investment counselling services, insurance companies, and miscellaneous endowments alone. Advisory Committee Report, supra
note 3, at 36-37 (citing figures supplied by the Financial Analysts Federation).
' As of 1977, institutional trades, presumably directed by market professionals, accounted for 70% of public trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange. M. Blume & I.
Friend, The Changing Role of the Individual Investor 4 (1978). Although individual investors are far more important on the smaller exchanges and in the over-the-counter market,
id. at 5, many of these investors also depend on the informed views of market professionals.
See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 3, at 290-91 (brokers are major information
source for individual investors).
Direct estimates of how rapidly prices reflect information after it becomes widely accessible to market professionals are difficult to come by, but one indication may be the market's
response to news of block trades. According to one study, it requires a mere 15 minutes-too
short an interval for post-trade arbitrage-for prices to stabilize after such trades. Dann,
Mayers & Raab, Trading Rules, Large Blocks and the Speed of Price Adjustment, 4 J. Fin.
Econ. 3, 18-21 (1977). Evidence that securities with little or no analyst following sell at a
discount indirectly confirms the contribution of market professionals to market efficiency.
"Investors are willing to purchase neglected, 'informationally naked' securities only at a discount relative to what they would pay for comparable. . . 'informationally covered,' securities." Arbel & Strebel, Pay Attention to Neglected Firms!, J. Port. Manag., Winter 1983, at
37, 40. There is some evidence that this phenomenon may be due in part to statistical
problems with the measurement techniques used. See, e.g., Roll, A Possible Explanation of
the Small Firm Effect, 36 J. Fin. 879 (1981). But more recent empirical research suggests an
anomaly in return levels that cannot be entirely explained either by methodological deficiencies or by any purely economic factor, such as tax selling or higher transactions costs,
suggested thus far. See Schwert, Size and Stock Returns, and Other Empirical Regularities,
12 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 3-4, 7-9 (1983) (surveying literature).
70 A question arises, however, as to exactly how market professionals earn returns on routine information that is widely distributed to security analysts, and therefore reflected in
price very rapidly. Must each "bit" of information, considered alone, yield marginal trading
returns large enough to justify its acquisition? For discussion of this issue, see infra text
accompanying notes 198-205.
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very much, especially in exchange markets where professionals
dominate trading. 71 This expectation is largely confirmed by em72
pirical studies of mutual fund returns.
In sum, the professionally informed trading mechanism explains
why any information that is accessible to significant portions of
the analyst community is properly called "public," even though it
manifestly is not. Such information is rapidly assimilated into
price, with only minimal abnormal returns to its professional recipients. And it is these characteristics, we submit, that largely convey
the meaning of a "semi-strong form" market response.
C. Derivatively Informed Trading
Yet not all information is public, even within the narrow confines of the professional analyst community. Corporate insiders
and exchange specialists, for example, enjoy easy access to information that would be prohibitively costly for anyone else to obtain,7 3 while professional analysts conduct in-depth research that
generates occasional informational monopolies. 4 In these and similar instances of monopolistic access, information first enters the
market through a very small number of traders whose own. resources are not large enough to induce speedy price equilibration.
But reflection of this information in price does not depend exclusively on the trading efforts of these insiders. Derivatively informed trading enhances relative efficiency and erodes the insider's advantage by capitalizing on the "informational leakage" 75
See T. Copeland & F. Weston, supra note 19, at 211.
E.g., Jensen, supra note 27, at 415 (sampled mutual funds earned risk-adjusted net
returns slightly below market average); Mains, supra note 27, at 384 (reanalyzing Jensen
data to show mutual fund returns, net of operating costs, roughly equal returns on market
portfolio).
71 The strong form efficiency tests, supra note 27, amply document the systematic informational advantage enjoyed by corporate insiders and other "insider" groups. Indeed, if
anything, these tests radically underestimate the magnitude of this advantage by relying on
data about trades that are registered or otherwise public. Because trading on inside information is both unlawful and easily hidden, data limited only to publicly disclosed trading by
insiders systematically excludes the trades most likely to reflect important informational
advantages. See Keown & Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity:
An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. Fin. 855, 856-57 (1981).
7" For a dramatic example, see SEC v. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983). Lloyd-Davies &
Canes, supra note 59, at 47-55, also provides evidence of the positive trading value of routine analyst research.
75 See Hirschleifer & Riley, supra note 39, at 1409-11 (informational leakage).
7
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associated with trading itself.
Informational leakage can assume many forms. Pure leakage-inadvertent, direct communication of trading information to
outsiders-doubtlessly plays a significant role in rendering markets
more efficient,76 even if its effects remain erratic. But beyond such
direct disclosure by accident or "theft," two forms of indirect leakage also contribute to market efficiency. These are trade decoding
77
and price decoding.

Trade decoding occurs whenever uninformed traders glean trading information by directly observing the transactions of informed
traders. Myron Scholes' classic study of secondary distributions
documents a common example of this phenomenon by demonstrating that only some large block sales of stock lead to substantial,
permanent declines in share price.78 The declines are especially
pronounced when sellers are officers or other insiders of the issuer;
moderate when sellers are investment companies and mutual funds
(which act on the advice of research staffs); and barely noticeable
when sellers are individuals, bank trust departments, and other
traders who may liquidate their holding for reasons other than in76 A professional in a major tender solicitation firm explains the "pure" informational
leakage that precedes public announcement of tender offers as follows:

You start with a handful of people, but when you get close to doing something the
circle expands pretty quickly. . . . You have to bring in directors, two or three firms
of lawyers, investment bankers, public-relations people, and financial printers, and
everybody's got a secretary. If the deal is a big one, you might need a syndicate of
banks to finance it. Everytime you let in another person, the chance of a leak increases geometrically.

Klein, Merger Leaks Abound, Causing Many Stocks To Rise Before the Fact, Wall St. J.,
July 12, 1978, at 1, col. 6, at 31, col. 1. In the case of takeovers, Keown & Pinkerton report
that approximately half of the price impact of the merger announcement on the target
firm's shares occurs before the public announcement of a tender offer. Keown & Pinkerton,
supra note 73, at 866. Their suggestion, however, that most of this pre-announcement price
effect results from pure leakage alone, id. at 863-66, may well slight the derivatively informed trading mechanism by neglecting indirect forms of information leakage. See infra
text accompanying notes 78-95.
17 We owe this latter term to Robert Verrecchia. See Verrecchia, Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition, and Market Information Efficiency, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 874, 881 n.12

(1980).
" Scholes, supra note 67. "Secondary distributions" are underwritten, block sales made
off the stock exchanges at a subscription price. Id. at 184-85. Since secondary distributions
are mediated by underwriters and are usually unregistered with the SEC, neither the subscription buyers nor the market ordinarily learns of the identity of the vendors until after
the sales are complete. Id. at 201-02.
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vestment gain. 79 The clear implication is that uninformed traders
use the identities of large sellers to deduce whether the latter are
likely to possess valuable information, and then proceed to trade
accordingly.8 0 Moreover, incidental evidence suggests that trade
decoding is pervasive well beyond the limited context of block
trades.8 1 Indeed, the Federal Securities Acts themselves provide
prime opportunities for trade decoding by the uninformed by forcing insiders and other informationally-advantaged traders to disclose their activities, if not their motives.8 2
Pervasive though it may be, however, trade decoding remains
limited by a significant constraint: uninformed traders must be
able to identify informed traders individually and observe their
trading activities directly. By contrast, the second form of indirect
leakage, price decoding, does not require uninformed traders to

79 Id. at 200-04. As might be expected, Scholes also reports that the minority of registered
secondary offerings whose vendors were known prior to the date of sale exhibited no abnormal price movement following the sale. Id. at 204-06.
So Id. at 202. The absence of any relationship between distribution size and the magnitude of longterm price change further supports a trade-decoding interpretation of Scholes'
findings. Id. at 207. For discussion of temporary price pressure effects and their significance
for the derivatively informed mechanism, see supra note 67; infra text accompanying note
128.
81 Brokers are particularly well-placed to engage in trade-decoding. Consider the ease
with which employees of E.F. Hutton & Company detected trading on inside tender-offer
information by a partner in a major Wall Street law firm: "employees at Hutton are understood to have noticed a pattern in [the partner's] account where, as one source put it, 'He
got too lucky. . . ."' Cole, Wachtell Lawyer is Out in Insider-Trading Case, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 12, 1981, at D29, col. 1, at D36, col. 3. However, not only brokers but the entire market
expects to learn from the activity of informed traders. The Advisory Committee Report,
supra note 3, notes that 47% of surveyed individual investors regarded the trading activity
of presumptively savvy institutions to be "important" trading information. Id. at 286. For
this reason, trade decoding, like any other information channel, can be manipulated to
deceive rather than inform. According to a well known (but apocryphal) story, the House of
Rothschild reaped a fortune by giving a public sell order after the Battle of Waterloo,
thereby leading London Exchange traders to believe that Rothschild had early knowledge of
a British loss when, in fact, Rothschild knew of the British victory. Rothschild then profited
handsomely, the story goes, by trading against a market it knew to be wrong. Kantor, supra
note 42, at 1431 n.4.
82E.g., § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982) (requiring reporting, within 10 days, of boilerplate information regarding the purchase of any security that gives the owner more than 5 percent of that class of security); § 16(a) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982) (requiring directors, officers, and 10% beneficial owners to report purchases and subsequent changes in ownership of issuer's equity securities within 10
days after initial acquisition and 10 days "after the close of each calendar month
thereafter").
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discover the identity of their informed cohorts. It merely requires
uninformed traders to observe and interpret anonymous data on
price and trading volume against the backdrop of other information or expectations that these traders possess.
In theory, at least, the logic of price decoding is simple. When
trading on inside information is of sufficient volume to cause a
change in price, this otherwise inexplicable change may itself signal the presence of new information to the uninformed. Why, after
all, would anyone persistently trade against the market unless they
possessed such information?"3 But beyond the "weak" learning involved in identifying the presence of new information, uninformed
traders may also succeed in decoding the actual content of the information. 4 The trick here, and admittedly it is no mean feat, is
the uninformed trader's ability to employ knowledge of the informational constitutents of the old price to deduce which possible
accretion of new information would successfully explain observed
price changes.8 5 Yet, probabilistically, such "strong" learning may
But see infra note 89 (manipulation through deceptive price signals).
What we term "weak" learning from price, then, does not involve the active extraction
of information from price, but only the more modest recognition that unanticipated price
changes may signal the existence of new information. This reflects the "rational expectation" that other traders, like oneself, buy or sell securities on the basis of their expected
returns. If market prices change unexpectedly, the reason must be that other traders have
acquired new facts or forecasts that alter their assessments of expected returns. Weak learning in this sense is the first step of price decoding, and may also accompany professionally
informed trading, see supra note 67, and the uninformed trading mechanism, infra text accompanying notes 116-21. By contrast, full price decoding, which is specific to the derivatively informed mechanism, involves "strong" learning from price. Significant numbers of
traders transmit actual information through price and volume signals.
85 Thus, unlike screening rules or other attempts to discover trading opportunities in
price data alone, price decoding relies principally on the interaction between price changes
and independent information about firms. The more widespread this independent information is among traders, of course, the more widely distributed correct deductions from price
changes will be, and the less likely it is that price decoding will yield trading profits. But if
incipient price changes can only be interpreted by a few traders who have already acquired
detailed knowledge about the firm, or if unexpected price changes lead a handful of traders
to research the firm, these price changes may well yield trading profits.
Since the mid-1970's, economists employing the conditional forecasting methodology associated with the "rational expectations" literature have developed a family of models specifying the sufficient conditions for, and the implications of, price decoding in a variety of simple markets. See, e.g., Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where
Trades have Diverse Information, 31 J. Fin. 573 (1976); Kihlstrom & Mirman, Information
and Market Equilibrium, 6 Bell J. Econ. 357 (1975). See also Hirschleifer & Riley, supra
note 39, at 1411-14 (reviewing forecasting methodology). S. Sheffrin, supra note 10, at 11524, provides a highly readable overview that relates these models both to the broader ra83
8U
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be less difficult than it at first appears; consider, for example, how
frequently increases in price signal the presence of inside information about impending tender offers."6
The theory of "weak" learning from prices is standard economic
fare, traditionally linked with the contributions of Friedrich
Hayek.87 Attempts to model "strong" learning, however, are comparatively recent and are still in a developmental stage in which
they must radically simplify the learning processes of real markets. 88 Nevertheless, they not only provide the best available account of this commonplace market phenomenon, 89 but they also

tional expectations literature and to contemporary finance theory (itself a variant of the
rational expectations approach).
88 See Keown & Pinkerton, supra note 73, who report not only accelerating price increases
during the three weeks that precede tender offers, but also
that 79, 60, and 64 percent of the acquired firms exhibited higher volume one, two,
and three weeks prior to the announcement date than they had three months earlier
with the weekly average volume over this three week period 247, 112, and 102 percent
higher than it was three months earlier.
Id. at 863.
It is impossible to determine how much such crescendos of trading activity owe to pure
leakage, trade decoding, or price decoding, respectively. The very strength of the incipient
price and volume changes, however, suggests that "strong" price decoding plays a major
role, especially as the other forms of informational leakage amplify the strength of the price
signals.
87 See Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 526-28 (1945).
" On the use of simplifying assumptions, see, e.g., Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393, 395 (1980) (proving conjectures regarding non-existence of fully-informative prices under simplified assumptions);
Radner, Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices, 47 Econometrica 655 (1979) (proving likelihood of fully-informative prices
under assumption of finite information states). Some scholars have criticized Radner, Grossman & Stiglitz, and other rational expectations "micro-theorists" for relying on implausible,
regression-like accounts of individual forecasting. S~e, e.g., Frydman, Towards an Understanding of Market Processes: Individual Expectations, Learning, and Convergence to Rational Expectations Equilibrium, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 652, 664-65 (1982). In our view, however, neither the complexity of real markets, nor the difficulties of providing a wholly
satisfactory theoretical account of individual forecasting behavior, diminish the central insights of the price-decoding theorists, which we address infra text accompanying notes 10323, and in Section IV.
89 The history of market manipulation is replete with persuasive, if back-handed, evidence of trader reliance on price decoding. To the extent that such venerable scams as
"wash sales" and "matched orders" trick uninformed traders into bidding up share prices
through misleading price and volume data, they succeed for precisely the same reason that
stock touting succeeds: namely, they transmit misinformation through a usually reliable information channel. See Kryzanowski, Comment Misinformation and Security Markets, 24
McGill L.J. 123, 124-26 (1978). Indeed, the fact that such deceptions can create "manipulation bubbles" of considerable duration (1-12 months) on thinly-traded exchanges, id. at 130-
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raise a question that cuts to the core of efficient market theory.
Why would anyone incur the cost and risk of acquiring restrictedaccess information, if hair-triggered "decoders" will extract the
bulk of its value? The answer must be that prices are not fully
informative and, indeed, that the acquisition effort is made precisely because they are not. As Grossman and Stiglitzs0 recently
demonstrated, a market in which price decoding was both costless
and accurate could not support an efficient equilibrium in which
prices fully reflect trading information. Rather, such a market
would be doomed to an oscillating dynamic of enlightenment and
ignorance. Traders would initially acquire information because, in
an inefficient market, they could earn returns on their investment
in acquisition. As more traders became initially informed, however,
the price system would convey more information to uninformed
traders, thereby lowering the returns to informed traders. At the
point at which the market became fully efficient, there would be
no return to informed traders for having acquired the information,
and, as a result, information acquisition would cease. The market
would sink into informational inefficiency once more, only to repeat the cycle as soon as some traders again found information ac-

31, suggests not only the extent of investor reliance on price information but also a link
between price decoding and the volatility of securities prices generally. See also Kryzanowski, Misinformation and Regulatory Actions in the Canadian Capital Markets: Some Empir-

ical Evidence, 9 Bell J. Econ. 355, 365 (1978) (although regulatory intervention deflates manipulative bubbles, price deflation is gradual). Recent investigations of the volatility of
exchange prices, as contrasted with the relative price stability of shares traded while the
exchanges are closed, also suggest the importance of price and trade decoding. See K.

French & R. Roll, Is Trading Self-Generating? (Feb. 1984) (Working Paper No.121, Center
for Research on Securities Prices, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business).
Of course, evidence of "strong" learning from price is always difficult to separate from
pure leakage or trade-decoding on the one hand, and "weak" learning from price on the
other. For example, Garbade, Pomrenze, & Silber report that dealers in Government National Mortgage Association securities periodically revise their bid and ask prices in light of
average price quotes of other dealers, although such revision is never total and depends on
the dispersion of other dealer prices. The greater the dispersion, the lower the apparent
quality of information in price. Garbade, Pomrenze, & Silber, On the Information Content

of Prices, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 50 (1979). These results are impressive testimony to the information content of prices. Yet they do not specifically distinguish between price decoding-a
dealer's inference from average price that he has underestimated public demand-and the
inchoate weak expectation that price itself can signal unknown but relevant information.
O0Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 88; Grossman & Stiglitz, Information and Competitive
Price Systems, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 246, 250-51 (1976). See also Grossman, supra note 85; S.
Sheffrin, supra note 10, at 122 (non-technical account of Grossman & Stiglitz model).
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quisition profitable.91
Perhaps it is fortunate, then, that fully-effective price decoding
remains a theoretical concept rather than a market reality. It is
only because uninformed traders cannot infer all information from
price-i.e., because prices are "noisy"-that informed traders enjoy a return on their information up to the point at which further
trading moves prices beyond the noise threshold.9 2 Thus, the reflection of non-public information into price is a two-stage process;
it is first triggered by initially informed "inside" trading, but, at a
critical threshold, it rapidly accelerates as a result of reactive
trades. This much ensures that price reflects each "bit" of decoded
information with a moderate degree of relative efficiency-less, to
be sure, than a wider initial distribution might provide, but far
more than the trades of initially informed investors alone could
produce.93 For the price system as a whole, background noise implies an "equilibrium degree of disequilibrium. 9' 4 Noise levels regulate the numbers of informed traders much like returns on initially informed trading regulate entry into the community of
market professionals in the context of professionally informed
trading. The number of informed traders, in turn, determines the
volume of limited-access information that influences prices at any
particular moment, and the end result is perpetual, if constrained,
disequilibrium.
In short, derivatively informed trading, whether it operates
through trade- or price-decoding, is self-limiting. It guarantees
neither full efficiency nor inefficiency, but rather a level of relative
91 Grossman & Stiglltz, supra note 88, at 404.
92 Id. In the simplified Grossman & Stiglitz model, "noise" takes the form of uncertainty
in the per capita supply of a single risky asset. Id. at 396. This single, exogenous noise
source is a standard feature of "noisy" learning models, which, owing to their necessarily
simple internal structures, otherwise threaten to make price too revealing to be empirically
plausible. See Diamond & Verrecchia, Information Aggregation in a Noisy Rational Expecations Economy, 9 J. Fin. Econ. 221, 222, 233-34 (1981). For discussion of a more intuitive
operational notion of noise, see infra note 120.
93 See supra note 67. The concomitant risks of price decoding are, of course, the danger
that price change may communicate misinformation, see supra note 89, or that it may be
incorrectly interpreted. These risks, which inhibit price decoding, are likely to be greater

than the analogous misinformation risks associated with pure leakage and trade decoding, if
only because the latter are intrinsically richer information channels. Thus, price decoding
may typically work in tandem with these other models of derivatively informed trading,

even when price signals are wrong.
94

Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 88, at 393.
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efficiency that is jointly determined by the effort required to acquire information and the decoding possibilities that limit its exploitation.9 5 Derivatively informed trading thus explains how
prices can come to reflect much information that is truly "nonpublic," even while suggesting the inevitable limits to the process.
D.

Uninformed Trading

The three trading mechanisms that we have considered thus far
each describe processes by which prices come to reflect particular
key trading facts. Such pieces of information have strong and
straightforward implications for price. As we emphasized in Section I, however, information is not limited to hard facts; it also
includes soft information, the stuff of forecasts and predictions,
that is at least as critical to trading as key trading facts. Both in
developing forecasts of future events and in making a master forecast of value, traders employ, in addition to key facts, a wide variety of secondary facts, differing beliefs, and diverse levels of predictive skills.96 This heterogeneity of information, beliefs, and
skills adds additional uncertainty to that stemming from the inherent indeterminacy of the future.9 7 The uncertainty arises from the
95 Verrecchia has recently modeled the interaction between the information acquisition
activity of traders and "weak" learning from price as a summary of aggregate trader information. Verrecchia, Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy, 50
Econometrica 1415 (1982). See infra note 120 (summarizing Verrecchia's conclusions).
" See supra text accompanying notes 41-42 (fact-forecast dichotomy). That the fact-forecast dichotomy is in some respects a simplification of the structure of information is apparent from the reference to "key" trading facts. Key facts such as earnings figures, dividend
payments, major business decisions, and reports of likely fraud, dominate trader information sets with strong, unproblematic implications for price. Secondary facts, which imply
marginal or contingent adjustments in expected value, are among the raw materials of "soft"
forecasts; they have compelling significance for trader expectations only in the aggregate. An
example of a secondary fact would be evidence of an issuer's product performance in one of
many local markets. Finally, certain third party forecasts themselves can assume the status
of key trading facts when they reflect secondary facts and judgments that are otherwise
unavailable to the market. An example would be an earnings projection by an issuer.
"7 Facts may also be uncertain because of unreliable reporting or the difficulty of verification. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48. Conceptually, this risk parallels the uncertainty introduced into forecasting by an incomplete set of secondary facts or the lack of
processing skills. The difference lies in the comparative ease with which many facts can be
verified as virtual certainties. See infra text accompanying notes 136-42.
For this purpose, we intend the "future" to include events that have already occurred but
that have not yet been disclosed to traders. For example, traders routinely predict the content of future public announcements about Federal Reserve decisions that have already
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sheer impossibility of acquiring both the full range of secondary
facts and the complete repertoire of skills necessary to frame optimal forecasts. To return to a concept used earlier,9 s a hypothetical
fully informed trader would form optimal forecasts as a result of
access to the aggregate information, beliefs, and skills of all traders
in the market, but individual traders would remain ignorant of this
optimal forecast information. Such information is "available" to
the market, but it nonetheless lies at the extreme pole of the continuum depicting the initial distribution of information to traders.
In extreme contrast to the virtually complete distribution of information that underlies universally informed trading, 99 optimal forecast information is not available to any individual trader. At this
juncture, the basic question of market efficiency resurfaces. What
is the mechanism by which the market comes to reflect the diverse
and imperfect forecasts of individual traders into the aggregate
forecast of price, and how well does this mechanism function as
measured against the yardstick of optimal forecast data?
The final market efficiency mechanism, uninformed trading,
permits prices, in some circumstances, to reflect aggregate-or
consensus-forecasts that are more nearly optimal over the long
run than those of any individual trader. In this sense, prices can
reflect information about which all traders are uninformed.1 0 ° For
expository purposes, it is useful first to develop the uninformed
trading mechanism in its simplest form, as a pure, "naive" 10 1 aggregation of information in price that occurs before traders dis10 2
cover the value of price as a forecasting statistic.

been made. See supra note 59.
'" See supra text accompanying note 41 ("fully informed trader").
" See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
"' Note, however, that uninformed trading never leads to prices that reflect wholly optimal forecast data. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06. Rather, this mechanism can
lead to prices that reflect a better approximation,over the long run, of such hypothetical
optimal forecasts than can the parallel assessments made by individual traders. For this
reason, the uninformed trading mechanism has the lowest relative efficiency of any of the
four market mechanisms. As measured against the yardstick of the target information-i.e.,
optimal forecast data-it can never assure fully informed prices, even though it may reflect
consensus forecasts in price much more rapidly than, say, derivatively informed trading will
reflect inside information in price.
1o Cf. S. Sheffrin, supra note 10, at 119-20 (defining "naive" price equilibrium for traders
with diverse information).
102 In actual markets, of course, traders are aware of the potential value of price as a
summary indicator of other traders' information. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15.
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If each trader's forecast about the likelihood of a future event is
informed in part by secondary facts and evaluations to which only
he has access, then an aggregation of all forecasts draws on an information pool much larger than that possessed by any individual
trader. Although each trader's own forecasts are skewed by the
unique constraints on his or her judgment, other traders will have
offsetting constraints. As trading proceeds, the random biases of
individual forecasts will cancel one another out, leaving price to
reflect a single, best-informed aggregate forecast. Uninformed
trading, then, resembles a regression in which the dependent variable is price, the independent variables are the "bits" of information bearing on an unbiased forecast, and the weights attached to
each bit are determined by the buy-sell decisions of individual
traders. Although individual traders will attach biased weights because each knows only a fraction of the relevant information, the
cumulative weights will be unbiased unless trading volume is itself
skewed toward the views of one set of uninformed traders. In this
respect, unsystematic bias "washes out" over trading in the same
way that unsystematic risk "washes out" in a diversified portfolio.103 Moreover, if any bias persists, it does so because the "errors"
We have previously referred to this knowledge as "weak" learning from price, see supra note
84 and text accompanying note 87, in order to distinguish it from the "strong" learning of
price decoding, which envisions that traders deduce the actual content of information. The
presence of weak learning in the context of uninformed trading, which is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 103-23, illustrates once again the blurring of boundaries among the
market efficiency mechanisms that persuades us that they are aspects of a single, complex
whole.
103 The role of price in the uninformed trading mechanism resembles the role of consensus forecast in polls of expert opinion. Such forecasts will tend to demonstrate greater predictive accuracy whenever individual experts have roughly equal access to diverse information or technical skills. See, e.g., W. Beaver, supra note 38, at 160-62 (over three year period,
consensus forecast of winning football teams outperformed forecasts of individual sports
reporters which made up the consensus forecast); Malabre, If One Economist Goofs, Will 46
Do Any Better?: Robert Eggert Thinks So, and He May Be Right, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1983,
at 53, col. 1 (expanding demand for consensus forecasts dictated by growing sense that
"while rarely exactly right, [they] are less likely than individual forecasts to go horribly
wrong"). And while consensus forecasts are clearly less useful when their constituent estimates are systematically biased, see infra note 107, even the effects of bias may be minimized with appropriate weighting strategems. S. Sheffrin, supra note 10, at 116-17. Since
systematic bias is likely to afflict all actual markets to some degree, the empirical weights
fixed by ongoing trading may critically affect the efficiency of uninformed trading. See infra
note 110. Whatever these effects, however, the information aggregation function of price is a
significant source of market efficiency that conventional economic theory has long neglected. S. Sheffrin, supra note 10, at 117.
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of individual traders are perversely correlated, just as unsystematic
10 4
risks might be in a poorly diversified portfolio.
Robert Verrecchia' 0 5 has modeled the conditions under which
the regression-like behavior of uninformed trading aggregates all
forecast information available to the market-but not to all individual traders-into a consensus best estimate of value. Of course,
real markets at best can only approximate these conditions, but
the interesting issue here, as with the other market mechanisms, is
the identification of the factors that determine when and how well
uninformed trading operates. Verrecchia's model requires traders
to make independent assessments of the value of risky securities
based on their own facts and forecasts, which in the aggregate form
a bounded, unbiased distribution around the hypothetical price
that a fully informed trader would assign the security.1 06 The first
of these conditions, that trader assessments be independent, requires an absence of collusion, "learning," or shared prejudice
among traders that would render individual forecasting errors mutually reinforcing.10 7 Complete independence, of course, is unlikely
in real markets, but so is widespread mutual dependence where it
contradicts the independent judgments of many traders. No one

104Any widespread mistake, forecasting error, or breakdown in the acquisition of key
facts can generate bias with respect to the "true" distribution of probabilities associated
with contingent outcomes. For example, widespread, if unjustified, optimism about the virtues of conglomeration represents an apparently common form of trader bias in poorly informed markets. The existence of forecasting bias, however, does not necessarily indicate
that individual traders are acting irrationally. Forecasting methods that were accurate in the
past, including reliance on the information content of price, may prove inadequate in light
of altered circumstances. See infra text accompanying notes 112-13 (bias created by injection of new trading fact).
105 Verrecchia, supra note 13. See Verrecchia, supra note 77 (alternative formulation of
simple aggregation). Still more recent aggregation models by Verrecchia explore markets in
which traders learn aggregate forecasts in part from price. Diamond & Verrecchia, supra
note 92; Verrecchia, supra note 95. For discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 114-23.
1o Verrecchia, supra note 13, at 88.
107 Widespread trade or price decoding would violate the independence condition. One
would not expect high volume derivatively informed trading, however, in the absence of new
key trading facts. Such facts would, in any event, render aggregate forecasts obsolete. Better
examples of assessment bias might be the expectations induced by market "gurus." See, e.g.,
Putka, Stocks' Record-Breaking '82 Rally Hid a Multitude of Market Flaws, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 3, 1983, at 5, col. 4 (pronouncements of Saloman Brothers' "guru" Henry Kaufman
triggered sustained 1982 market rally). Note, however, that if traders condition their beliefs
on both price and their own independent assessments-i.e., engage in "weak" learning but
not price decoding-the independence condition is not violated. Verrecchia, supra note 13,
at 88. But see infra note 119.

1984]

Mechanisms of Market Efficiency

ever earned money in the market, after all, by consciously discounting his or her personal knowledge without good reason. The
second condition of uninformed trading, that trader assessments
be "bounded," merely requires that all such assessments fall in the
same ball park.1 08 Traders with wildly-skewed personal assessments will impede price convergence-reduce the relative efficiency of the uninformed trading mechanism-and may even preclude it entirely in thinly-traded markets. 109 Again, however,
market discipline in the form of heavy trading losses will restrain
idiosyncratic traders and may even eliminate them through a
"Darwinian" process of natural selection.1 10
Verrecchia, supra note 13, at 82.
09The analogy for purposes of our regression metaphor, see supra text accompanying
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note 103, is wildly skewed "outliers" in data sets. These outliers can have a dramatic and
often unwarranted effect on the predicted magnitude and variance of the dependent variable (here market price), especially when the data set is small. Precisely because of this effect, Verrecchia suggests that smaller fins with fewer shareholders will have a comparatively greater incentive to release information and reduce the dispersion of trader forecasts
that might otherwise lead to skewed share prices. Verrecchia, supra note 13, at 89-90. Since
markets are more complex than the regression metaphor would suggest, factors other than
the "outlier effect" also affect the quality of price as an information-aggregating statistic. As
Verrecchia has recently noted, one such factor is risk preference. The quality of consensus
forecasts will increase if risk-tolerant traders make better forecasts than their risk-avoiding
counterparts. Verrecchia argues that they are likely to do so. Verrecchia, supra note 77, at
878-79. Employing a similar methodology, Figlewski observes that equilibrium prices will
better aggregate trader information where all traders are relatively risk-averse, and where
they resemble one another in key respects bearing on the magnitude of individual trades.
Such factors include individual wealth, forecasting skills, and the level of risk preference.
Figlewski, supra note 13, at 594-96. As in the case of the "outlier effect," these observations
generally confirm the importance of according each trader's independent assessment full
weight in price.
1 0 Verrecchia, supra note 13, at 82. Cootner provides the classic early discussion of "natural selection" (or wealth redistribution) and how it contributes to the uninformed trading
mechanism:
Given the uncertainty of the real world, many actual and virtual investors . . . will
have many, perhaps equally many, price forecasts ...
.If any group of investors was
consistently better than average in forecasting stock price, they would accumulate
wealth and give their forecasts greater and greater weight. . . .Conversely, investors
who were worse than average in forecasting ability would carry less and less weight.
P. Cootner, The Random Character of Stock Market Prices 80 (1964). Figlewski, however,
notes a constraint on Darwinian selection that may render this process self-limiting. As long
as all traders forecast on the basis of some relevant information that would not otherwise
register in price, they need not be driven from the market entirely no matter how poorly
they compare to more astute or informed traders. In a process recalling the Grossman and
Stiglitz "Efficiency Paradox," see supra text accompanying notes 90-91, trading activity will
transfer wealth from bad to good forecasters until, on average, the independent informational contributions of even poor forecasters will earn a positive return. This is true because,
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It is the third condition of uninformed trading, that aggregate
trader assessments remain unbiased with respect to the optimal
price estimate of a fully informed trader, that may be the most
demanding. This condition embraces the preceding two requirements, since either widely-shared forecasting errors or idiosyncratic trading can bias the aggregate-level distribution of trader assessments. But, in addition, the "no-bias" condition carries
implications for the acquisition of new key trading facts that can
significantly alter individual assessments. Until the market fully
incorporates such key information into price, the independent assessments of uninformed traders-traders who do not know of the
new information-are inevitably systematically biased. Once any
trader acquires a new key fact that renders hitherto uncertain contingencies more (or less) likely, the consensus forecast of uninformed traders, as embodied in existing price, is biased relative to
the newly-available information. Moreover, it remains so until the
market fully incorporates the new key information into price,
through one of the three "informed" trading mechanisms previously described.
This complementary relationship among the market mechanisms
can be viewed either from the perspective of uninformed trading or
from that of the three informed trading mechanisms. When viewed
from the perspective of uninformed trading, the informed market
mechanisms are "shortcuts" to the elimination of sudden informational bias in consensus prices. They rely on the speedy transmission of information to traders rather than on the much slower and
less certain process of market discipline."' By contrast, when uninformed trading is viewed from the perspective of the three inif such contributions are genuinely independent, they will possess some predictive utility
that even the most astute traders cannot match. Figlewski, supra note 13, at 591-92. See also
Figlewski, supra note 41, at 99-100. Of course, this assurance of a market niche for poor
forecasters is a "defect" of uninformed trading only from the demanding perspective of a
fully informed trader. From the vantage point of mere mortals, it contributes to the aggregate information content of price.
1' See supra note 110 (market discipline). Moreover, the informed trading mechanisms
ensure that the bulk of trading information is shared by all traders. A large percentage of
traders receive the diverse residual information, consisting of forecasts and secondary facts,
in comparable if not exactly equal endowments. This enhances the quality of consensus
forecasts. See supra note 103 (consensus expert forecasts depend on equal access to diverse
information). Since neither professionally informed nor derivatively informed trading literally transmits information to every trader, however, the process also depends on universal
"weak" learning from price. See supra note 84; infra text accompanying notes 115-19.
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formed market mechanisms, it represents an interstitial mechanism that operates between the appearances of new key trading
facts. Uninformed trading "fine-tunes" equilibrium price and assures that price registers any gradually developing consensus about
future contingencies.
The example of a truly innovative investment contract, such as a
radically novel form of bond indenture, further illustrates the complementary nature of the market mechanisms. When an issuer Arst
announces such an innovative security, all traders will be uncertain
about its worth. Although the issuer may make good-faith representations about value, most traders will discount these as self-interested puffery.112 Absent convincing assurances, the initial pricing of the innovative security will be left to the uninformed trading
mechanism, which will tend to "undervalue" it relative to the information possessed by the good-faith issuer-but not, of course,
relative to the aggregate forecasts of the uninformed traders. Thus,
the security's uninformed equilibrium price will be "biased," and
relatively inefficient. Efficiency is possible only if the issuer succeeds in making its representations credible, or if an enterprising
trader independently acquires the key facts that establish their accuracy."3 In the first case, subsequent price equilibration would
proceed rapidly through the universally informed or professionally
informed trading mechanisms; in the second, it would proceed
more slowly through derivatively informed trading.
Yet this depiction of the relationship between uninformed and
informed trading mechanisms still remains incomplete in one important respect: it ignores the fact that traders themselves are
acute observers of market behavior. If prices successfully aggregate
all available information, including consensus forecasts and secondary facts, traders will begin to condition their trading activity
on price as well as on their individual assessments of value." 4 This
111 The example of the innovative bond indenture together with the kind of assurances
that issuers can offer traders is analyzed in detail in Section III, infra text accompanying
notes 153-63.
113 The good faith issuer, of course, offers an accurate appraisal of the innovation's value.
If such an appraisal can result only from detailed study, "outside" traders may not find
replication of the study worth their while. See infra text accompanying note 132.
114 Diamond & Verrecchia, supra note 92, at 222 (simple price aggregation models are
"subject to the objection that when prices do contain information that a particular trader
does not possess he ought to make use of it"). See also Garbade, Pomrenze & Silber, supra
note 89 (study of GNMA dealer price revision in light of independent assessments and aver-
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conditioning on price adds "learning" to the basic aggregation
mechanism of uninformed trading and is precisely the "weak
learning" from price that we previously contrasted 'with the
"strong learning" of price decoding. 11 5 Weak learning in this sense
occupies a middle ground between uninformed and derivatively informed trading. 116 Unlike price decoding, which transmits key
trading facts, weak learning conveys refracted data about consensus opinion that is already fully impounded in price and has comparatively little potential for revising individual traders' facts and
forecasts. In many instances, the simple aggregation process of uninformed trading will obscure the sources of weak or gradual price
changes and so preclude any deduction about their meaning other
than the obvious one-that a shift has occurred in consensus market expectations." 7 But even where traders are able to associate
price and volume signals with shifts in particular aggregate forecasts, such as an altered consensus forecast about future Federal
Reserve Board policies, they will only acquire an indication of
whether the market disagrees with them, not of why it does. The
force of such an indication depends on each trader's level of confidence. Individual estimates of value will move toward existing
prices, and individual forecasts toward consensus predictions, in
rough proportion to how highly each trader assesses the comparative quality of his or her own collection of information.
The existence of weak learning from price"' itself indicates that,
age price quotes).
See supra text accompanying notes 84-88; supra notes 84, 89 & 102.
In the recent history of efforts to model market mechanisms, uninformed trading accompanied by "weak learning" from price finds its place in the conjunction of price aggregation models and the rational expectations literature. See supra note 85. The leading examples include Diamond & Verrecchia, supra note 92; Figlewski, supra note 41; Hellwig, On the
Aggregation of Information in Competitive Markets, 22 J. Econ. Theory 477 (1980); Verrecchia, supra note 95. Although most of these models are presented as descriptively superior to the rational expectations models in which price transmits diverse information without first aggregating it, see, e.g., Grossman, supra note 85, in our analysis both families of
models capture real but distinct market processes: namely, uninformed trading with learning and price decoding, respectively. See, e.g., Diamond & Verrecchia, supra note 92, at 22123 (questioning realism of information transmission models). See also supra note 85 (rational expectations models defimed). The fact that these disparate processes may sometimes
occur simultaneously within different groups of traders, such as where sophisticated traders
forge ahead with price decoding and lay traders lag behind with weak learning, need not
blur the central distinction between them.
117 Diamond & Verrecchia, supra note 92, at 232-33.
18 See supra notes 84 & 87.
"'
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on average, such learning improves the quality of individual trading decisions. To the extent that it succeeds, it will also have a
beneficial "feedback" effect on the core aggregation processes of
uninformed trading by decreasing unwarranted dispersion in individual assessments of value. " 9 The amount and importance of
weak learning that occurs, however, are also constrained by the
level of price noise-the same random fluctuation in price that
masks the transmission of key trading facts through price decoding. Price noise, then, regardless of its source, 120 establishes the

"' If traders rely on price in roughly inverse proportion to the quality of their independent assessments, the most poorly informed traders will rely most on price, thereby reducing the number of wildly skewed "outlier" trades. See supra note 109. In this sense, weak
learning from price can function as a short-cut to the elimination of bias, just as do the
informed trading mechanisms. See supra text accompanying note 111. On the other hand,
weak learning can also generate inefficiency in uninformed trading by amplifying any systematic bias reflected in price. Weak learning cannot create biased prices, see supra note
107, but if the forecasts of confident investors who trade heavily on their independent assessment are already biased, weak learning by less confident traders may transmit the bias
and "freeze" it into price. This phenomenon parallels the transmission of misinformation
through price decoding. See supra note 89. In all likelihood, schemes to defraud investors
through "churning" and "matched orders," id., depend on the joint operation of both price
decoding and weak learning. Similarly, weak learning is likely to augment any "natural"
misinformation transmitted by price decoding and so contribute to the overall volatility of
share prices. Id. The persistence of weak learning despite these inefficiencies, however, indicates its net positive contributions to the informational quality of trades, and thus to the
quality of consensus information reflected in price.
120 Considerations of simplicity and theoretical consistency have led economists to treat
noise as random price fluctuation generated by supply-related factors outside the market.
See Diamond & Verrecchia, supra note 92, at 233-34 (tax and life-cycle motivated trades as
sources of price noise); supra note 92 (noise from variation in supply of risky assets). For
descriptive purposes, however, it is more useful to define "noise" operationally as all seemingly random fluctuations in price that interfere with price decoding and weak learning. By
definition, then, "noise" measures the extent to which the prices generated by uninformed
trading subsequently prove to be imperfect indicators of future returns. Certainly this definition includes any supply-related stochastic price fluctuation. But see supra note 67 (supply and demand effects on individual securities prices likely to be modest). Yet it also embraces the effects of all residual uncertainties affecting price, including the inherent
uncertainty of future events; the limits on total information available to traders; the relative
inefficiencies of the market mechanisms, including any systematic bias in uninformed trading; and the intrinsic difficulties of predicting returns partly on the basis of price. See
Figlewski, supra note 41, at 100-01; Frydman, supra note 88. Such a global concept of noise
highlights the interrelationship between the informativeness of prices and other market
variables, including the total amount of information acquired by traders and the relative
efficiency of the market mechanisms. Verrecchia, however, has recently employed the narrower concept of an exogenously-fixed source of noise to model the informativeness of price
in relation to several important market variables. Verrecchia, supra note 95. His analysis
suggests that where price aggregates rather than simply transmits information, prices reveal
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limits on the ultimate efficiency of uninformed trading. 121 On the
other hand, the instances in which the market has "guessed" right
are an index of the success of uninformed trading. The paradigmatic examples are the many occasions on which publication of
Federal Reserve Board policy decisions, fluctuations in money supply, and similar data of interest to investors have resulted in no
diseernable effect on prices. 12 2 Not surprisingly, these examples
differ from the case of the novel innovative security in that they
concern future events about which all traders are likely to possess
well-specified, reasonably exact forecasts. 23
In sum, the formulation of expectations in response to uncertainty will always constitute a major portion of the task of valuing
securities. Over much of this domain, the uninformed trading
mechanism will bear the burden of reflecting these expectations in
price.
E. Summary
The uninformed trading mechanism completes the array of capital market mechanisms that, in our view, constitutes an essential
element of efficient market theory. For any initial distribution of
information in the market, including an initial distribution to no
one in the case of optimal aggregate forecasts, one or more efficiency mechanisms facilitate the eventual "reflection" of informa-

an increasing proportion of the trading content of available information as noise levels, information costs, or group risk aversion decreases. Id. at 1427-28. In the case of reduced noise
levels, moreover, prices become more informative even though they aggregate less total information, since the very ease with which they reveal information also lowers trader incentives to acquire it. Id. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 90-91 (contrasting "efficiency paradox" outcome of strong learning models).
121 Stated differently, it limits the extent to which price can converge to a single best
estimate that reflects not only key trading facts, but also optimal forecasts of all residual
uncertainties affecting a security's value.
122 See, e.g., Waud, supra note 59, at 248-49 (Federal Reserve discount rate decisions). By
way of contrast, Diamond and Verrecchia, supra note 92, point to one obvious instance in
which uninformed trading fails to aggregate trader information fully, namely, the significant
announcement effect that follows publication of the consumer price index, all of whose components are known to traders in the aggregate. Id. at 233. See Schwert, The Adjustment of
Stock Prices to Information About Inflation, 36 J. Fin. 15, 27-28 (1981).
123 Market experience with routine forms of new information establishes a range of possible price effects. But even this bounded range of possible outcomes will be hazy in the case
of novel events. See F. Knight, supra note 42, at 233 (distinguishing between "risk" and
"uncertainty").
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tion into price. 1 4 Moreover, the four efficiency mechanisms are
complementary; each functions over a characteristic segment of the
continuum of initial distributions of information among traders.
As Figure One illustrates, if the mechanisms are portrayed in
this fashion, they parallel the criterion for partitioning information
sets that implicitly informed Fama's trichotomy of weak/semistrong/strong form tests of market efficiency. Universally informed
trading extends over all widely-disseminated information, including the price-history information that underlies weak form tests.
Professionally informed trading operates on all publicly available
information, but it is particularly active where information is
"semi-public"-i.e., initially distributed or useful to only a minority of sophisticated trading professionals. Professionally informed
trading thus links the information sets sampled by semi-strong
form tests and by those strong form tests, including studies of mutual fund performance, 12 5 that aggregate returns to sophisticated
traders over time. By contrast, derivatively informed trading acts
most prominently on key trading facts over which very small numbers of traders exercise monopolistic access. It dominates the remaining strong form tests that routinely demonstrate substantial
market inefficiency, such as those involving corporate insiders and
market specialists. Finally, uninformed trading acts on the "soft"
information of forecasts and assessments that is not directly sam26
pled by any of the other tests.
The foregoing analysis does more, however, than merely vindicate a familiar classificatory schema. It also renders explicit the
intuition behind the expansion of these categories from a classification of tests to a descriptive language of market responses that
implicitly distinguishes among levels of relative market efficiency,
a point reflected in Figure One by the correspondence between the
relative efficiency continuum, the original weak/semi-strong/strong

124 This is not to say that all information will be fully reflected in price, regardless of its
initial distribution or trading import. Some inside information may never trigger a sufficiently powerful price signal to alert uninformed traders. Nor is it likely that uninformed
trading will ever fully reflect optimal forecast data in price, no matter how rapidly it operates. See supra note 100.
'" See supra note 27.
126 See supra notes 25-27. Of course, to the extent that key facts sampled by semi-strong
form tests are successfully forecast prior to their availability as facts, these tests do sample
forecast information. See supra note 27.
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form trichotomy, and the operative capital market mechanism.
This step of focusing explicitly on efficiency mechanisms, we submit, completes the project of giving theoretical content to the operational vocabulary of market efficiency theory-the project that
began more than a decade ago with analytical efforts to clarify the
basic definition of market efficiency.
Much work remains to be done in further illuminating the operation of the four market efficiency mechanisms. Not only is the
modeling of each mechanism, considered independently, still in its
developmental stage, but attempts to model the synergistic interaction of the mechanisms are even more preliminary. 12 7 Research
of the latter type may help explain puzzling discrepancies between
the actual response of price to new information and the response
that any one of the mechanisms considered alone might lead one to
expect. Why, for example, does informed trading appear to operate
with little loss in relative efficiency down to a quite narrow initial
distribution of information among traders, a critical threshold floor
of initially informed traders? One answer might be that a threshold number of traders is required to emit a strong price signal. In
this case, derivatively informed trading may "amplify" professionally informed trading by alerting the entire analyst community to
the existence of new semi-public information. 128 Similarly, uninformed trading, by reducing price noise levels, may help accelerate
price decoding and so contribute to the relative efficiency of derivatively informed trading.
Finally, the cycle is complete when uninformed trading generates prices that reflect high-quality forecasts about future events
or facts that are as yet unknown to the market. Such anticipation
minimizes the discrepancies between ex ante "uninformed" and ex
post "informed" equilibrium price levels and thereby enhances the
relative efficiency of all three informed trading mechanisms. How11 Recent models joining the aggregation processes of uninformed trading with weak

learning from price, see supra text accompanying notes 114-19, are a promising first step in
this direction, although even these are more extensions of uninformed trading than true
dual mechanism models. See supra note 116.
"

Similarly, weak learning from price may buttress professionally informed trading by

rapidly conveying the trading content of the new information to the entire market. See

supra note 67. In addition, the converse may also be true. Information acquisition by market
professionals may increase the overall information content of prices, reduce "noise" in a
global sense, and thereby increase the relative efficiency of price decoding. See supra note
120.
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ever, because uninformed trading works best when large numbers
of traders form well-specified assessments about future facts and
future events, it will be most efficient when traders are well aware
of the importance of such contingencies in advance. That is, uninformed trading works best for "known" uncertainties: those future
events that are likely to be widely anticipated before they are
known, and widely known when they occur. Such "future facts" are
rapidly assimilated into price by the universally informed and professionally informed trading mechanisms. 12 9 Conversely, when key
trading facts that bear on the forecasting of future events are rapidly disseminated, they help minimize the bias of individual trader
assessments and thereby enhance the relative efficiency of uninformed trading. 13 0 Thus, the efficiency mechanisms discriminate
jointly as well as separately among information sets. Some types of
information, such as Federal Reserve Board announcements and
routine disclosure reports, are efficiently reflected in price in two
ways: ex ante in the form of accurate anticipation, and ex post in
the form of rapid assimilation through the most efficient informed
trading mechanisms. Other types of information, of which data
about innovation is the best example, may be subject to relatively
inefficient assimilation both ex ante and ex post.
The exact nature and magnitude of such interaction among
mechanisms, which presumably contributes to total market efficiency across all available information sets, must await future investigation. At this juncture, we must content ourselves with the
more limited observation that the four capital market mechanisms
function with decreasing relative efficiency. Thus, we expect the
breadth of the initial distribution of information among traders to
determine the relative efficiency of the market's response.

III.

THE INFORMATION MARKET

In the previous section we suggested that the capital market's
relative efficiency depends on the initial distribution of informa229

Uninformed trading works best for "known" uncertainties for two reasons. Many trad-

ers will form careful, independent forecasts about these contingencies, thus expanding the
information base that is aggregated by price; and, because these contingencies are familiar
to the market, trader forecasts will fall within a bounded distribution of expected outcomes,
thus increasing the predictive quality of the assessments reflected into price. See supra note
109.
31oSee supra note 111.
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tion, and that the various capital market mechanisms are not
equally effective for all distributions of information. We illustrated
these points by arraying both the mechanisms and Fama's original
trichotomy of weak, semi-strong and strong form efficiency along a
continuum representing the breadth of initial distribution of trading information. Fama's trichotomy, we suggested, was really an
approximation of an underlying relationship between how broadly
information is initially distributed, and the particular market
mechanism-and level of market efficiency-with which it is reflected in price. But while this analysis explains how (and how
much) efficiency is achieved given the initial distribution of information among traders, it tells only half the story. Given the operative capital market mechanisms, the relative efficiency of the market's response to particular information depends on the initial
distribution of that information among traders. The question now
is, what determines that initial distribution?
To answer that question, the focus of our analysis shifts to the
operation of a different market: the market for information. Although the distribution of information determines which capital
market mechanism will operate and, therefore, how efficient the
capital market will be, it is the information market that determines how information is initially distributed. Analysis of the overall process of market efficiency thus requires careful consideration
of the structure of the information market.
A.

The Central Role of Information Costs

Since efficiency in the capital market depends on the distribution of information, it is ultimately a function of the cost of information-to traders. The lower the cost of particular information, the
wider will be its distribution, the more effective will be the capital
market mechanism operating to reflect it in prices, and the more
efficient will be the market with respect to it. 13' Understanding
market efficiency, then, requires detailed analysis of the nature
and dynamics of information costs.
131

We recognize that the market reflects expected returns from investments in informa-

tion as well as the cost of information. The problems associated with assuring a return to
investment in information costs was briefly considered in Section II, supra text accompanying notes 88-91. We return to this problem again in Section IV after the development of the

cost side of the market. See infra text accompanying notes 198-205.
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A Taxonomy of Information Costs

Information costs may be divided into three categories, each corresponding to one of the three forms of active response to uncertainty described in Section I. The first category is costs of acquisition. These costs will differ in character depending on whether one
is the originator of the information or only its subsequent recipient. For the originator, acquisition costs are the costs of producing
the information in the first place (as with a discovery or innovation). For the subsequent recipient, acquisition costs are those of
securing access to information produced by someone else. This
may be done either with the originator's cooperation, as through
purchase, or despite the originator's efforts to prevent access, as, at
the extreme, through industrial espionage.
The second category is the cost of processinginformation once it
is acquired. 13 2 For both the originator and a subsequent recipient,
processing costs are best exemplified by investment in human capital. Evaluation of information, whether self-produced or acquired
from others, requires special skills, such as a facility in accounting,
finance or securities analysis, that can ordinarily be obtained only
through investment in expensive professional training. The cost of
such training is reflected in the wages of the skilled employee or in
the opportunity costs of his or her principal.
The third category of information costs arises from the problem
of verification. Here the task is to determine the quality of information. How does the acquirer of information determine its accuracy? Like acquisition costs, the expense of verification manifests
itself differently depending on whether one is the originator of the
information or a subsequent recipient. For the originator, verification costs take the form of further investments to determine the
accuracy of the existing information by, for example, hiring an expert to evaluate it.15 3 A subsequent recipient may undertake similar efforts, but its principal verification cost is that of determining
132 When information is acquired by purchase, the acquisition and processing categories
of information costs merge to some extent. For example, purchasers must incur processing
costs before they can set a price for the information they seek to acquire. The same problem
also arises with respect to verification costs. See infra text accompanying note 145. Despite
the potential blurring of our categories when information is acquired by purchase, they remain analytically useful. Moreover, not all information is acquired by purchase.
13" This example of verification costs is taken from C. Holloway, Decision Making Under
Uncertainty 351 (1979) (expected value of imperfect information).
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the veracity of the originator. The originator will have an incentive
to act opportunistically by misrepresenting the accuracy, and
therefore the value, of the information. 3 4 In this case, verification
costs may take the form of a direct investigation by the subsequent
recipient, similar in character to the efforts undertaken by an originator, or of alternative verification techniques such as bonding or
13 5
the use of third party experts.
2. Market Responses to Information Costs
Market participants shape the cost structure of the information
market by their efforts to reduce each category of information
costs.1,3 6 Consider, for example, how a general contractor who bids
on a construction contract might respond to verification costs. The
134 The difficulty of assuring oneself of the value of purchased information has been recognized for some time. See, e.g., Hirschiefer, The Private and Social Value of Information
and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 Am. Econ. Rev. 561 (1971). More generally, the
difficulty presented is opportunism, or "self-interest seeking with guile." Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 23 J.L. & Econ. 233, 234
n.3 (1979). See generally 0. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust
Implications 7-10, 26-56 (1975). While opportunism is typically treated as a risk associated
with voluntary exchanges, the problem of verification does not disappear when the originator of the information parts with it involuntarily. Suppose the originator suspects the possibility of espionage. The originator's response-"opportunistic" in the sense we use the
term-would be to alter the information so as to render it misleading. Allied efforts during
World War II to mislead German intelligence as to the site of the invasion of France is one
historical example of this phenomenon. More recent examples include the sting operation
undertaken by IBM to interfere with industrial espionage directed at it, see Tinnin, How
IBM Stung Hitachi, Fortune, Mar. 7, 1983, at 50, and efforts by Convergent Technologies,
Inc., to mislead its competitors by spreading inaccurate rumors about its research work. As
Convergent's president described the practice, "[i]f we became uncomfortable that somebody knew too much, we would vector it off [misdirect their attention]." Larson & Dolan,
Thinking Small: Large Computer Firms Sprout Little Divisions For Good, Fast Work, Wall
St. J., Aug. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 1. See also supra notes 81 & 89 (misinformation through trade
and price decoding).
1-1"Bonding" occurs when the originator of information puts at risk an asset that is forfeited if the information is less accurate than represented. This approach and the range of
other actions that can be taken to reduce verification costs is considered infra text accompanying notes 136-42. The general problem of verification costs, in relation to products as well
as information, is surveyed in Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets,
25 J.L. & Econ. 27 (1982).
136 Market participants always have a cost incentive to minimize market failures of all
sorts. Continuing market imperfections then point not to the futility of their efforts, but to
the presence of frictions that are irreducible through market efforts. This point is made with
respect to externalities generally by Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & Econ.
141 (1979), and with respect to information problems by Barzel, Some Fallacies in Interpretation of Information Costs, 20 J.L. & Econ. 291 (1977).
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size of the contractor's bid depends on, among other things, the
accuracy of information provided by a subcontractor about the
completion date for its portion of the project. If the general contractor believes that there is a fifty percent chance that this information is incorrect and that the resulting delay will increase overall costs by $100,000, the general contractor's bid must be $50,000
higher to reflect the potential inaccuracy. 13 7 The general contractor
therefore has an incentive to invest in verification, because more
accurate information-a lower probability that the information is
incorrect-allows it to make a lower and more competitive bid.
But some forms of verification will be more costly than others, in
that they will assure less accuracy for a given expenditure. 138 One
approach to the verification problem is "pre-purchase verification"
by the recipient of information. In this case, the general contractor
would itself investigate the subcontractor by, for example, speaking with others for whom the subcontractor has worked or with the
subcontractor's bank. This approach is costly, however, not only
because the general contractor must expand resources to acquire
the verifying information, but also because the information itself is
of limited usefulness. The fact that the subcontractor has completed other projects on time in the past may not be sufficient assurance that it will do so again. An incentive exists not only to
verify but to obtain high quality verification as economically as
possible.
For this purpose, an alternative form of pre-purchase verification that requires the sub-contractor's cooperation may prove far
more successful. The subcontractor may simply warrant that its information is of the represented quality; i.e., that it will complete
the project by the promised date. This allows the general contractor to spend less on verification, because its bid may be made as if
the subcontractor's information were completely accurate. If the
information proves inaccurate, the subcontractor bears the cost.13 9

137

For simplicity, the example assumes that the general contractor is risk neutral.

138

Techniques used to reduce all three categories of information cost are considered in

Section IIIB, infra text accompanying notes 143-67.
139 Of course, the general contractor must still incur some verification costs to determine
whether the subcontractor can satisfy its monetary obligation if it breaches its warranty.

The general contractor may resort to credit investigations, letters of credit, and bonding
companies to reduce these costs. Note also that the subcontractor will require compensation
for providing a warranty that shifts the risk of inaccurate information. However, since the
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The general contractor can then learn the true accuracy of the information costlessly as the project proceeds. As a result, its total
information costs are reduced, and its bid is more likely to
140
succeed.
Economizing on verification costs, moreover, is not limited to a
particular technique. Indeed, warranties may prove to be wholly
ineffective where the information in question is not the prediction
of a single future event-that a project will be completed on
time-but is rather a subjective probability distribution of future
results."" Here, subsequent events would not necessarily reveal the
accuracy of information; a party who received a warranty would
thus have to expend substantial resources to determine whether its
warranty had been violated. In such settings, alternative economizing techniques are more effective. For example, the parties may
use information intermediaries who offer economies of specialization, scale, and scope in verification that are not available to the
1 42
individual acquirers of information.
B. Information Costs and Market Efficiency
Our special interest in the information market's economizing
process is its relationship to capital market efficiency. If, as we argue, capital market efficiency is a function of information costs,
then economizing on information costs pushes the capital market
in the direction of greater efficiency. Because the information market determines the breadth of initial distribution of information to
the capital market, our approach suggests that the inefficiencies of
subcontractor can more easily verify its own information than can the general contractor,
the subcontractor will be the cheaper risk bearer in the absence of significantly different
levels of risk aversion.
110 This technique not only responds to the verification problem, but does so in a way
that minimizes the cost of the response. The burden of verification is put on the subcontractor, the party for whom information costs are the lowest. It is simply cheaper for the subcontractor to gather information bearing on the probabilities of his own performance. See
Barzel, supra note 135, at 28-32.
M An example is a prediction of the likelihood of a borrower defaulting on an outstanding debt.
142 See, e.g., Leland & Pyle, Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial
Intermediaries, 32 J. Fin. 371 (1977); see infra notes 147-48. Information intermediaries arbitrage information asymmetries with the same beneficial effect on markets as in any other
arbitrage setting. This phenomenon, like that of information asymmetries in general, is pervasive and will receive substantial attention in Sections IIIB and IV, infra text accompanying notes 143-205.
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the information market-particularly inefficiencies in the distribution of information that arise from transactions costs-should be
143
the focus of analysis.
The overall relationship between information costs, information
cost economizing techniques, and the distribution of information,
can be effectively depicted in graphic form. Figure Two displays
the three categories of information costs, and the market economizing techniques that have developed to reduce each category of
costs, along a continuum of absolute cost. Consider first the expense of acquiring information. Where an originator desires to protect its product, the cost of acquisition by a subsequent recipient
will be quite high. Information about the product will not be for
sale at all or, at best, its sale price will be high. The market will
respond to the high cost of the information through economizing
techniques such as investigative analysis, careful surveillance of
the originator's behavior, or industrial espionage.
These techniques will reduce, to some extent, the acquisition
cost to subsequent recipients. In absolute terms, however, cost will
remain high for at least two reasons. First, these economizing techniques are themselves quite expensive. Over and above the direct
costs, how does one evaluate, for example, the indirect expense to
the Japanese computer companies recently indicted for purchasing
stolen IBM business secrets?14 4 Second, the accuracy of the information acquired is subject to substantial uncertainty. Verification
therefore becomes a critical concern; yet the acquirer cannot use
most of the conventional market techniques for economizing on
verification costs because these require the cooperation of the information's originator. One could hardly expect the originator and
involuntary transferor of information to assist in its verification, if
only because most of the techniques for acquiring information
from such a recalcitrant originator depend on the originator's igno1 45
rance of the effort.

'll This relationship was alluded to, but not pursued, in T. Copeland & J. Weston, supra
note 19, at 204. See also Gonedes, supra note 19 (exploring information production and
capital market efficiency in the context of external accounting).
' See Tinnin, supra note 134, at 50 ("After the arrests, one of Hitachi's foremost objectives in its legal maneuvers was to avoid a trial in which this embarrassing material would
be displayed for the world to see and hear.").
'" If the originator were aware of the surveillance, he could take steps either to falsify the
information, see supra note 134, or to stop the surveillance.
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Other examples of market economizing on acquisition costs occur when the originator makes no effort to protect the information,
but merely decides not to incur the full costs of distributing it.146
We then see market efforts to economize on acquisition costs
through collectivization at both the private and public levels. At
the private level, for example, organizations of securities professionals hold cooperative programs in which high company officials
speak to many analysts at once, thus reducing the cost of access for
any individual analyst. Indeed, the very existence of information
intermediaries such as financial and securities experts reflects, in
part, the potential for economies of scale and scope 14 in efforts to
economize on information costs. 14 8

1

0 In this case, the information in question is typically not a product that its originator

intends to sell, but rather a by-product of its principal activity. A good example of this
phenomenon is the gathering of information by analysts through such indirect sources as
reports required by trade associations or governmental agencies. Some of this information
might not have otherwise been disclosed by the company. Indeed, the company may have
been unaware that the information would be considered important by analysts; or it may
have feared that disclosure would have an adverse effect on the price of its stock, while
nondisclosure would not. But cf. Grossman & Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35
J. Fin. 323 (1980) (failure to disclose can lead to conclusion that information was unfavorable); see infra note 156. On the other hand, the company has an obvious incentive to disclose
many types of favorable information, thereby reducing the acquisition costs of subsequent
recipients. Recipients then face the problem of verifying the information to determine if the
originator has behaved opportunistically.
17 The fact that substantial capital may be needed to acquire and store information generates the potential for economies of scale in this context. Economies of scale in general
arise where increased volume allows operation at a lower portion of a declining average cost
curve. See generally F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 81104 (2d ed. 1980). A related phenomenon is the experience curve, which describes an inverse
relationship between cost and growth in cumulative total output, rather than growth in capacity per period as in economies of scale. Here the idea is akin to that of a learning curve.
Production becomes more efficient as the degree of experience increases, because, all other
things being equal, we get better at things as we do them more. See generally M. Salter &
W. Weinhold, Diversification Through Acquisition: Strategies for Creating Economic Value
65-78 (1979).
Economies of scope, on the other hand, shift the inquiry from the impact of volume on
the production costs of a single product to the impact of producing a number of related
products on the production costs of each. The concept has two general components. The
first focuses on economies of hard product costs, such as the ability to use common production facilities for different products. See, e.g., Bailey & Friedlaender, Market Structure and
Multi-Product Industries, 20 J. Econ. Lit. 1024 (1982). The second seeks to explain why
such economies are exploited by a single firm in contrast to other arrangements; it stresses
diversification as a means of avoiding high transactions costs. See Teece, Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm, 3 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 39 (1982).
148 Intermediaries play an even greater role in reducing information processing and verifi-
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At the collective level, legislation such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,149 which requires continual disclosure of extensive current information by public companies, eliminates the repetitive cost of individual acquisition of information by each analyst.
This form of mandatory disclosure collectivizes information acquisition by requiring the originators of information to distribute it
and, in some cases, even requiring them to create it. 150
Market efforts to reduce acquisition costs also occur at the lower
end of the cost continuum. For example, a company that wishes to
distribute information indicating favorable corporate prospects
may do so at little cost merely by issuing a press release. The financial press as an institution functions to reduce the acquisition
costs of information recipients, in large part by reducing the costs
151
of voluntary distribution to the originators of information.
Figure Two also shows how markets economize on the costs of
processing information. Perhaps the most pervasive example is the
specialized business of securities analysis itself, which permits substantial economies of scale and scope in utilizing human capital.
Similar economies are available in the use of the support equipment, such as computer hardware and software, that is increasingly
necessary for performance of the analyst's task. As a result, there
are specialists in information processing, such as research firms
and the research departments of brokerage firms, whose functional
advantage is their ability to process information more cheaply than
non-specialists.I5

cation costs. See infra text accompanying notes 152 & 159.
"' 15 U.S.C. § 78a-kk (1982).
150 Collectivization of production and distribution costs also exploits the economies of
scope that exist when the company is already producing similar information and has an
established means of distributing it. Cf. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 3, at 634-36
(mandated disclosure reduces the incentives to expend resources on non-productive private
information search). This is consistent with a "public choice" approach to the regulatory
process, which posits that "regulations will tend to favor (subsidize) relatively small and
well organized groups that have a high per capita stake in the regulations. . . ." S. Phillips
& J. Zecher, The SEC and the Public Interest 22 (1981). The financial analyst community,
which most directly benefits from a reduction in the cost of producing information about
publicly traded companies, is precisely the type of group that would be expected to lobby
for the adoption of such regulations. Id. at 22-23. See infra text accompanying note 244.
'5 The financial press also plays a role in economizing on processing and verification
costs. See infra note 152.
"28The financial press plays a similar role, offering almost continual analysis of corporate
and economic prospects. Such collectivization of the processing function reduces costs, but
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The category of verification costs, however, yields the most interesting array of market techniques for reducing information
costs. Consider the producer of a new financial product. The producer has an obvious incentive to supply the market with information indicating that the product is worth its asking price. 155 Indeed,
the product can be described generally as only an uncertain stream
of future income; information concerning the risk and timing of
that stream is part of the product itself. But even if distribution by
the seller eliminates the cost of acquiring information, a would-be
purchaser is still subject to an information cost problem. How does
it know whether the information the producer supplies is accurate?
After all, the information's producer will often stand to benefit by
leading the recipient to overvalue the product. Where the quality
of the information is difficult to determine, its buyer has little
choice but to assume that it, and the product it concerns, are of
lower quality than represented. Only by discounting the information's accuracy can the buyer be certain that he or she has not
unknowingly overpaid. The result is that sellers have too little incentive to provide better information, because "it won't be believed anyway." Poor quality information drives higher quality information from the market,""' and individual buyers who wish to
obtain more accurate predictions of a security's value can do so
only by making substantial individual investments in verification.
Better products will be mispriced because the capital market will
15 5
not efficiently reflect information about their superior quality.

it may discourage independent efforts by traders to process the information more quickly,
thoroughly, or creatively. Assuming that the economic advantage to be derived from individual efforts is relatively small, a trader would have to engage in a substantial volume of
trading to justify such expenditures. This again suggests a role for intermediaries who,
through aggregation, control a volume of trading large enough to make the effort profitable.
See J. Lorie & M. Hamilton, supra note 7, at 100.
153 See, e.g., Grossman & Hart, supra note 146.
154 This is an example of the "lemon problem." E.g., Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons":
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970); Grossman, The
Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality, 24 J.L. &
Econ. 461 (1981); Wilson, The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection, 11
Bell J. Econ. 108 (1980).
,55 One qualification is in order. As both a conceptual and an empirical matter, there is a
substantial relationship between market efficiency and the idea that assets are correctly
priced. To say that the market has incorrectly priced an asset is to say either that one can
correctly predict the proper price of an asset and the market is inefficient because it has
priced the asset other than as predicted; or, alternatively, that the market price is efficient
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A broad range of market techniques has developed to deal with
this problem by reducing verification costs. At the most costly end
of the continuum are solutions that rely solely on buyer verification without the assistance of the originator. For example, buyers
may employ experts, such as accountants, lawyers, or business consultants, to examine the offered information. Although these techniques still require each buyer to verify the information individually, they do achieve economies of scale with respect to the skills
necessary for verification.
Yet these and other buyer verification techniques that function
without the seller's cooperation are very costly. Substantial additional savings in verification costs are achieved if the seller itself
verifies the accuracy of the information. One such approach relies
on the efforts of information sellers, unaided by intermediaries, to
"signal" in a believable fashion that they offer high quality information. Signaling in this context means the distribution of a particular type of information. In general, parties signal when they
desire to convey information about an attribute that is not otherwise discernible. In our case, that attribute is the seller's propensity to misrepresent the accuracy of the offered information. For
the signal to be effective, the seller must show that its interests do
not lie in misrepresenting accuracy. The signal therefore contains
no new information about the accuracy of the original information
in the absence of something that demonstrates that the signal it156
self is accurate.

and it is the prediction-the asset pricing theory-that is incorrect. See Jensen, supra note
9, at 96. Indeed, the most common statistical technique for measuring market efficiency is
in fact a joint test of both market efficiency and the capital asset pricing model. See, e.g., G.
Foster, supra note 12, at 363.
156 The signal must be one that cannot be reproduced by another company whose information is inaccurate. The need for a signal exists precisely because the observable characteristics of the firms do not allow one to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate information. If the signal of a high accuracy firm can be imitated by a low accuracy firm, it will
not "facilitate distinguishing between firms whose decisions have different unobservable
characteristics." Gonedes, Corporate Signaling, External Accounting, and Capital Market
Equilibrium: Evidence on Dividends, Income, and Extraordinary Items, 16 J. Acct. Research
26, 30 (1978). Scholars have used signaling theory to help explain an increasing range of
financial decisions. See, e.g., Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and
"The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy, 10 Bell J. Econ. 259 (1979) (dividends as a signal of expected cash flows under certain conditions); Gonedes, supra note 19 (financial accounting);
Grossman & Hart, supra note 146 (corporate takeover bids); Ross, The Determinants of
Financial Structure: The Incentive Signalling Approach, 8 Bell J. Econ. 23 (1977) (capital
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A typical but costly form of signaling is the investment by sellers
in firm-specific capital, such as reputation and advertising, whose
value would be reduced if the quality of the product were lower
than represented. 157 In situations where this form of investment is
not feasible, sellers may employ hostage techniques; for example, a
seller may post a bond that is forfeited to the buyer if the informa158
tion is of lower quality than represented.
In other situations, however, the costs of signaling or bonding by
the seller will simply be too high; the seller will lack the capital
and time to invest in reputation or the funds to post a bond."5" In
many such cases, outside specialists acting as information intermediaries will offer their own reputation in lieu of the sellers' as
a bond of quality.16 0 Examples of such specialists in the products
structure).
117

Barzel, supra note 135; Grossman, supra note 154, at 470-77; Klein & Leffler, The Role

of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615 (1981).
"I See Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Am.
Econ. Rev. 519 (1983). A hostage strategy goes beyond simple signaling. It serves not only as
a screening technique to allow sellers who are more accurate to identify themselves, but also
as a means of reducing the seller's incentive to behave opportunistically when screening
alone will not suffice. For the screening technique to be effective, the seller must contemplate future transactions where a penalty will be exacted for having incorrectly signaled. See
Klein & Leffler, supra note 157; Telser, A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus.
27 (1980). Indeed, a significant portion of Klein and Leffler's analysis is devoted to describing the circumstances in which the ex post penalty for cheating will exceed the ex ante gain.
The hostage technique extends the screening approach to situations where no future transactions are contemplated.
159 One example involves the role of the investment banker in the mergers and acquisition
context. The investment banker acts as an information seller who must verify the accuracy
of the information (the acquisition opportunity) it offers for sale to its client. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51
(1982). One way to reduce the client's verification costs is for the client to "pay" some portion of the investment banker's fee by allocating to the banker some of the client's posttransaction investment banking services. If the information proves to be inaccurate, the client can penalize the investment banker by obtaining these services from another source.
This is, however, a very expensive verification technique; it is available only to a diversified
information seller, like an investment banker, who can offer post-transaction services to the
client. Id. at 59.
,' In some situations a third party is critical to the verification process. Where, for example, the verification problem concerns information provided by the issuer of corporate debt,
the issuer's reputation is already at stake and the promise to repay the debt commits the
entire financial resources of the issuer. Any additional issuer warranty or bond concerning
the accuracy of the information would be superfluous, and some signaling by third parties is
necessary. See generally Thakor, An Exploration of Competitive Signalling Equilibria with
"Third Party" Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance, 37 J. Fin. 717 (1982)
(insurance coverage on corporate debt issue can signal its probability of default). A recent
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market are the Underwriter's Laboratory and the Good Housekeeping Seal; in the financial markets, the most obvious example is
the role played by rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's and
Moody's.1 6 1 A less obvious but similar role is also played by financial intermediaries, although the verification technique used by
these information agents differs.1 62 Rather than demonstrating
confidence in the accuracy of the seller's information by staking
their reputation on it, these financial intermediaries signal their
belief by purchasing the seller's offering for their own account,
thereby staking their future directly on the accuracy of the seller's
information.1 6 s
A collective, and therefore potentially less expensive, solution to
the problem is the legislative imposition of civil and criminal penalties on low quality producers. By imposing costs only on those
producers who would exploit high buyer verification costs by
falsely pretending to provide quality information, such legislation
makes it more costly for producers of low quality goods to mimic
the behavior of high quality producers. At the extreme, well-defined and energetically enforced legislation of this type turns the
lemon problem on its head and drives low quality producers from
the market. This process may explain in part why trade associations that are dominated by high quality firms often lobby for
more stringent legislative standards and greater enforcement of
64
those standards.
development in municipal financing illustrates this phenomenon. Commercial banks have
begun issuing letters of credit to insure municipal bonds against the risk of default. Standard & Poor's has disclosed that, in rating these bonds, it focuses not on the risk of issuer
default, but on the risk that the bank will default on the letter of credit. Carrington, Bank
Letters of Credit Proliferate, Creating Some New Safety Fears, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1983, at
29, col. 3.
61

We will later argue that the role of the investment banker in initial and other risky

public offerings is that of a "reputational intermediary." See infra text accompanying notes

194-197.
I'l We do not, of course, argue that information intermediation entirely explains the exis-

tence of these institutions. Economies of scale and scope are likely to combine with conditions of asymmetrical information and concerns of confidentiality to explain the precise services offered by particular intermediaries. See Campbell & Kracaw, supra note 19.
M'See Campbell & Kracaw, supra note 19; Leland & Pyle, supra note 142; Thakor, supra

note 160. It is precisely this type of behavior that facilitates the trade decoding mechanism.
See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
164 Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982), which imposes

liability on underwriters and others for misstatements or omissions in a registration statement, may fit this model. Certainly fairness does not compel imposing liability on under-
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Finally, we should briefly consider the low cost end of the verification cost continuum. What residual verification costs attend the
sale of information by sellers who have preexisting investments in
reputation, such as AT&T, or accompany the sale of information
where collective responses to verification costs, such as legislatively
imposed penalties for misrepresentation, have already effectively
limited entry by low quality producers? Here the e5residual costs associated with verification should be quite small
Figure Two summarizes the cost structure of the information
market. Levels of cost associated with particular information differ
depending on the extent of acquisition, processing, and verification
costs, as well as on the availability of economizing techniques.
With this structure in place, we are now in a position to complete
the inquiry with which this section began, by examining the relationship between information costs, on the one hand, and the
"availability" of information to the capital market, on the other.
Figure Three superimposes Fama's original weak/semi-strong/
strong form classification scheme, and the relative efficiency conwriters in amounts substantially in excess of their profit from engaging in the transaction.
Nor is the imposition of liability on underwriters the best means of spreading costs among
potential victims. Rather, imposing substantial liability on the underwriter, but with a defense that relieves it of liability if it has made a diligent investigation of the issuer, is better
explained by a belief that the behavior of the issuer, the ultimate object of the legislation, is
constrained more effectively by imposing liability on the issuer's agent than by increasing
the penalties imposed on the issuer itself. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and
the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 857, 895-96 (1984). The puzzle is to explain, in
light of a public choice approach to regulation, see supra note 150, why the underwriting
community countenanced the imposition of liability.
The historical setting in which the Securities Act of 1933 was adopted probably made
some expansion of underwriters' liability inevitable. See Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 Va. L. Rev. 776, 794-95 (1972).
Since 1933, however, the only serious effort to limit underwriters' liability has been the
movement that produced the 1934 amendments to section 11, and even they left liability
substantially in excess of the underwriter's spread. The traditional explanation for the equanimity with which underwriters have accepted statutory liability is that actual liability has
seldom been imposed under section 11. We believe, however, that our analysis suggests an
additional explanation. In the absence of liability, it would be difficult for a high quality
investment banker to signal its quality to the market in a manner that could not be imitated
by a lower quality firm. To the extent that section 11 liability is likely to fall more heavily
on low than on high quality investment bankers, it would be in the interest of high quality
firms to submit the industry to such liability, thereby imposing additional costs on low quality firms and making it more expensive for them to imitate the signals of high quality firms.
'" This fact is reflected in recent developments in the investment banking business. See
infra note 206.
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tinuum that underlies it, on Figure Two's depiction of the cost
structure of the information market. This juxtaposition reveals
that the relative efficiency continuum substantially parallels the
information cost continuum. A market is strong form efficient if its
prices reflect inside information that is privately held; by definition, the originator of such information wishes to prevent its dissemination. Not surprisingly, all three categories of information
costs in this region of Figure Three are at the high end of the cost
continuum. Acquisition costs are high because they involve such
costly techniques as monitoring the originator's behavior or engaging in commercial espionage. Processing costs are high because the
information is less intelligible than it would be if the originator
had voluntarily cooperated with the recipient, and because the
often surreptitious methods of acquiring such information prevent
pooling or other cooperative means of achieving scale economies in
processing information. Finally, many of the most effective techniques for economizing on verification costs are unavailable because of the originator's unwillingness to cooperate.
Fama's semi-strong form category also corresponds to a particular range of the information cost continuum in Figure Three. Cooperative efforts frequently reduce the total costs of acquiring information in this region and also achieve economies of scale and
scope in processing costs, often through the services of information
intermediaries such as financial analysts. Moreover, the availability of verification techniques that rely on the cooperation of originators of information now make economizing on verification costs
more effective. These techniques include bonding and hostage
strategies, the use of third party verifiers like certified public accountants, 16 6 and the good offices of intermediaries such as rating

,', While part of their value lies in their ability to exploit economies of scale and scope,
third-party verifiers such as certified public accountants also function as reputational intermediaries. Central to this function is the accountant's reputation for independence; only

if the accountant can be expected to treat the client at arm's length is its message of verification believable. This explains the emphasis on independence both in public regulation, see
17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b)-(c) (1983) (requirement of independence for recognition as certified

public accountant by Securities and Exchange Commission), and in studies of the demand
for public accounting services. See, e.g., Benston, The Market for Public Accounting Services: Demand, Supply and Regulation, 2 Acct. J. 2 (1979); Ng, Supply and Demand for

Auditing Services and the Nature of Regulations in Auditing, in "The Accounting Establishment" in Perspective 99 (S. Davidson ed. 1979); R. Watts & J. Zimmerman, The Market for
Independence and Independent Auditors (June 1981) (University of Rochester Center for
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services and financial intermediaries.
Fama's final category, weak form efficiency, parallels cost conditions at the low end of the cost continuum in Figure Three. In this
region, acquisition costs are minimal and the marginal costs of producing and distributing information are low. Such conditions are
perfectly consistent with the form of information typically associated with weak form efficiency, namely, historical price information. This information is an ordinary byproduct of market trading:
the organized securities exchanges produce it as a routine service,16 7 and the financial press serves to collectivize its low cost
dissemination.
An important insight emerges from the discussion of the correlation between the relative efficiency continuum described by
Fama's categories and the cost characteristics of the market for information: relative efficiency is a function of information costs.
Holding constant the capital market mechanisms discussed in Section II, the market becomes more efficient as the cost of information decreases. Put in terms of the Fama definition, the information available to be reflected in price by the capital market is
determined by cost conditions in the information market.
IV. THE CAPITAL

MARKET AND THE INFORMATION MARKET:

THEORETICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE SYNTHESIS

In Sections II and III we considered separately the two elements
of the common definition of market efficiency in order to understand the mechanisms that determine the level of capital market
efficiency. Looking first in Section II at the capital market mechanisms that reflect information in price, we argued that which
Research in Government & Business, Working Paper No. GPB 80-10). An issuer can internalize some of the economies of scale and scope of outside auditors by conducting a substantial portion of its audits internally, but it can never internalize their reputational role.
16' An attempt further to reduce the costs of acquiring price information is reflected in
the efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission to create a National Market System
pursuant to the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 1, 89 Stat. 97
(1975). These efforts include, with varying degrees of commitment and success, the creation
of consolidated tape and quotation reporting systems; the linkage of major exchanges, by
providing participants in any exchange access to offers on all others; and a linkage of NASDAQ, the over-the-counter quotation system, with the Intermarket Trading System, which
links the New York Stock Exchange with major regional exchanges. See generally R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 2, at 492-97; Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 883 (1981).
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mechanism is operative, and the concomitant efficiency of the market with respect to particular information, is a function of the initial distribution of that information among traders. A wider distribution triggers a more effective capital market mechanism and
thus makes for greater relative efficiency in the capital market. We
then shifted our focus in Section III to what determines the initial
distribution of information among traders. This required examination of the cost structure of the information market, which led us
to conclude that, holding capital market mechanisms constant, the
distribution of a particular piece of information is a function of its
cost. If information is less costly, it is more widely distributed and
more efficiently reflected in securities prices. This approach integrates the functioning of the information and capital markets.
From the perspective of the capital market, market efficiency is a
function of the initial distribution of information among traders;
from the perspective of the information market, market efficiency
is a function of the costs associated with particular information.
The common factor is information costs.
Our integration of the capital and information markets is depicted in Figure Four, which combines the relationship between
capital market mechanisms and relative efficiency shown in Figure
Two with the relationship between cost conditions in the information market and relative efficiency shown in Figure Three. As in
Figures Two and Three, the level of market efficiency appears on
the capital market side as a function of the initial distribution of
information among traders, and on the information market side as
a function of the information costs attending that information.
The juxtaposition of these two relationships demonstrates the link
between the capital and information markets. The information
cost continuum, lying immediately above the measure of relative
efficiency, parallels the distribution of information continuum, lying immediately below a similar index of efficiency. As information
costs decline, more-and better-information is available to more
traders, and the market becomes more efficient, both because the
information is better and because its wider distribution triggers a
more effective capital market mechanism. The intuition underlying
this relationship is also reflected in Figure Four. Consider the most
efficient range of the relative efficiency continuum, that associated
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with the weak form portion of the Fama trichotomy.," The acquisition cost of information in this range can be as low as the price of
a newspaper. Such information is also easy to process and nearly
costless to verify.8 9 As a result, it is widely distributed. 170 Indeed,
it almost meets the sufficient condition for market efficiency reflected in the perfect market assumption: that the information be
1 71
costlessly available to all traders.
The core of our analysis, then, is that the cost of information
critically determines market efficiency because it dictates not only
the amount of information attending a particular security but also
the distribution of that information among traders, which in turn
168 An overwhelming body of empirical evidence attests to the existence of weak form
efficiency. See supra note 25.
16I A possibility of price manipulation always exists, but the costs of policing against this
danger suggest a collective rather than an individual response, consistent with the anti-manipulation provisions of the Securities Exchange Act. From this perspective, the prohibitions in section 9 of the Exchange Act against, for example, creating "actual or apparent
active trading in [any] . . . security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for
the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others," 15 U.S.C. §
78i(a)(2) (1982), are a collective effort to preserve the integrity of the trading information
upon which the capital market mechanisms, particularly derivatively informed trading, depend. So understood, the Securities Exchange Act makes it illegal to create "noise" intentionally or to employ price and volume to disseminate misleading signals that reduce the
informativeness of price. See supra note 120 (concept of noise); supra note 89 (market
manipulation).
170 In an important sense, Figure Four, as well as the preceding figures, is far too simple.
(This conclusion is precisely the opposite of that reached by some readers of an earlier draft
of this article.) The problem is that the vertical relationships reflected in the figures and in
the preceding text do not adequately express the fact that these relationships are not fixed,
but will differ depending on the type of information in question and its institutional setting.
For example, it is easy to imagine types of information, such as newspaper reports of arcane
scientific discoveries, whose acquisition costs are low but whose processing costs will be
quite high. This suggests that the three horizontal arrays of information costs really ought
to be constructed as if they were part of a slide rule and could be repositioned in relationship to each other as the particular situation required. To do so, however, would turn the
figures into an impediment rather than an aid to understanding. This is, to be sure, precisely the criticism leveled against the figures originally, but at this point even their creators
would agree.
An additional complication should also be noted. The very act of processing or verifying
information can transform it into different information, see supra text accompanying notes
43-44. As a result, facially identical information may have different distributions and be the
subject of different capital market mechanisms. Thus, for example, the surface content of a
bit of widely distributed information-perhaps new demographic figures-will be incorporated into price via the universally informed trading mechanism, while the deeper insights
of those who invested in processing or verification will be incorporated into price via the
professionally informed trading or derivatively informed trading mechanisms.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
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determines the operative capital market mechanism. This focus on
information costs also identifies the invisible hand that moves the
market toward greater informational efficiency. Information market incentives lead to economizing on information costs and thus
to the availability of more effective capital market mechanisms.
The result is an integrated understanding of the mechanisms of
market efficiency that we believe provides both theoretical insights
and new opportunities for employing the market efficiency concept
to inform regulatory policy.
In this section we apply our synthesis of the operation of the
capital and information markets to two theoretical puzzles. The
first is to explain the investment banker's role in increasing the
efficiency of the market's response to innovative financial products. The second is to understand the apparent conflict between
empirical evidence that the capital market is weak form efficient
and the theoretical insight, discussed in Section IIC,172 that prices

can never be fully efficient with respect to any genre of
information.
A.

The Role of the Investment Banker

Consider the problem of a company that has developed an innovative senior security that better responds to a problem endemic to
all senior securities, namely the risk of opportunistic behavior by
junior securities holders. Once the terms of a senior security are
fixed and it is sold, the holders of senior and junior securities face
an inherent conflict of interests. Because the holders of senior securities paid a price based on the existing risk of the business, a
post-issuance increase in risk transfers wealth from them to the
holders of junior securities.' Purchasers of senior securities recog172

See supra text accompanying note 90.

173

This may be seen by recharacterizing the interest held by the junior security holders

as an option. The junior security holders have "sold" the company to the senior security
holders in return for the amount paid for the senior securities, a management contract, and
a call option entitling the junior security holders to repurchase the company by satisfying
the terms of the senior securities: repaying the face value of the indebtedness where the
senior securities are in the form of debt, or continuing the dividends where the senior securities are in the form of preferred stock. If the company is worth more than the exercise price
of the option, the junior security holders will exercise their option. If the company is worth
less, the junior security holders presumably will not exercise it, by defaulting on the debt or
passing preferred dividends. They will thereby allow the senior security holders to "keep"
the company through a formal bankruptcy reorganization or through the usual right of pre-
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nize this risk, however, and reduce the price they will pay in anticipation of opportunistic behavior by junior security holders. In the
end, the cost of such opportunism is borne by the company
through receipt of a lower price for its senior securities. It is therefore in the company's interest to reduce the potential for opportunistic behavior by junior security holders. This effort commonly
takes the form of contractual limitations expressed either in the
bond indenture when the senior security is debt 174 or in the preferred stock contract when the senior security is equity. 175 Because
no contractual prohibition is perfect, however, the potential for
some opportunism remains. In theory, an issuer who can further
reduce this potential by devising a more effective contractual prohibition will secure a higher price for an otherwise identical
security.
Now suppose an issuer develops an innovative contract term
that dramatically reduces the potential for opportunism by junior
security holders. 176 How do market prices come to reflect the value

ferred holders to name the board of directors when preferred dividends are in arrears. See
generally Black & Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. Pol.
Econ. 637 (1973) (analyzing corporate liabilities as combinations of options); Gilson, The
Case against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 775, 834 n.229 (1982) (analyzing conflicts between preferred and common stockholders). Examination of the determinants of the value of the junior security
holders' option shows that an increase in the riskiness of the company's business results in
an increase in the value of the option (and a corresponding decrease in the value of the
senior security). See, e.g., R. Brealey & S. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 433-41
(1981); J. Van Home, supra note 41, at 80-88. While an increase in risk-the variability of
the potential value of the business-increases both the potential gain and loss of the option
holder relative to the exercise price, the gain is unlimited while the loss is bounded by the
price paid for the option. If the company is worth less than the exercise price, the junior
security holders simply will not exercise the option. The junior security holders therefore
have a substantial incentive to behave opportunistically by altering the company's investment behavior to increase the risk of its business.
174 See Kalay, Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints, 10 J. Fin.
Econ. 211 (1982); Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. Fin. Econ. 117 (1979). Cf. Ho & Singer, Bond Indenture Provisions and the Risk
of Corporate Debt, 10 J. Fin. Econ. 375 (1982) (examining the effect of alternative bond
indenture provisions on allocation of risk between claimants); John & Kalay, Costly Contracting and Optimal Payout Constraints, 37 J. Fin. 457 (1982) (effort to derive the most
effective form of constraint for a debt contract).
175 Gilson, supra note 173, at 834 n.229.
170 Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Ill. 1978),
aff'd per curiam, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979), and Morgan
Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), demonstrate the continuing potential for such innovation. Both cases hold that high interest rate
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of this innovation? To understand the process by which the innovative security is priced "correctly" by the market, one must first
address the problem of information costs. The difficulty is not, of
course, with the acquisition of information by prospective buyers;
the issuer's interest is to distribute information about the innovation as widely as possible in order to sell the new security. Rather,
the problem lies with the costs to prospective buyers of processing
and verifying information about the innovation. In order to process
the information, buyers must understand how the new security ostensibly reduces the risk of opportunism as well as know how much
the asserted protection is worth. In order to verify the information,
buyers must evaluate its accuracy in light of the danger that the
issuer is opportunistically misrepresenting the value of the
innovation.
It is entirely possible, however, that potential buyers will not
find the new security at all attractive if they have to bear the full
expense of these processing and verification costs. Ironically, one
reason that the new security may not be attractive is itself the result of past market efforts to economize on information costs. Conventional securities that compete with the novel security will have
virtually identical contractual provisions prohibiting opportunism. 1 7 This repeated use of the same form document will eliminate the costs of determining, for each new issue, what alternative
formulations mean and how effective they are.'7 8 But this technique's very success in reducing information costs for issuers using
the "market" form document will also serve to create a barrier for
innovators: buyers' alternative investment opportunities impose far
lower information costs than the innovative product requires. In
securities-preferred stock in Franklin Life and bonds in Morgan Stanley-could be refinanced by the issuer more promptly following a drop in interest rates than language in the
preferred stock contract and bond indenture suggested. Moreover, the effect on the market
price of the preferred stock following announcement of the redemption in Franklin Life
strongly suggests that the market had not anticipated that such refinancing was allowable.
17 Kalay, supra note 174, examined the bond indentures on a randomly selected sample
of 150 companies listed in Moody's Industrial Manual. Of the 135 reporting a form of bond
covenant that limited the amount of dividends that could be paid, 128 used the form recommended by the American Bar Foundation in its Commentaries on Indentures (1971).
17' This suggests an alternative explanation for contractual boilerplate. One does not
change, or even discuss, its content from transaction to transaction not because it is unimportant, but because boilerplate serves to reduce information costs. This function should be
familiar to practicing lawyers who will often save negotiating costs by accepting contractual
formulations from prior transactions with which they are already familiar.
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this situation, how can the market become efficient with respect to
the innovation? Correct pricing will not occur automatically. If
each potential purchaser must educate itself about the innovation
and verify for itself the accuracy and good faith of the issuer, the
information will not be widely distributed. Indeed, some of it may
not be distributed at all because the costs to each potential purchaser may simply be too great. High information costs, then, lead
to a narrow distribution of fully understood and verified information, a comparatively ineffective set of capital market mechanisms,
and market prices that remain in the inefficient range of the relative efficiency continuum. If information costs are high enough, the
issuer might not realize any return on its investment in developing
a better security, and market inefficiency would operate as a com79
plete barrier to innovation.1
It is in the issuer's own interest, then, to help reduce information
costs. Our approach to market efficiency leads to considering the
role of the investment banker as an agent for economizing on information costs. 18 0
Investment bankers are typically seen as having two principal
functions in the distribution of securities. First, investment bankers serve as distributors for the issuer, providing the sales force
and facilities necessary to sell the securities to the public.' 8 ' Second, they provide a form of risk sharing or insurance, at least in
connection with "firm commitment underwriting,"'8 2 that relieves
the issuer of some of the risks inherent in the offering of a security."8 3 But even taken together, these two functions do not entirely
17 In the absence of an expectation of a return on investment in innovation, the issuer
would have no incentive to make the investment.
180 While we discuss the investment banker's function primarily in the context of innovative securities, the investment banker has a role to play whenever verification is costly.
"I'See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 15,807, 44 Fed. Reg. 28,574 (1979), reprinted
in [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,073 (May 9, 1979). See also Baron,
The Incentive Problem and the Design of Investment Banking Contracts, 3 J. Banking &
Fin. 157 (1979) (examining the incentives bearing on the underwriter's performance of the
distribution function).
182 There are two principal forms of underwritten
offerings: best efforts underwriting,
where the underwriter agrees only to use its best efforts to sell the securities, and the issuer
bears the risk that some or all of the securities will not be sold; and firm commitment
underwriting, where the underwriter agrees to purchase the securities from the issuer, and
the subsequent public distribution is, at least technically, for the underwriter's own account.
183 Such risks include the danger that a change in market conditions will affect the price
of the offered security or, alternatively, the number of units that can be sold at the antici-
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explain the modern underwriter's role. While distribution is obviously an important function, a sizable percentage of the total underwriting compensation goes to participants who do not actually
engage in selling the security."" Nor does risk sharing account for
the remainder of the modern underwriting function, since the underwriter need bear little risk even in a firm commitment underwriting.185 In a typical firm commitment underwriting, the price
that the underwriter pays to the issuer is not set, and the underwriter is not committed to purchase the securities, until approximately twenty-four hours before the registration statement is declared effective and the public sale of the securities commences. 8 6
The issuer thus bears virtually all risk of changed market conditions prior to the commencement of sale.18 7 Moreover, the practice
pated price. See, e.g., 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 159-72 (2d ed. 1961); Mandelker &
Raviv, Investment Banking: An Economic Analysis of Optimal Underwriting Contracts, 32
J. Fin. 683, 683-84 (1977) ("Underwriting is the insurance function of bearing the risks of
adverse price fluctuations during the period in which a new issue of securities is being
distributed.").
184 A typical allocation of the underwriting fee in an offering would be 20% to the managing underwriter for having the client, 30% to the members of the underwriting syndicate for
the expenses of the offering, and 50% to those who actually sell the securities at retail. R.
Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 2, at 21. The importance of the distribution function
seems to be growing. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 15,807, supra note 181, at 28,574,
reprinted in [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,073, at 81,758 ("The selling concession in recent years has grown as a percentage of the gross spread, apparently
reflecting the increased importance of selling efforts to a successful underwriting."); Robertson, The Underwriters Have to Offer Even More, Fortune, January 1973, at 116.
185 See Smith, Alternative Methods for Raising Capital: Rights Versus Underwritten Offerings, 5 J. Fin. Econ. 273, 288-89 (1977).
16 See, e.g., Schneider, Manko & Kant, Going Public: Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1981). The time when the offering can commence can be
predicted with precision. The SEC first must advise the issuer that the registration statement is acceptable, and then the statement is typically declared effective immediately following filing of the pricing amendment, which discloses the price set by the purchase agreement. The purchase agreement itself protects against any unforeseen delay by conditioning
the underwriters' obligations to purchase the securities on the prompt effectiveness of the
registration statement. See, e.g., 6 R. Shapiro, A. Sachs & C. Olander, Securities Regulation
Forms, Form 1-3, at 1-38 (1975) (example of purchase agreement).
137 A recent example illustrates the point. Imagic, a privately held manufacturer of video
game cartridges, had filed a registration statement for an initial public offering. It was very
close to signing a purchase agreement when disclosure by a competitor, Atari, of lower than
expected sales and earnings caused a sharp drop in the stock prices of video game manufacturers and, presumably, the price at which the Imagic issue could be sold. The underwriters
did not share in the risk of this event; rather, the offering was cancelled and the issuer bore
the entire risk. See Imagic Inc. to Delay Offer Due to Market's "Unsettled Condition," Wall
St. J., Dec. 13, 1982, at 20, col. 2.
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of soliciting "indications of interest"-non-binding statements of
intent to buy the securities-from prospective purchasers during
the period between the filing of the registration statement and the
commencement of sales further reduces the risk that the securities
will be priced too high.18 8
The only risk that then remains for the underwriter to "share" is
that of a change in market conditions during the short period, typically no more than a week, 18 9 required by the underwriter to complete the sale. But even here the underwriter need bear little risk;
the futures and options markets permit it to hedge the risk of market changes during the offering period. For example, if the underwriter fears that interest rates may rise while it is trying to sell a
fixed rate bond, it can eliminate all risk by selling treasury bills for
future delivery.1 90 Similar hedging of overall market conditions is
possible in equity offerings through the use of futures markets in
various stock composites."'
If distribution and risk sharing do not adequately account for
the investment banker's function, some additional factor must be
at work. Our analysis suggests that investment bankers play a
third role, that of an information and reputational intermediary,
which is particularly important in the context of new issues and
other innovations.

I" See Securities Act Rule 134(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(d) (1983) (allowing solicitation of
written indications of interest with delivery of preliminary prospectus bearing required
legend).
181 See Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra note 186, at 25 ("final settlement with the underwriters usually takes place seven to ten days after the registration statement has become
effective").
190 An increase in interest rates will result in a loss on the underwriting, because the
increase will reduce the value of the bonds. But the increase will result in a profit on the
treasury bill sale, because it will decrease the price of the treasury bills that must be purchased to make future delivery. The mechanics of this form of hedging are described in
Draper, Financial Futures for Hedging Long-Term Debt, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1983,
at 172. See Guzzardi, The Bomb I.B.M. Dropped on Wall Street, Fortune, Nov. 19, 1979, at
52 (use of hedging by first Boston and Salomon Brothers to reduce exposure in $1 billion
IBM debt offering).
91 For example, option contracts are available on the value of the Standard & Poors 500
list through the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, on the New York Stock Exchange Composite
Index through the New York Futures Exchange, and on the Value Line Composite Index
through the Kansas City Board of Trade. This strategy would not protect an underwriter
against unfavorable events affecting only the issuei of the security (unsystematic risk).
However, the detailed representations and warranties concerning its business made by the
issuer in the purchase agreement provide a hedge against such surprises during the period in
which the securities are sold. See, e.g., 6 R. Shapiro, A. Sachs & C. Olander, supra note 186,
at 1-31 to 1-35.
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Recall the problem facing an innovative issuer. Buyers find it
too expensive to determine for themselves whether the issuer's new
form of security warrants a higher price; and even if the issuer
could educate them individually, the verification problem remains.
Buyers still must be convinced of the accuracy of the information
the issuer provides. A reputable investment banker may be able to
solve both problems. Processing costs are obviously lower for a single investment banker than for a disparate group of individual
buyers. This fact reflects the savings that accrue both from collectivization and from the potential for scale and scope economies in
19 2
information processing.
From our perspective, however, the investment banker's role in
reducing verification costs is even more critical. The difficulty confronting the issuer and prospective buyers is that determining the
quality of the issuer's information is expensive ex ante, but not ex
post. Before the sale, prospective buyers must incur verification
costs to assess the issuer's good faith; after the sale, the issuer's
behavior will reveal the quality of the information at virtually no
cost. In this setting, a common technique for economizing on information costs is for sellers to make capital investments in brand
name or reputation as a means of signaling the quality of the information. By making the investment in reputation, the seller signals
its belief that when the purchaser learns the truth ex post, the
quality of the information provided by the seller ex ante will be
proved high. If the original information proves to be of low quality,
the value of the seller's investment in reputation will diminish.
Thus, the seller's investment in reputation demonstrates that it is
not in his interest to misrepresent the accuracy of its information;
and the buyer can rely upon that signal in lieu of engaging in
costly verification itself.183
The disadvantage of this economizing technique, however, is
that in many cases it may not be available to an information seller.
First, the seller may lack the capital to invest in a reputation.1 9

:"

See supra text accompanying note 147.
See supra text accompanying note 157.
Even if the seller has the capital to invest in reputation, it still may be cheaper to
"rent" a reputation depending on the size and frequency of anticipated offerings. There are
economies of scale in the creation and use of reputations.
93
194
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Second, it may lack the time to build a reputation prior to the
contemplated sale. Third, even if the seller is willing to invest the
necessary time and resources, prospective buyers may still harbor
doubts about the its good faith-an investment in reputation cannot wholly eliminate the incentive to behave opportunistically.
Suppose, for example, that an issuer contemplates going to the
capital market only once, and thereafter intends to finance its
growth internally. In that case, an investment in reputation may be
not a bond but bait, willingly lost in order to catch a more valuable
fish. The gains from opportunism may well exceed the costs of lost
reputation. Finally, each of these three difficulties-of money,
time, and lingering suspicion-are particularly acute when an issuer makes its first offering.
It is in this setting that the critical role of the investment banker
as a reputational intermediary becomes clear. In essence, the investment banker rents the issuer its reputation. The investment
banker represents to the market (to whom it, and not the issuer,
sells the security) that it has evaluated the issuer's product and
good faith and that it is prepared to stake its reputation on the
value of the innovation. Moreover, because the investment banker,
unlike the issuer, is certain to be a "repeat player" in the capital
markets, there are no final period problems to dampen the signal
of value. 9 5
The investment banker's role as an informational and reputational intermediary can dramatically affect the efficiency of the
market's response to an innovative security. As the cost of information about the security is reduced, information is more widely
distributed and, therefore, more effectively reflected in market
price. 198 Of course, the market never becomes completely efficient
,95 Baron, A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution
Services for New Issues, 37 J. Fin. 955 (1982), and Baron & Holmstrom, The Investment
Banking Contract for New Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem, 35 J. Fin. 1115 (1980), focus on a different, but related, informational role
for investment bankers. They argue that the investment banker has much better information concerning what the issuer's securities are worth than the issuer, and the resulting
asymmetry is between the banker and the issuer rather than between the issuer and the
buyer. Our focus here is on the latter asymmetry, which Baron notes but does not pursue.
Baron, supra, at 956.
196 The role of investment bankers in reducing information costs is also apparent from an
examination of their historical development. For example, Goldman Sachs & Co. had its
origin in Marcus Goldman's commercial paper business, in which he would purchase short-
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with respect to the innovative security. Information costs are always greater than zero: information concerning the innovation will
not be perfectly processed, and the investment banker's signal, itself costly, will not be perfectly credible. The market price of the
innovative security will therefore still be lower than it would be if
information costs were zero. Nonetheless, the investment banker
helps make the market more efficient than it otherwise would be.
And from our perspective, a more complete picture of the role of
this critical actor in the capital markets demonstrates the value of
understanding the relationship between information costs and
197
market efficiency.
term notes from small manufacturers for resale to banks. V. Carosso, Investment Banking in
America 19 (1970). The early development of investment banking, during periods when
more primitive communication capability-in terms of both technology and a common accounting language-served to ensure very high barriers to verification, may best be understood from the perspective of information costs. Cf. F. Allen, The Great Pierpont Morgan
70-71 (1965) (Morgan firm's unprecedented reorganization and underwriting fees justified in
large part by the enormous value of the Morgan reputation; Morgan firm's efforts to tie up
further control of reorganized railroads in voting trust was necessary to safeguard its
reputation).
" An understanding of the investment banker's cost-economizing role as a reputational
intermediary may also help unravel what Brealey & Myers have described as one of "the ten
unsolved problems in finance." R. Brealey & S. Myers, supra note 173, at 735, 738. Ibbotson,
Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues, 2 J. Fin. Econ. 235 (1975), found that
initial public offerings are significantly underpriced. An investor purchasing a portfolio of
such securities in their initial offering would earn in abnormal return of 11.4% over the
first month. The puzzle is to explain this phenomenon. Of course, the strength of the underwriter's bargaining position may reduce the prices that issuers receive for their securities.
Cf. Baron, supra note 195, at 972-74 (unseasoned issuers that are less informed about market demand for their securities are more likely to accept too low a price from investment
bankers). But the question remains as to why the investment bankers would pass the benefit on to the public.
Our approach to the puzzle begins by recognizing that underwriters, as reputational intermediaries, reduce verification costs, and so increase the value of offered securities. And
while Smith, supra note 185, has argued that competition in the market for verification from
legal, accounting and engineering firms would limit "the benefit of whatever 'expert' valuation by the investment banker associated with an underwriting . . . to the difference in
costs between certification through the underwriting process and independent certification,"
id. at 285, the fact is that there are no comparable reputational intermediaries. The certification function of lawyers, accountants and engineers, while real, see supra note 167, is substantially more limited.
In part, how the issuer and the underwriter split the increase in value arising from verification depends on competitive conditions in the market for underwriters, information asymmetries, and the costs of contracting. Baron, supra note 195. The underwriter's portion of
the increase represents a deduction from the price the issuer would receive if information
were costless and verification unnecessary. The problem, however, is that abnormal returns
to investors also represent such a deduction. Why do investment bankers content them-
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B. The Efficiency Paradox
A second theoretical application of our thesis resolves, at least in
part, the "Efficiency Paradox" developed by Sanford Grossman. 9s
In Section IIC we considered the conflict identified by Grossman
between the need for a return on investment in information and
the existence of an efficient information market. If market efficiency with respect to particular information means that one cannot earn a normal return on its acquisition, then information acselves with half a loaf, when they are apparently in a position to claim the public's share as
well?
The answer, we think, lies in the fact that the investment banker provides verification by
pledging its investment in reputation as a bond that the information offered by the issuer is
correct. But characterizing the banker's reputation as an investment raises the issue of what
form that investment takes. We argue that passing on to the customer a portion of the
return the underwriter receives for pledging its reputation is best understood as a capital
investment in reputation, a way of ensuring that the customer's ex post experience will be
consistent with the issuer's and investment banker's ex ante representations. And, like corporate image advertising, an investment in reputation is a wasting asset that requires ongoing replenishment. A reputation for accurate pricing in the past does not eliminate the need
for continued investment in the future. This analysis is consistent with competitive conditions in both the market for supplying investment banking services to issuers and the market for selling new securities to the public. It merely suggests an additional capital cost
associated with successfully operating in such markets.
That underwriters may underprice an issue in order to dispose customers favorably toward future issues is not original to us. Indeed, Ibbotson considered and rejected just such
an explanation for his empirical results: "Although this explanation is prevalent on Wall
Street, it clearly violates an efficient market framework." Ibbotson, supra, at 264. Our information cost analysis of market efficiency, however, alters the framework to which Ibbotson
refers. Positive verification costs, in the form of payments from issuers to underwriters for
acting as reputational intermediaries and payments by underwriters to customers as investments in reputation, are entirely consistent with an efficient market framework in anything
other than the frictionless world of perfect markets. Our explanation might be tested in part
by investigating whether the extent of underpricing depends on the magnitude of the investment banker's reputation.
Saul Levmore questions our explanation by pointing out that while the average abnormal
return for new issues was positive in Ibbotson's study, there was considerable variance
within the portfolio, with a substantial number of issues earning negative abnormal returns.
How good an investment in reputation can this form of underpricing be if nearly as many
customers lose as win? See Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 Va.
L. Rev. 645, 657-59 (1984). Given the difficulty of ex ante valuation, it is hardly surprising
to find such high variance. But the underwriter would have to ensure that its customers
acquired most or all of the portfolio; otherwise, the reputational effect might not be
favorable. This is, in fact, consistent with the common practice of allocating "hot issues" to
one's best customers, thereby both insuring that the investors' overall return will approximate the mean regardless of the variance, and nicely limiting the investment in reputation
to the most important audience.
108 See supra text accompanying note 90.
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quisition will cease when the market becomes efficient. No one will
invest in costly information if he cannot earn a return on it, and
the market will become inefficient again. The result will be constant disequilibrium-a vacillation between efficiency and inefficiency powered by the need for a positive return on investment as
an incentive to acquire costly information. Grossman resolved this
conflict, it will be recalled, by introducing the concept of noise: so
long as prices do not disclose -all information, there will be an
"equilibrium degree of disequilibrium" 119 somewhere short of full
efficiency.
This resolution coincides with our information cost analysis of
the mechanisms of market efficiency; the market we describe is
simply not perfectly efficient. While we do argue that an evolutionary bias pushes the market toward efficiency, the Efficiency Paradox arises only when full efficiency is achieved. Our very emphasis
on information costs recognizes that prices need not be perfectly
efficient with respect to any particular information. Nevertheless,
the central question posed by the Efficiency Paradox remains: Is
the market ever "truly" efficient with respect to any type of information? The Efficiency Paradox denies the possibility of a fully
efficient equilibrium. By contrast, our analysis in Section II of at
least two of the capital market mechanisms-universally informed
and professionally informed trading-explicitly pointed to reaching just such an efficient equilibrium at a pace contingent on the
mechanism involved. Correctly understood, however, the conflict
between these perspectives is more apparent than real.
The problem is best analyzed by returning to the evidence that a
fully efficient equilibrium does exist for at least some types of information. Recall that a substantial body of empirical literature
demonstrates that market prices efficiently reflect information
about the past prices of securities-the studies that Fama originally described as weak form tests. 20 0 These studies suggest that

trading strategies based on manipulation of past price information
cannot yield trading profits. Because information costs associated
with this type of information are so low, its distribution is virtually
universal, and we would expect the market to be efficient with respect to it. Moreover, because these results seem to hold up over
"I See Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 88, at 393; supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
0 See supra note 25.
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extended periods of time, market efficiency does not appear to oscillate or "swing" with changing levels of returns from trade. But,
if the market is stably efficient with respect to past price information, why would anyone make an investment, even a very small
one, to acquire such information? What keeps the market
efficient?
The explanation lies in the joint cost aspects of the use of the
particular information in question. Positive costs, however small,
incurred in gathering information about past prices would normally trigger the Efficiency Paradox unless traders unavoidably incur these costs as part of other investment strategies that do have
the potential to yield them positive net returns. In this case, the
market would not be efficient with respect to the other strategies,
but would be efficient with respect to past price data. The return
necessary to achieve "weak form efficiency" would come from the
lure of the other strategies. Putting the point somewhat differently, the information about past prices behaves as if it were
costless to the extent that the expenditure necessary to acquire
and process this information is made for another purpose. 201 The
market becomes completely efficient with respect to one form of
information as a result of efforts to exploit inefficiency with respect to another.
A second example of the phenomenon of informationally efficient markets, this time dealing with a type of information commonly analyzed through semi-strong form tests, further clarifies
our point. A large body of empirical literature tests the pricing effects of cosmetic accounting changes, such as the method of calculating depreciation or of accounting for an acquisition, that alter
reported earnings but not real cash flow. 20 2 These studies uni201 Of course, we do not suggest that traders must engage in chartist-type, "technical"

analysis of past prices to make full use of their investment in other information. On the
contrary, it is knowledge about the primary informational constituents of past prices that
traders must carry forward in their efforts to acquire, process, or verify new information. To
the extent that many, if not all, traders must keep abreast of the fundamental information
underlying past prices in order to value new information properly, past price information
behaves as if it were costless. Efficient market prices would require chartist-type technical
research only to the extent that this could succeed where efforts to decode the informational
constituents of past prices directly had failed. Thus far, of course, all evidence other than
the continuing practice of technical analysis militates against its utility as a form of price
decoding and supports traditional weak form price efficiency. See supra note 25.
202 These studies are exhaustively reviewed in the surveys cited supra note 12.
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formly show that the market processes such changes efficiently: it
promptly and correctly evaluates them as meaningless. But how
can prices efficiently reflect the information that a cosmetic accounting change does not alter firm value if no one can earn a return on investing in that information?
Again, the answer seems to us to depend on the cost of maintaining, rather than of first achieving, the efficient equilibrium. Assume an initial innovation: the discovery that cosmetic changes in
reported earnings do not alter firm value. The empirical literature
does not demonstrate that the originators of this insight failed to
earn a return on their efforts. Rather, it is reasonable to suppose
that they did earn an acceptable return on the information, but
that the secret was subsequently dissipated through discovery by
competitors (or even academics). So understood, the question
posed by the Efficiency Paradox is not whether incentives exist to
induce the original innovation. 03 Rather, the puzzle is to explain
how an efficient equilibirum is maintainedonce the innovation becomes so widely known that profit is no longer possible for those
who exploit it.
Our answer is the same that we offered in the analysis of past
price information. Because of joint cost characteristics, maintenance of the equilibrium is effectively costless, and the Efficiency
Paradox disappears. The costs of maintaining an equilibrium are
not the costs of discovery, but merely the costs of continuing to
reflect a prior discovery in price. Just as with past price data, these
costs are virtually zero, consistent with an efficient equilibrium,
because of their joint characteristics. Traders reflect an accomplished innovation in their pricing evaluations as an inextricable
part of their efforts to acquire or process other, still innovative,
204
information.
The importance of the joint cost characteristics suggests a more
general insight: equilibrium analysis in the information market
103 This issue focuses on whether the market is allocatively, as opposed to informationally, efficient. See Rubinstein, supra note 30, at 820-23 (discussing informational efficiency).
204 In the case of past price information, traders can fully value new information about an
individual security only through knowledge of the informational constituents of its old price.
By contrast, where traders discover the "true" effects of a genre of accounting changes, they
obtain information about the entire range of securities that are subject to these changes. In
both instances, however, the costs involved are those of maintaining an informational equilibrium rather than of initial discovery.
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must be considered in a dynamic context. The cost and return conditions necessary to induce the initial acquisition of new information are very different from the cost and return conditions necessary to maintain an efficient equilibrium with respect to that
information after it has become widely distributed. It is the incentive to acquire new information and to develop new innovations
that encourages the behavior necessary to maintain an efficient
equilibrium with respect to prior information and innovations.
Our reconciliation of the conflict between empirical evidence
suggesting the existence of efficient equilibria and the prediction
of an absence of such equilibrium derived from the Efficiency Paradox also helps to interpret a substantial number of the empirical
studies that have been used to test for the existence of market efficiency. Considering efficiency from the perspective of the costs of
maintaining an equilibrium, studies finding that the market disregards cosmetic accounting changes may well not be semi-strong
tests, as they are commonly described, but only a different type of
weak form test. Both these studies and those considering the reflection in price of past price information investigate a common
question: Is the market efficient when information costs are very
low? For real evidence of semi-strong form efficiency, we would
want to consider tests of the market response to new, and therefore
more costly, information. Not surprisingly, here the evidence suggests some level of inefficiency, which is precisely what the Efficiency Paradox would predict. 0 5

205 See, e.g., Bjerring, Lakonishok & Vermaelen, Stock Prices and Financial Analysts'

Recommendations, 38 J. Fin. 187 (1983); Givoly & Lakonishok, The Information Content of
Financial Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings: Some Evidence on Semi-Strong Inefficiency, 1 J.
Acct. & Econ. 165 (1979); Watts, Systematic 'Abnormal' Returns After Quarterly Earnings
Announcements, 6 J. Fin. Econ. 127 (1978) (abnormal returns not due to deficiencies in the
capital asset pricing model are possible from quarterly earnings announcements, if direct
transactions costs [use of a broker] can be avoided). These studies, which by and large rely
on more frequent price observations than older tests of the ECMH, indicate small but significant deviations from semi-strong form price efficiency. Such deviations are precisely
what we would expect where publicly-announced information is genuinely new and difficult
to value, and where large numbers of traders consequently elect not to invest in valuation
costs.
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Mechanisms of Market Efficiency
INSIDER TRADING, MANDATORY DISCLOSURE, AND THE
MARKET SYNTHESIS

DuAL

In the preceding section, we sought to demonstrate how our synthesis of the capital and information markets' operation provides
insight into two theoretical puzzles: the investment banker's role in
facilitating new financial products and the "Efficiency Paradox."
Our analysis of those two theoretical puzzles was intended merely
to illustrate-not exhaust-the explanatory potential of the dual
market perspective. They were selected no less for their ability to
demonstrate the disparate information market processes that operate in the high- and low-cost regions of the information cost continuum than for their intrinsic theoretical interest. In this section,
we continue in much the same spirit by analyzing two policy
problems-the regulation of insider trading and the mandatory
character of disclosure under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934-to illustrate the value of our dual market synthesis as a
framework for addressing policy issues in corporate and securities
law. As in the previous section, these two issues are not the only
ones that might profitably be addressed from the dual market perspective. 20 They are, however, particularly useful illustrations for

'" While we cannot attempt an inventory of all the other issues whose resolution might
be aided by our approach, some sense of their range may be suggested by two examples.
The first concerns the SEC's recent adoption, on a permanent basis, of shelf registration
procedures in Rule 415. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6,499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889 (1983),
reprinted in [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,449 (Nov. 17, 1983).
For the text of the new rule, see id. at 52,896, reprinted in 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3,383
(Nov. 17, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.415). One critical result of Rule 415 is to
restructure the role of the underwriter in an important class of securities offerings. In contrast to the traditional pattern in which the underwriter is selected long before the pricing
of the security and plays a central role in preparing the registration statement, see supra
text accompanying notes 181-86, Rule 415 facilitates a form of offering commonly referred
to as a "bought deal," in which the registration statement is prepared, filed, and declared
effective prior to selection of the underwriter. See Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient
Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 Va. L. Rev. 135, 148 (1984)
("bought deal"). The Rule 415 underwriter is selected only at the last moment prior to sale
of the securities, and the selection is based largely on the amount bid for the securities by
prospective underwriters. In such a transaction, of course, the underwriter cannot make any
significant investigation of the issuer and, thus, cannot play its traditional role of policing
disclosure by -the issuer. See supra note 164.
This reduction in the underwriter's role has not been without controversy. The investment banking community has objected vigorously because the Rule has enlarged the area of
explicit price competition between underwriters and, as a result, has substantially reduced
the size of the underwriting spread in offerings in which the rule is used. See, e.g., Ehrbar,
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two reasons. First, as in the case of the two theoretical puzzles considered in the preceding section, they concern information sets
that have quite different cost characteristics. Inside information is
extremely costly to everyone except the small group of insiders
who have access to it. By contrast, the accounting data contained
in SEC filings under the 1934 Act is widely distributed at little
cost to recipients. Second, scholars have already extensively analyzed both issues using the tools of modern finance theory and, in
particular, the now standard version of the ECMH. We believe
that a dual market approach has fresh insights to offer to supplement those derived from a simple application of the tools of finance theory.
The two policy discussions that follow, then, are intended to
demonstrate the utility of an analytical framework, not to provide
exhaustive consideration of our target problems or to fix on definitive solutions. Indeed, it is precisely the simple solution offered by
earlier commentators relying on finance theory, namely, complete
or partial deregulation, that unifies the separate analyses of this

Upheaval in Investment Banking, Fortune, Aug. 23, 1982, at 90. Additionally, at least one
member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Commissioner Barbara Thomas, criticized the Rule because it reduces the underwriter's role in the disclosure process. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6,423, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,799, 39,803-09 (1982), reprinted in [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,250, at 85,284-88 (Sept. 2, 1982) (Commissioner Thomas dissenting to extension and amendment of Rule 415). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 6,499, supra, at 52,897, reprinted in [Current Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,449, at 86,346-47 (Nov. 17, 1983) (Commissioner Thomas dissenting
to permanent adoption of Rule 415). We believe that our approach to the underwriters' role
in the distribution of securities, supra text accompanying notes 192-93, can be helpful both
in sorting out the controversy and in developing appropriate limits on the application of the
Rule. For example, it seems to us that both the objection to shrinking underwriting spreads
and Commissioner Thomas' concern with the due diligence role of the underwriter are best
evaluated from the perspective of the role of the underwriter as a reputational intermediary.
Identifying the settings in which reputational services are not needed may not only explain
why underwriting spreads are lower in these offerings, but may also provide the best approach to determining the appropriate breadth of the Rule's application.
A second area where a focus on the mechanisms of market efficiency can have significant
policy implications is in evaluating the development of a national market system. See supra
note 167. Our analysis of the relationship between information costs and market efficiency
suggests that market structure has a substantial impact on the cost of information, and
therefore on relative marketing efficiency. The empirical evidence is beginning to bear this
out. See Sanger & McConnell, Stock Exchange Listings, Firm Value and Security Market
Efficiency: The Impact of NASDAQ, (June 1983) (Working Paper) (prior to NASDAQ, OTC
stocks earned positive abnormal returns on announcement of stock exchange listing; abnormal returns disappeared in post-NASDAQ period).
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section. Thus, the deregulation of insider trading is often urged as
one of the few reforms with any real promise of increasing the informational efficiency of securities prices.2 0 7 Similarly, deregulation
of corporate disclosure requirements is frequently advocated as an
appropriate response to evidence that mandatory disclosure has
had little impact on the behavior of securities prices.2 08 We remain
skeptical, however, of simple deregulation solutions in both cases.
Our skepticism stems not from any great satisfaction with existing
law. Rather, it results from a straightforward application of the
dual market synthesis, which, we believe, establishes that the case
for entirely deregulating insider trading is weak, and that the case
against mandatory disclosure is far from convincing.
A.

The Insider Trading Debate

Those who advocate relaxing the prohibitions against insider
trading typically argue that such trading is not merely harmless,
but is actually beneficial in a number of respects. Our particular
concern here is the assertion that insider trading has desirable effects on the market price of the security being traded.2 0 9 For example, sell orders by insiders with unfavorable private information
are said to drive the price of the security down toward its "true"
value, the price at which it would trade if the inside information
were disclosed. A buyer of the security thereby pays a lower and
more accurate price than he or she would have paid in the absence
of insider trading.2 10 For our purposes, the argument's most interesting feature is its unstated assumption about the market dynamic by which insider trading alters the price of the security. It
seems clear that the decline in price is generally believed to be
caused by the increase in supply resulting from the insider's sell
order. The problem, however, is that this critical assumption concerning the operative market dynamic is wrong. 1 1
207
'"

z

See infra text accompanying notes 209-10.
See infra text accompanying notes 225-26.
The argument that insider trading may actually be beneficial to uninformed investors

originates with H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966). Other claims on
behalf of insider trading are discussed infra note 221.
110 This argument necessarily assumes that the uninformed trader's decision to buy the
security was not induced by the fall in the security price.
"I Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 857 (1983), do
not make this mistake. Nevertheless, they offer a quite different policy recommendation
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The error in this supply-based explanation for the price effect of
insider trading lies in its misspecification of the relevant supply.
Capital asset pricing theory teaches that a security represents only
a particular combination of expected return and systematic risk,
for which there is a vast number of substitutes. Thus, the relevant
supply for purposes of determining the impact of insider trading is
not the "float" in the particular security, but rather the total of all
other investment opportunities with a similar relationship between
risk and return. 212 The increase in the correctly specified supply
caused by an insider's sell order is simply too small to have any
but a transitory, and probably insignificant, impact on the price of
2 13
the security.
Our approach to the concept of market efficiency and the capital
market mechanisms that underlie it allows us to identify the manner in which insider trading alters security prices. The price of a
security changes as a result of new information that alters investors' expectations about the security's risk and return.2 14 Insiders
trade because private information alters their expectations. But
their trading will change the market's expectations about the security, and hence its price, only if their private information is
somehow transmitted to the market. Thus, the price effect of insider trading is an example of what we have called the derivatively
informed trading mechanism. 1 5 As a result of price or trade decod-

than we do. Cf. infra note 224.
It is unclear which mechanism Manne originally believed was responsible for the reflection of inside information in price. At times he implies, as we argue, that the critical factor
is the distribution of the information, H. Manne, supra note 209, at 82-83. At other times,
however, he seems to believe that a supply effect is responsible. Id. at 80. In a later work
that has not received the attention it deserves, Manne stresses the importance of the informational explanation and acknowledges that the supply effect was overemphasized in his
original work. H. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure under Federal Securities
Laws, in Wall Street in Transition 21, 74-79 (Manne & Solomon eds. 1974).
212 The ability of an investor to alter the risk of a security by borrowing to purchase it
further increases the supply of fungible investments.
213 See R. Brealey, supra note 65, at 35-44; Scholes, supra note 67. Easterbrook, supra
note 8,at 335-36, makes a similar point. For a related discussion, see also supra note 67 and
text accompanying notes 78-80 (Scholes study and price effects).
214 This is the disequilibrium role of information described supra text accompanying
notes 38-39.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 73-95. This observation assumes, of course, that
the number of insiders is not large enough to alter price through "weak learning." See supra
note 84. In the latter case, insider trading begins to meld with the operation of the professionally informed trading mechanism. See supra note 67.
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ing216-deducing the content of private information from transitory price fluctuations or the identity of traders-the market
"learns" the relevance of the insiders' private information from
their own trading activity, and the price of the security changes to
reflect the market's new information.2 17
Identifying the mechanism that underlies the price effects of insider trading is critical because it focuses attention on the relative
efficiency of these price adjustments. Comparatively speaking, derivatively informed trading is an inefficient capital market mechanism. Insider trading, then, often causes prices to move in the
"right" direction, just as proponents of deregulation argue. But because derivatively informed trading functions slowly and sometimes only sporadically, encouraging it is unlikely to have much
effect on the efficiency of securities prices. If we stipulate for the
moment that our sole concern is market efficiency, it hardly follows that deregulating insider trading without more is the most
promising of possible reforms. The critical policy question is not
whether to permit insider trading, but whether the derivatively informed trading mechanism can be made to operate more
efficiently.
Consider how a discussion of insider trading might proceed if it
selected market efficiency as its chief aim and built upon analysis
of the derivatively informed trading mechanism. Recall that price
decoding, the chief source of the price effects of insider trading, is
also a poor transmitter of derivative information in comparison to
trade decoding. Minor fluctuations in price and volume are inherently ambiguous or subject to noise; observations on the activity of
individual traders are much more informative. It follows that the
greater the number of uninformed traders who are able to learn
the identity of insider traders, the size of their trades, and other
derivative information, the more effectively the derivatively in-

"' See

supra text accompanying notes 77-95.

217 See supra text accompanying note 80. Price and trade decoding are complementary

processes. Among other interactions, trade decoding-by traders who are both aware of the
initial insider trading and can draw the necessary inferences from that fact-causes the
price of the security to change. This triggers price decoding by other traders who lack the
information required for successful trade decoding. Of course, if the fact that insiders are
trading is truly kept secret, and if the transitory price effects are too small to facilitate price
decoding, the inside information may not be reflected in price until it is actually discovered
or disclosed.
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formed trading mechanism will operate and the greater will be the
market's relative efficiency with respect to the inside information.
Thus, making the derivatively informed trading mechanism more
effective requires wider distribution of the information on which
the critical deductions are based, and the issue becomes how to
disclose the fact that insiders are trading and the size of the
trades.21 8 But while certain insiders are currently required by Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act to disclose their trading, 219 disclosure is required only some ten to forty days after the
trade, 220 hardly an aid to efficient operation of the derivatively informed trading mechanism. Understanding the mechanism by
which insider trading alters market price thus suggests that a serious argument for lifting the prohibition on insider trading based
on information effects must also consider a recommendation that
the insider be required to disclose, at some period before trading,
his identity and the size of the intended trade.2 21
218 It is important to distinguish this disclosure from disclosure of the inside information
itself. Although disclosure of the inside information would achieve full informational efficiency, it would also alter the incentives to create the information in the first place, thereby
raising questions of allocational efficiency. See, e.g., Hirschliefer & Riley, supra note 39, at
1404-06 (altering incentives to promote more efficient use of information will tend to reduce
incentives to produce information). To be sure, any increase in informational efficiency from
insider trading may alter the incentives to create the information because it reduces the
opportunity to exploit informational disparities through trading. Because the derivatively
informed trading mechanism does not disclose the information itself, however, it will not
reduce the returns to information creators who exploit their information through production
rather than trading, and concern over an impact on allocation is thereby minimized. Id. A
reduction in return to trading is principally important with respect to the use of insider
trading as a form of management compensation. We consider this infra note 221.
219 Trading on inside information, however, remains illegal under current law.
220 Section 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982), requires that an insider file a report of his
trading with the SEC within ten days after the trade and within ten days after the close of
the calendar month in which trading occurs.
221 Some precedent for this type of regulation, and a rough indication of how such disclosure might work, may be found in the rules governing the required filing of Form 144 prior to
the sale of restricted securities. See generally D. Goldwasser, A Guide to Rule 144 (2d ed.
1978); Fogelson, Rule 144-A Summary Review, 37 Bus. Law. 1519 (1982).
Our policy recommendation is not, however, without objection even on its own terms.
Another common justification for insider trading, also originating with Henry Manne, is
that it represents a form of compensation bargained for by insiders. H. Manne, supra note
209, at 138-41. According to this view, prohibition of insider trading simply shifts the form
but not the amount of managerial compensation-a result that, without more, hardly seems
worth the cost. And while our requirement of pre-trade disclosure does not prohibit insider
trading, it would tend to reduce the profit available from such trading precisely because the
derivatively informed trading mechanism would be more efficient. Thus, the increase in in-
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Our focus on creating institutional arrangements that increase
the effectiveness of the relevant capital market mechanism parallels the conclusions recently reported by Plott and Sunder following their examination of the performance of experimental securities markets in a laboratory environment.2 2 2 In most of the
experimental markets tested, a fraction of the traders were given
information that the other traders lacked. Thus, the experiments
tested, in part, the operation of the derivatively informed trading
formational efficiency from disclosure comes at the cost of an arguably unnecessary shift in
the form of managerial compensation. This is not the place to evaluate the overall desirability of insider trading, but even a brief consideration suggests that restricting the use of
insider trading as a form of management compensation may be beneficial in itself.
One concern is the relative lack of effective market checks on the payment of excessive
compensation through insider trading as compared to more traditional methods. Because
excessive insider trading does not alter the firm's cash flows, it need not affect firm performance in the product or capital market in ways that will significantly constrain managerial self-interest. Nor would the market for corporate control pose a sufficient check. If a
target's managers earn excessive compensation by insider trading, its attraction to potential
acquirors may rest in part on the possibility that their managers stand to gain the same
opportunity after acquisition. Eliminating insider trading might benefit the shareholders
through an increase in share price, but the acquiring company managers, by foregoing the
opportunity for insider trading, would bear the entire cost. Thus, for this purpose, the market for corporate control may operate only to shift the opportunity for excessive compensation between managers, rather than to eliminate it. Reinforcing the lack of market checks on
insider trading is the difficulty of monitoring such trading. Although more traditional methods of compensation necessarily appear in the accounting records of the firm, levels of insider trading cannot easily be determined for precisely the same reasons that prevent effective enforcement of the current prohibition. See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading
Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1980).
In addition to the greater potential for excessive payments, the use of insider trading as a
method of compensation also raises problems of perverse incentives. The literature on insider trading has long recognized that incentives concerning whether and when to disclose
new company information may be affected by the opportunity for insiders to trade before
disclosure. But the availability of insider trading also has a perverse effect on managers' risk
preferences in connection with firm investments. Giving managers the right to trade on inside information, even if only on positive information, has the effect of giving them an option that will be exercised only if positive information is produced. We know, however, that
the value of an option increases as the risk of the company's business-the variability of
return-increases. Thus, managers who can trade on inside information have an incentive to
increase the risk of the business by making more risky investments. This is not so troublesome in itself as it might, however inexactly, balance the risk aversion resulting from the
managers' undiversified human capital investment in the firm. The problem, however, is
that the incentive extends to making negative net present value investments: investments
for which the increase in risk is not matched by a commensurate increase in expected return. In this setting, managers share in the gain if the risky investments pay off, but the
shareholders bear all of the cost if they do not.
222 Plott & Sunder, Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models, 90 J. Pol. Econ. 663 (1982).
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mechanism that has structured our discussion of the informational
role of insider trading. The results of the experiments led Plott
and Sunder to the following conclusion, in which we find important support for both our overall approach and our specific policy
recommendation:
[D]iscussion of bids, offers, trader identification, and other endogenous sources of information suggests that the trading institutions
themselves may be important in determining the applicability of
the [rational expectations, i.e., efficient markets] models. Institutions can dictate the type of information available to participants.
For example, a computerized market which masks bids, offers, and
trader identity or even volume may not operate as efficiently as
3
22
one which does not.

In the end, our point is not to resolve the desirability of insider
trading here.224 We do believe, however, that the perspective
gained from our analysis of the mechanisms of market efficiency
sheds substantial light on the appropriate approach to the problem. And that, after all, is precisely our point.

223

Id. at 690 (emphasis added).

224 Informational efficiency is not itself enough to justify lifting the prohibition on insider
trading. If insiders are allowed to trade on private information, outside investors will be
systematically disadvantaged through a decrease in their expected return. As Kenneth Scott
has pointed out, investors will not play in a game in which the odds have been changed
unfavorably without a commensurate increase in payoff. Scott, Insider Trading- Rule 10b-5,
Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. Legal Stud. 801, 808 (1980). Thus, while insider trading may have no distributional impact, which was Professor Scott's point, it will increase the
cost of capital. The question then becomes whether this cost is offset by the value of compensating managers through insider trading. As our prior comments indicate, see supra note
221, we doubt that it is. A company can achieve all of the benefits of insider trading through
incentive plans keyed to stock prices or other measures of firm performance. Moreover, such
plans avoid the monitoring problems associated with insider trading. Indeed, we believe that
it is in fact the high cost of monitoring insider trading that answers the rhetorical question
commonly put as an argument in favor of insider trading- If insider trading is actually detrimental to companies, why do we see so few private contracts prohibiting it? See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 211; Dooley, supra note 221, at 48-49. If effective monitoring requires computerized surveillance of the entire trading market, see Noble, How the S.E.C.
Watches Stocks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1984, at D1, col. 4, free rider analysis would counsel in
favor of collective monitoring and enforcement-i.e., a legally imposed prohibition. For a
careful and sophisticated exposition of the opposite perspective, see Carlton & Fischel,
supra note 211.

1984]

Mechanisms of Market Efficiency
B.

The 1934 Act Mandatory Disclosure Debate

Proponents of abandoning or curtailing the duty to file disclosure reports under the Securities Exchange Act 215 join critics of insider trading prohibitions in preferring an unregulated information
market to the current regulatory regime. Unlike the critics of insider trading rules, however, the proponents of relaxing mandatory
disclosure do not argue that deregulation will increase the informational efficiency of prices; rather, they argue only that it will decrease issuer filing costs while leaving the amount and quality of
information largely unaffected. 226 Disclosure under the 1934 Act is
said to be an unsuccessful attempt to collectivize information
costs. An unregulated information market would result in dissemination of much the same information to traders at lower cost.
Expressed in such general terms, this conclusion is extremely
difficult to evaluate, not only because of the empirical uncertainties surrounding the costs and benefits of 1934 Act disclosure, but
also because these variables themselves depend on the particular
disclosure that is required.2 27 For our purposes, however, a final
verdict on mandatory disclosure is of less interest than a single key
assumption that shapes the terms of the debate: the belief that
whether mandatory disclosure successfully economizes on information costs can be determined on the basis of the behavior of securities prices. This assumption structures the evidence deployed by

225

Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982), currently

requires all publicly-held corporations having a class of securities listed on a national securities exchange, or having 500 shareholders and $1,000,000 in assets, to file annual Form 10-K
reports, quarterly Form 10-Q reports, and periodic Form 8-K reports. Form 10-K includes
certified financial statements and certain other qualitative information specified in Regulation S-K; Form 10-Q chiefly requires abbreviated quarterly accounting data; and Form 8-K,
which must be filed 15 days after the occurrence of certain materially important corporate
events, requires a brief description of the triggering event. For examples of Forms 10-Q, 10K, and 8-K, see 6 R. Shapiro, A. Sachs, & C. Olander, supra note 186, Forms 1-29 to 1-31, at
1-300 to 1-349.
226 E.g., H. Kripke, supra note 1, at 106-39; S.Phillips & J. Zecher, supra note 150, at 2751; Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am. Econ. Rev. 132 (1973).
'27 For example, one of the chief consequences of the recent Advisory Committee Report,
supra note 3, was to move the Commission toward a more permissive position on the voluntary disclosure of "soft," or forecast, information. The Commission's reluctance to allow, let
alone require, disclosure of this type of information has been a significant element in some
of the arguments directed against the cost-effectiveness of mandated disclosure. See, e.g., H.
Kripke, supra note 1, at 106-39.
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both critics and supporters of the 1934 Act in two important ways.
It does so initially in the weight assigned to semi-strong form
ECMH tests demonstrating that prices reflect most of the informational content of 1934 Act filings before the forms are actually
filed. 22s It also does so in the significance attached to time series
data, gathered by George Benston, on the behavior of securities
prices before and after the passage of the 1934 Act. 2 9 Because the
assumption is particularly central to Benston's analysis, we examine it in the context of his work.
In brief, Benston compared the behavior of stock prices before
and after the passage of the 1934 Act for two groups of corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange: firms that voluntarily disclosed their sales figures prior to the 1934 Act, and firms
that disclosed their sales only after the 1934 Act made disclosure
mandatory.3 0 Using the now standard cumulative abnormal return
methodology to control for the effect of market-wide influences on
stock prices, Benston found that the differential impact of
mandatory disclosure of sales data on the two groups did not result
in differential effects on their share prices. Specifically, neither
228 See, e.g., Benston, supra note 226, at 137-41 (critical of disclosure); Friend & Wester-

field, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: Comment, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 467, 467-70
(1975) (supporting disclosure).
229 Benston, supra note 226, at 141-53. For critical discussion of the Benston study, see
Friend & Westerfield, supra note 228, and Benston's reply, Required Disclosure and the
Stock Market: Rejoinder, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 473 (1975). See also Seligman, The Historical
Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. Corp. L. 1 (1983). The Benston
study occupies a central position in recent securities scholarship because it is the first and
most influential time series analysis of the effects of the 1934 Act. More recent scholarship
continues to probe time series data for possible effects of the 1934 Act on securities returns,
but it has not thus far altered the key terms of the debate between Benston and his critics.
See, e.g., Ingram & Chewning, The Effect of Financial Disclosure Regulation on Security
Market Behavior, 58 Acct. Rev. 562 (1983) (observing temporal shift in securities returns
associated with passage of the 1934 Act); Chow, The Impacts of Accounting Regulation on
Bondholder and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of the Securities Acts, 58 Acct. Rev. 485
(1983) (rejecting hypothesis that 1934 Act redistributed wealth between shareholders and
bondholders).
The Securities Act of 1933, which imposes mandatory disclosure in connection with the
issuance of new securities, has also been the subject of several time series studies, beginning
with the pioneering investigation by Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37
J. Bus. 117 (1964). See also Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the
Market for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. & Econ. 613 (1981). Although these studies reach
conclusions similar to Benston's, we leave discussion of the 1933 Act for another day in light
of the comparatively greater institutional complexity of new issue disclosure.
23 Benston, supra note 226, at 142.
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group showed significant changes in its aggregate rate of return to
investors after the passage of the Act,23 1 there were no significant
differences in the Act's effects on the volatility of stock prices between the two groups,2 3 2 and following mandatory disclosure no
significant differences emerged in thdsensitivity of the two groups'
stock prices to market-wide, systematic influences. 233 Largely on
the basis of these results, Benston argued that the financial data
generated by 1934 Act filings were of little value to investors, and
that, therefore, "[there appears to have been little basis for the
[1934] legislation and no evidence that it was needed or
' 23
desirable.

Yet both this conclusion and the voluminous debate that it has
triggered presume that any positive effects resulting from 1934 Act

"' More precisely, Benston's examination of the performance of the stock of disclosure
and nondisclosure firms following passage of the Act revealed that neither group of stocks
earned significant cumulative abnormal returns during the transition period when 1934 Act
disclosure was implemented. Id. at 147-48. This methodology aggregates the extent to which
the monthly returns for each stock differed from that predicted by an optimal measure of
the stock's sensitivity to systematic, market-wide influences on price. Recall that the capital
asset pricing model postulates that share prices are a linear function of systematic risk. The
"normal" returns on a security, therefore, will be randomly distributed around expected
returns that are calculated on the basis of the security's distinctive sensitivity to marketwide price changes (the security's "beta"). Benston, in effect, showed that returns on both
the disclosure and the non-disclosure securities remained "normal" during the start-up of
disclosure, suggesting that the onset of mandatory disclosure of sales data had no unanticipated impact. If, alternatively, managers of nondisclosing firms had withheld sales information prior to mandatory disclosure in order to deceive the market about the riskiness of
their firms, the onset of mandatory disclosure might have been expected to result in negative abnormal returns as the market reflected the previously unanticipated bad news. See id.
at 144.
2
"Price volatility" here refers to the variance in a stock's prices that could not be predicted by each stock's characteristic sensitivity to market-wide price influences ("beta").
Presumably the release of previously undisclosed information about the non-disclosing firms
might either increase or decrease price volatility. Benston, for example, speculated that disclosure of unanticipated information might increase price volatility if it misled traders to
underestimate the unsystematic risk of securities. Benston, supra note 226, at 144. By contrast, wider distribution of information as a result of mandatory disclosure might decrease
price volatility because it would trigger more effective capital market mechanisms. In fact,
Benston found no significant differences in volatility between the securities of disclosing
and non-disclosing firms. Id. at 141-49.
233 "Market-wide systematic influences on price" refers here to each individual security's
"beta." See supra note 228. Newly-disclosed information might be expected to alter a stock's
beta if it led to revised expectations about the stock's sensitivity to market-wide economic
influences. Benston, supra note 226, at 144.

"

Id. at 153.
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disclosure must register in price behavior. 3 Our analysis of the
capital and information markets leads us to conclude that this is
not the case. Although a positive price response to the 1934 Act
would confirm that informational benefits flow from mandatory
disclosure, 238 an absence of price response can tell us very little
about the Act's actual effect. The reason is simple. Unless the information to be disclosed under the 1934 Act was either very costly
or wholly unavailable to the market before the Act, we would not
expect the Act to have any immediate effect on securities prices
because the capital market efficiency mechanisms are likely to
have caused the information to be reflected in price even before
the Act's passage. This alone, however, does not establish that the
1934 Act was without benefit. Mandatory disclosure might still
have created substantial savings for informed traders by collectivizing some of the costs of acquiring, processing, and verifying information that traders had independently expended prior to the Act's
passage. In short, a plausible explanation of the effects of the 1934
Act is that it increased the net returns to informed traders rather
than their gross returns, through savings on investment in information rather than through increases in trading profits. Any such
net gain would not have been reflected in Benston's analysis.
This observation leads us to a simple hypothesis about which
market participants benefited most from mandatory disclosure. In
1934 as well as today, the most likely potential winners from such
disclosure were, and are, members of the professional trading community. Assuming that prices prior to 1934 efficiently reflected
sales data, and quite possibly all other information that was subsequently disseminated through 1934 Act filings, the market mechanism most likely to be responsible for such a high degree of relative efficiency in pre-Act prices must have been professionally
235 Quite remarkably, neither Benston nor his critics have thus far considered why this
should be so; that is, they have not explained why we should always expect even major
information cost savings to generate less volatile or more "honest" securities prices. See I.
Friend, Economic and Equity Aspects of Securities Regulations 19-27 (University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School Working Paper No. 7-82) (June 1982); N. Gonedes & N. Dopuch,
Capital Market Equilibrium, Information Production, and Selecting Accounting Techniques: Theoretical Framework and Review of Empirical Work, in Studies on Financial Accounting Objectives: 1974, at 48, 93-96 (1974).
2 Benston's focus on sales disclosure, see supra text accompanying note 230, does not
preclude the possibility that other information made available by mandatory disclosure
might have affected securities prices.
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informed trading. To be sure, professionally informed trading was
doubtlessly assisted by derivatively informed and uninformed
trading. 2 7 Moreover, the professionals of 1934 were less specialized
and sophisticated than today's professionals; they undoubtedly
viewed themselves as members of the Wall Street "club" rather
than as analysts of securities. Nonetheless, prior to 1934, the professional community could have succeeded in acquiring or surmising the information that the Act subsequently required issuers to
file, at least for accounting items as important as sales and for
firms large enough to be listed on the NYSE.
The crucial difference between the pre-Act and the post-Act periods, then, would only have been one of cost. After the Act, the
same information that Wall Street traders had always acquired
2 s8
would simply have become cheaper to obtain, process and verify.

From this perspective, the Act's passage is analogous to the introduction of a new piece of hardware-for example, a new computer-that reduces the costs to traders of processing information.
The first professional trader to acquire such a device would increase his net earnings, because the new computer would enable
him to process the same amount of trading information at a lower
cost. Indeed, even if all professional traders acquired computers,
each would increase his or her net earnings because lower processing costs would add to the net returns of the entire community of
professional traders. Only when the higher profits attracted additional competition in the form of new entrants would the earnings
of individual traders return to their pre-innovation levels. 3 9 In
principle, there is no difference between this computer hypotheti217 See supra text accompanying notes 73-123 (derivatively informed and uninformed

trading mechanisms). The absence of significant differences in price behavior between "disclosure" and "nondisclosure" stocks in the periods before and after passage of the Act suggests the importance of professionally informed trading. Not only would derivatively informed and uninformed trading presumably have resulted in less efficient aggregate prices
for the nondisclosure stocks prior to 1934, but they would also have generated greater volatility for these shares. See supra note 119.
:38 Benston has recently acknowledged the potential for SEC administration of 1934 Act
disclosure to reduce the information costs of market professionals. See G. Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure in the UK and the USA 169-70 (1976).
" This prospect assumes an absence of entry barriers. Note also that when higher net
returns to brokers and other professional traders are "competed away," the net returns to
lay investors who use the services of these professionals will increase, ultimately resulting in
an increase in securities prices. Any such delayed price effect, however, will be extremely
gradual, and thus quite unlike the sharp price impact anticipated by Benston's analysis.
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cal and the imposition in 1934 of mandatory disclosure, except that
issuers rather than traders bear the information costs under a
mandatory disclosure system, and therefore the ultimate efficiency
of the system depends on whether collectivization
actually results
240
in a reduction in overall information costs.
We conclude that the disclosure provisions of the 1934 Act may
have initially operated-whatever the beliefs of its proponents and
critics-as a form of relief legislation for professional traders, with
little or no immediate value to issuers or to the ostensible beneficiaries of the Act, the uninformed investing public.241 Of course, we
cannot say whether the potential savings in information cost conferred on the market professionals of 1934 were significant, still
less whether they outweighed the disclosure costs imposed on issuers by the Act. 24 2 Moreover, even if we knew the answers to these
questions, the dual market perspective suggests that they would
have little relevance for the debate over mandatory disclosure today. The information market infrastructure has evolved dramatically since 1934 in ways that arguably might either diminish or en240 This seems plausible because issuers are the lowest cost producers of such information,
and collectivization of production eliminates the costs of repetitive production.
211 This observation about the 1934 Act disclosure system's beneficiaries is less surprising
than it may at first appear, given Wall Street's heated opposition to the Act. See J. Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 85-99 (1982). Such opposition, however, came
largely from a coalition of lead underwriters and major issuers. Id. In the 1930's, specialized
trading interests still lacked an independent political voice. By 1964, however, security analysts and other trading professionals had gained independent clout, and they enthusiastically welcomed the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565
(1964). These amendments expanded the coverage of mandatory disclosure from exchangetraded securities to most over-the-counter stocks as well. J. Seligman, supra, at 311-12.
Note that we make no claims about the conscious intentions of the Act's drafters and
supporters, or about the potential indirect benefits of a vigorous professional trading community for lay investors or the public at large. Cf. supra note 239 (possibility of delayed
impact on securities prices). Our only observation is that market professionals rather than
lay investors stood to gain in the first instance from 1934 Act mandatory disclosure, and
they apparently believe that they have. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63 (security
analysts are end users of disclosure documents).
242 Conceivably a time series study of, for example, returns to brokerage houses during
the 1930's might shed light on the extent of cost savings to market professionals. The credibility of this approach, however, may be compromised by the likely effects of the Great
Depression on trading income. A more promising approach might be to compare the net
trading returns before and after the Act of two groups of brokers: those with low cost access
to undisclosed information and those without such access. Our hypothesis would predict
that the disparity between these two groups would diminish after the Act's passage.
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hance the gross informational benefits of mandatory disclosure. 24 3
Perhaps the only circumstance that has remained unchanged since
1934 is that market professionals are the primary potential beneficiaries of mandatory disclosure. This accounts in part, we suspect,
for the overwhelming support that the securities industry gave expansion of the disclosure system in 1964,244 as well as for the generally high esteem in which the industry holds most SEC disclosure activities.
If our hypothesis is correct, there may not be any accurate
method to ascertain the gross benefits of mandatory disclosure today other than by abandoning some or all of the disclosure system
and observing the long-term effects on the information acquisition
costs of market professionals. Short of such Draconian surgery,
something might be learned through careful institutional studies of
how securities analysts actually employ 1934 Act disclosure data.
Yet even this type of research, while potentially illuminating,
would be deficient in two respects: one would still not know the
extent to which issuers would provide equally credible information
if mandatory disclosure were abandoned; and one would not know
the extent to which filing obligations serve ex ante to verify information already released to market professionals through less formal channels. Ironically, Benston himself noted the latter point 45
in acknowledging the limited utility of semi-strong form test data:

243 A variety of factors, including the increase in size of the professional trading community, the impact of computer technology and new techniques in securities analysis, and a
greater willingness on the part of issuers voluntarily to disclose information, suggest that
mandatory disclosure may accomplish significantly less today than it did in the 1930's. See,
e.g., H. Kripke, supra note 1, at 117-33. On the other hand, the far broader coverage of
mandatory disclosure today, with over 10,000 firms required to report as compared to a few
hundred in the 1930's, and the fact that securities analysts are able to follow closely only a
fraction of all reporting firms, suggest that the beneficial effects of disclosure may actually
be greater today than in the earlier period. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 3, at
XVIII-XIX, 91-92 (1,000 of 10,000 reporting companies followed by analysts). But see H.
Kripke, supra note 1, at 126-28 (Advisory Committee figures too low, small companies either
want to attract analyst attention or support too little trading activity to justify disclosure).
244 See supra note 241.
145 Benston and other critics of mandatory disclosure have also considered the prospect
that the unregulated market would force voluntary disclosure at levels comparable to today's levels of mandatory disclosure. See, e.g., H. Kripke, supra note 1, at 126-68; Benston,
Required Periodic Disclosure Under the Securities Acts and the Proposed Federal Securities
Code, 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 1471 (1979); Grossman, supra note 154; Verrecchia, Discretionary
Disclosure (August, 1983) (Working Paper No. 101, Center for Research in Security Prices).
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Even though the [test] evidence reviewed does indicate that the
financial reports required by the SEC, when made available, have
almost no information content, this does not prove that the required disclosure is not valuable to investors. One might argue that
the statements provide a confirmation of data previously released.
Because investors know that a corporation's sales, operating expenses, extraordinary gains and losses, assets and liabilities will be
reported, they may have some assurance that the preliminary re24
ports, press releases, etc., are not prevarications. ,
Benston comes very close to acknowledging that the amount and
character of available information depends on the complex continuous variable of cost, rather than on the dichotomous circumstance
of whether or not disclosure is mandated. But he rejects this insight in his later conclusion that the 1934 Act had no economizing
effects at all. By contrast, if mandatory disclosure is viewed
through the lens of a theory of efficiency mechanisms that operate
in both the capital and the information markets, the inconclusive
implications of Benston's findings emerge clearly.
As the preceding discussion indicates, however, the dual market
perspective does not simplify policy analysis of mandatory disclosure any more than it leads to definitive recommendations about
the proper regulation of insider trading. In both cases, the net effect of our analysis is to complicate policy considerations with new
sources of potential cost and benefit and new possibilities for regulatory innovation. We believe, however, that these complications
are a small price to pay for an analytical framework that places
policy discussion on a firm theoretical footing.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The nature and extent of informational efficiency in the capital
market has been a focus of academic inquiry for at least twentyfive years now. Although for much of that period research efforts
have focused primarily on empirical testing, more recent work has
turned toward providing a cogent theoretical account of the
processes by which new information is reflected in price. Our own
efforts to explain how the capital and information markets jointly
operate to determine the relative efficiency of securities prices is in
246

Benston, supra note 226, at 141. From a dual market perspective, assurances against

issuer "prevarication" are merely devices for reducing verification costs.
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part an illustration of this shift in emphasis and in part an attempt
to offer an analytical synthesis of its achievements thus far. At this
point, however, it is tempting to step back from our focus on the
capital market and consider briefly whether our analysis has explanatory value beyond the specialized world of securities traders.
Markets, after all, are pervasive phenomena; they mediate the allocation of far more than capital. Moreover, the extent of informational efficiency is surely a central determinant of the pricing behavior and institutional underpinnings of all markets, and not
merely of the securities markets. Our analysis, then, is only part of
a broader inquiry into the functioning of markets in general. That
inquiry, stated generically, examines the joint interaction of product or service markets and the associated markets in information
about the product or service.
Conclusions are an appropriate place for optimism. We are convinced, at least at this preliminary stage, that a continuum of market mechanisms keyed to the broad or narrow distribution of trading information is a general analytical tool with value for
understanding a wide spectrum both of markets and of their attendant institutional supports. 47
247 Consider how the dual market perspective, with its focus on the reduction of information costs, might inform inquiry into the behavior of such otherwise idiosyncratic markets as
that for the sale of residential real estate. The real estate market, like the capital market,
has specialized institutional actors whose roles, at least superficially, are quite unlike any we
have considered thus far. Nevertheless, even these seem susceptible to better understanding
through examination of their efforts to economize on information costs. Real estate brokers,
for example, collectivize the costs of acquiring information because they are repeat players
in a market where the principal traders are single transactions novices. Professional brokers
also serve in a capacity akin to that of professional traders in securities markets in that they
"police" housing prices. Brokers are driven not by the lure of arbitrage profits, as in the
securities markets, but rather by the incentive to maximize their own commissions by setting the price of housing neither so low as to forego income nor so high that a house will not
sell. In this sense, real estate brokers play an advisory role that grows out of the informational asymmetry between broker and seller as a result of differential information costs that
Baron and Holmstrom have identified for investment bankers in the capital market. See
Baron & Holmstrom, supra note 195.
A second example of an information cost perspective on the real estate market involves
verification, rather than acquisition costs. We would expect the costs of verifying information to be quite high in the real estate market if either buyers or sellers were to attempt to
resolve verification costs individually. Sellers have a powerful incentive to behave opportunistically in a one-shot, high-stakes transaction, and the very fact that the seller does not
engage in recurrent sales precludes the use of reputation or other bonding devices as means
of reducing verification costs. These considerations, together with the economies of scale
that result from the specialized use of human capital, suggest that the real estate market
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would prove fertile ground for the development of third-party informational experts akin to
accountants in the capital market. This expectation is confirmed by the common use of
expert pest control and structural inspections as part of the real estate transaction. In turn,
the availability of such low cost verification techniques, as well as the easily observable
nature of the facts subject to verification, may explain why real estate brokers, despite substantial efforts directed at building a reputation for professionalism and integrity, do not
function as reputational intermediaries the same way that investment bankers do in the
securities market. See supra text accompanying notes 189-93. In the real estate market less
costly verification techniques dominate.
We may also speculate as to the particular market mechanisms that operate in the market
for residential real estate. One would expect to find processes resembling both universally
informed trading and professionally informed trading, the latter largely because of the professional broker's pricing function. But it is unlikely that derivatively informed trading
plays a significant role, because most trading information that bears on price in the real
estate market is asset specific. Such information is of. value only to the pricing of a single
house that enters the market very infrequently. The seller, then, is always in the position of
an insider with information that the buyer is unlikely to discover through the market itself.
This apparent failure of a market mechanism to reflect information in price is ameliorated,
however, by the relative ease with which buyers can independently duplicate the seller's
inside information. Because that information most likely bears on the physical condition of
the house, it can be independently acquired and verified at modest expense through fihsthand or expert inspection. And when the seller does know of a latent condition that inspection would not reveal, the law collectivizes verification costs by imposing on the seller a legal
duty to disclose and backing that duty with a buyer's remedy for fraud. See J. Calamari & J.
Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 9-20, at 289-90 (2d ed. 1977) (general rule is that seller of
land is under obligation to disclose latent defects). In short, information costs are not as
high as one might initially expect and derivatively informed trading is not necessary.

